So that all _that_ which we call different faculties, tempers, and passions, strictly speaking, means nothing else, but the various acts of one and the same rational principle, which has different names, according to the objects that it acts upon, and the manner of its acting.
In some things it is called speculative, in others it is called practical reason. And we may as justly think our speculative reason is a different faculty from our practical reason, as that our aversions, or likings, are not as fully to be ascribed to our reason, as syllogisms and demonstrations.
* It was truly reason that made _Medea_ kill her children, that made _Cato_ kill himself, that made Pagans offer human sacrifices to idols; that made _Epicurus_ deny a providence, _Mahomet_ pretend a revelation; that made some men sceptics, others bigots; some enthusiasts, others profane; that made _Hobbes_ assert all religion to be human invention, and _Spinosa_ to declare trees, and stones, and animals to be parts of God; that makes free-thinkers deny freedom of will, and fatalists exhort to a reformation of manners; that made _Vaux_ a conspirator, and _Ludlow_ a regicide; that made _Muggleton_ a fanatic; and _Rochester_ a libertine. It was as truly reason that did all these things, as it is reason that demonstrates mathematical propositions.
_Medea_ and _Cato_ acted as truly according to the judgment of their reason at that time, as the confessor that chuses rather to suffer, than deny his faith.
Had not _Medea_ and _Cato_ thought it best to do what they did, at the time they did it, they would no more have done it than the _confessor_ would chuse to suffer rather than deny his faith, unless he had judged best so to do.
And when we say reason governs the passions, it means no more, than that reason governs itself; that it acts with deliberation and attention, does not yield to its first judgments, but uses second, and third thoughts.
So that guarding against the passions, is only guarding against its own first judgments and opinions; that is guarding against itself.
To all this may, perhaps, be objected, that our passions arise from bodily motions, and depend upon the state of our blood and animal spirits, and therefore what we do under their commotions, cannot be attributed to our reason.
It is readily granted, that the body has this share in our passions and tempers: but then the same thing must be granted of the body, in all the acts and operations of the mind. So that if our desires and aversions cannot be imputed to our reason, because of the joint operation of the animal spirits in them; no more can syllogisms and demonstrations be attributed to our reason, because the operation of bodily spirits concurreth in the forming of them.
For the most abstract thought, and speculation of the mind, has as truly the _conjunct_ operation of bodily spirits, as our strongest desires or aversions. And it is as much owing to the state of the body, that such speculations are what they are, as it is owing to the state of the body, that such passions are what they are.
For the motions of the bodily spirits are inseparable from, and according to, the state and action of the mind: when reason is in speculation of a trifle, they concur but weakly; when reason speculates intensely, their operation is increased. And sometimes the attention of the mind is so great, and has so engaged and called in all the animal spirits to its assistance, that the operations of our senses are suspended, and we neither see, nor feel, till the attention of the mind has let the spirits return to all the parts of the body.
Now will any one say, that these intense thoughts are less the acts of the mind, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits, than when it is acting with indifference, and so has a lesser quantity of bodily spirits?
Yet this might as well be said, as to say, that the assent or dissent, in speculation, is the act of our reason; but liking or disliking, loving or hating, are not the acts of our reason, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits.
For, as the mind is in a different state when it desires good, or fears evil, from what it is when it only compares two triangles; so the motions of the bodily spirits, have only _such_ a difference, as is _correspondent_ to these two states of the mind. They act and join as much in comparing the triangles, as in the desire of good, or fear of evil. And the mind is just as much governed by the body, in its passions, as in its calmest contemplations.
For as the gentle operation of the animal spirits is then correspondent to the state and action of the mind; so in all our passions, the strong and increased motion of the animal spirits, is equally correspondent thereto.
So that reason is no more the agent, in our tempers and passions, than in our dry and sedate speculations.