a Acts iii. τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, 12. "εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς εἰς " ἔπαινον δόξης 1
19, Vii. 19;
c Here only.
αὐτοῦ 3 τοὺς “ προηλπικότας "ἐν τῷ χριστῷ
ὅν 13. ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς,"
d1 Cor. xv. 19; Ps. xxxii. 21.
Lens δοξ. A, al., Chr., Thdrt., Oec.; text {BDEFGKLP 1, 35, 48, 57, all Eus.
Cyr., Dam., Th!
2 After δοξ. omit αντον D'FG, ἆ, e, g, Tert.
5 rous to xp. om. 115; Tw Om. FG 1, 50.
‘For υμεις, ἡμεις N°AKL 13, 39, 44-6, all Thl., Oec,
harmony with the import of the other passives in the paragraph; sustained, perhaps, by the use of προσκληροῦν in Acts xvii. 4, where the idea is rather that of being allotted to Paul as disciples than that of joining their lot (AV and RV = “ consorted with”) with Paul ; and, in par- ticular, as suggested by the els τὸ εἶναι that follows—els τὸ ἔχειν rather than εἰς τὸ εἶναι being what would naturally follow the statement of an inheritance which we τεςεϊνεά.---προορισθέντες κατὰ πρόθεσιν : having been foreordained ac- cording to the purpose. The fact that we were made the heritage of God is thus declared to have been no incidental thing, not an event belonging only to time or one having its explanation in ourselves, but a change in our life founded on and resulting from the eternal foreordaining purpose of God Himself. The purpose of God is expressed here by the term πρόθεσις, the radical idea in which is that of the setting of a thing before one. It occurs six times in the Pauline Epistles, and is not confined to one class of these, but appears alike in the Primary Epistles, the Epistles of the Captivity, and the Pas- toral Epistles (Rom. viii. 28, ix. 11; Eph. i. 11, iii. 11; 2 Tim.i.9, iii. 1ο). Outside these Epistles it occurs only twice in the NT, both times in Acts (xi. 23, xxvii. 13) and of human purpose.—rov τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος: of Him who worketh all things. The πάντα has the absolute sense, and is not to be restricted to the ‘all things” that belong to the Divine grace and redemption. The foreordination of men to a special re- lation to God is connected with the foreordination of things universally. The God of the chosen is the God of the universe; the p which is the ground of our being made God’s heritage is the purpose that embraces the whole plan of the world ; and our position as the κλῆρος and possession of God has behind it both the sovereignty and the efficiency of the Will that energises or is operative in all things.—xata τὴν βουλὴν
τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ : after the counsel of his will, The distinction between
ονλή and θέλημα is still much de- bated, scholars continuing to take pre- cisely opposite views of it. On the one hand, there are those who hold that θέλειν and its cognates express the will as proceeding from inclination, and that βούλεσθαι and its cognates express the will as proceeding from deliberation (Grimm, Wilke, Light., etc.). On the other hand, there are those who contend that θέλειν is the form that conveys the idea of deliberation and βούλεσθαι that which carries with it the idea of inclina- tion. In many passages it is difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate any real distinction, the terms being often used indiscriminately. But in connections like the present it is natural to look for a dis- tinction, and in such cases the idea of intelligence and deliberation seems to attach to the βουλή. This a s to be supported by the usage which pre- vails in point of fact in the majority of NT passages, and in particular by such occurtences as Matt. i. 19. Here, there- fore, the will of God which acts in His foreordaining purpose or decree, in bei declared to have its βουλή or ‘counsel, is set forth as acting not arbitrarily, but intelligently and by deliberation, not without reason, but for reasons, hidden it may be from us, yet proper to the Highest Mind and Most Perfect Moral Nature. ‘ They err,” says Hooker, with reference to this passage, ‘‘who think that of God's will there is no reason ex- cept His will” (Ecc. Pol., i., 2). It is also implied in this statement that the Divine foreordination, whether of things universally or of men’s lots in particular, is neither a thing of necessity on the one hand nor of caprice on the other, but a thing of freedom and of thought; and further, that the reasons for that fore- ordination do not lie in the objects them- selves, but are intrinsic to the Divine Mind and the free determination of the Divine Will.