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11 Cor. iii ἔχοντες γάλακτος, καὶ οὐ στερεᾶς τροφῆς.
2) εἰ κιν.
13. ' πᾶς γὰρ ὁ μετέχων
20; Eph γάλακτος, ἄπειρος λόγου δικαιοσύνης" νήπιος γάρ ἐστι: 14. τελείων
Iv. τά.
only receive the simplest nourishment. Milk represents traditional teaching, that which has been received and digested by others, and is suitable for those who have no teeth of their own and no suf- ficiently strong powers of digestion. This teaching is admirably adapted to the first stage of Christian life, but it cannotform mature Christians. For this, στερεὰ τροφή is essential.
Ver. 13. πᾶς yap... νήπιος γάρ ἐστι. ‘For every one who partakes of milk [as his sole diet] is without ex- perience of the word of righteousness ; for he is a babe.” The reference of yap is somewhat obscure. It seems in- tended to substantiate the last clause of ver. 12: “ Ye cannot receive solid food, for you have no experience of the word of righteousness”. But he softens the state- ment by generalising it. Every one that lives on milk is necessarily unacquainted with the higher teaching, which is now λόγος Suk. ἄπειρος having no experi- ence of, ignorant ; as κακότητος ἄπειροι, Empedocles in Fairbanks, Phjl. of Greece, p. 202. ἄπειρος ἀγρεύειν, Ba- brius, lxix. 2; ἄπ. τοῦ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, An- tiphon, Jebb, p. δ. λόγου δικαιοσύνης, with teaching of righteous conduct the suckling has nothing to do; he cannot act for himself, but can merely live and grow; he cannot discern good and evil, and must take what is given him. Righteousness is not within the suck- ling’s horizon. He cannot as yet be taught it; still less can he be a teacher of it (ver. 12) νήπιος yap ἐστι, for he cannot even speak [νη-ἔπος-- Ιπίαης], he is an infant. The infant can neither understand nor impart teaching regard- ing a life of which he has no experience, and whose language he does not know. Indirectly, this involves that the higher instruction the writer wished to deliver was important because of its bearing on conduct. [Other interpretations abound. Chrysostom and Theophylact understand the reference to be either to the Christian life or to Christ Himself and the know- edge of His person. Others, as Beza, Liinemann, and many others, take it as ‘a periphrasis for Christianity or the Gospel, inasmuch as the righteousness which avails with God is precisely the contents of the Gospel”. Riehm also thinks that the Gospel is meant, ‘“ be-
δέ ἐστιν ἡ στερεὰ τροφὴ, τῶν διὰ Thy ἕξιν τὰ αἰσθητήρια yeyupva-
cause it leads to righteousness”. West- cott understands it of the “ teaching which deals at once with the one source of righteousness in Christ, and the means. by which man is enabled to be made partaker of it”. The view of Carpzov,,. and also that of Bleek, is governed by the connection of Melchizedek with righteousness in vii. 2.]
Ver. 14. τελείων δὲ. . . . ‘ But solid food is for the mature, those who, by reason of their mental habits, have their senses exercised to discern good and evil.”” τέλειος commonly opposed in classical and Biblical Greek to νήπιος;. as in Polyb. v. 29, 2, ἐλπίσαντες ὡς. παιδίῳ νηπίῳ χρήσασθαι τῷ Φιλίππῳ, εὗρον αὐτὸν τέλειον ἄνδρα. Cf. Eph. iv. 13; and Xen., Cyr., viii. 7,3. They are here further defined as τῶν... κακοῦ. ἕξις [from ἔχω, as habitus from habeo], a habit of body, or of mind; as in Plato, Laws (p. 666), τὴν ἐμμανῆ ἕξιν τῶν νέων. Also, p. 966, ᾿Ανδραπόδου yap τινα ov λέγεις ἕξιν. Aristotle (Nic. Eth. ii. 5) determines that virtue is neither a δύναμις nor a πάθος, but a ἕξις, a faculty being something natural and innate, while virtue is not. Plutarch (Moral., 443), following him, defines ἕξις as ἰσχὺς . . « ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγινομένη, which resembles Quintilian’s definition (x. I, 1), “firma quaedam facilitas, quae apud Graecos ἕξις nominatur’’. Aristotle (Categor., viii. 1) distinguishes ἕξις from διάθεσις, τῷ πολὺ χρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον, but elsewhere he uses the words as equivalents. Longinus (xliv. 4) uses it of faculty. ἕξις, then, is the habitual or normal condition, the dis- position or character; and the expres- sion in the text means that the mature, by reason of their maturity or mental habit, have their senses exercised, etc. αἰσθητήρια: ‘senses’. Bleek quotes. the definition of the Greek lexico- graphers and of Damascene τὰ ὄργανα ἢ τὰ μέλη δι ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα. So Galen in Wetstein, ‘organs of sense”. Here the reference is to spiritual faculties of perception and taste. γεγυμνασμένα - + + πρὸς διάκρισιν . . ., “exercised so. as to discriminate between good and evil,” z.e., between what is wholesome and what is hurtful in teaching. [Wet- stein quotes from Galen, De Dignot. Puls., ὃς μὲν yap τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἔχει