lectual intuition which is apart from sense, above consciousness, and released from the laws of the understanding, and which compre- hends the absolute by becoming the absolute, and thus knows God by being God."^ This assumption that man is God, shocks the reason and common sense of men as well as outrages their relig- ious and moral convictions.
3. In tiie third place, Hamilton and Mansel demonstrate that, assuming the definitions of the Absolute and Infinite given by the transcendentalists, the most contradictory conclusions may logi- cally be deduced from them. " There are three terms familiar as household words in the vocabulary of philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of metaphysical theology. To conceive the Deity as He is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as absolute, and as infinite. By First Cause, is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the Abso- lute, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no neces- sary relation to any other being. By the Infinite, is meant that which is free from all possible limitation ; that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all eternity." ^
According to these definitions, in the sense in which they are intended to be taken, it follows : —
1. That the Infinite and Absolute must include the sum of all being. For "that which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, bat of all possible modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode and limited by it ; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of be- coming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation."^
2. If the Absolute and Infinite be as above defined, it cannot be the object of knowledge. To know is to limit. It is to distin- guish the object of knowledge from other objects. We cannot conceive, says Hamilton, of an absolute whole ; i. e., of a whole so great that we cannot conceive of it as a part of a greater whole. We cannot conceive of an infinite line, or of infinite space, or of infinite duration. We may as well think Avithout thought, as to assign any limit beyond which there can be no extension, no space, no duration. " Goad imagination to the utmost, it still sinks para- lyzed within the bounds of time." * It follows, therefoi'e, from the very nature of knowledge, accoi-ding to Hamilton, that the Infinite and Absolute cannot be known.
1 Prounsi of Philosophy, by S. Tyler, LL.D., p. 200. 2 Mansel, p. 75.
8 Mansel. p. 76. * Hamilton's Discus^ons, p. 8S
348 PAKT I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. IV. - Can God be knowh ?
The Infinite cannot Know.
3. It also follows from these premises, that the Infinite cannot know. All knowledge is limitation and difference. It supposes a distinction between subject and object, between the knower and what is known, inconsistent with the idea of the Absolute.
4. It follows also that the Absolute cannot be conscious, for con- sciousness involves a distinction between the self and the not-self. It is knowledge of ourselves as distinct from w^hat is not ourselves. Even if conscious only of itself, there is the same distinction be- tween subject and object ; the self as subject and a mode of the self as the object of consciousness. " The almost unanimous voice of philosophy," says Mansel, " in pronouncing that the Ab- solute is both one and simple must be accepted as the Toice of rea- son also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter." " The conception of an absolute and infinite consciousness contradicts itself." 1
The Absolute cannot he Cause.
5. It is equally clear that the Absolute and Infinite cannot be cause. Causation implies relation ; the relation of efficiency to the effect. It also implies change ; change from inaction to activ- ity. It moreover implies succession, and succession implies ex- istence in time. " A thing existing absolutely (i. e., not under relation)," says Hamilton, " and a thing existing absolutely as a caiise, are contradictory." He quotes Schelling^as saying, " He would deviate wide as the poles from the idea of the Absolute, who would think of defining its nature by the notion of activity." *' But he who would define the Absolute by the notion of a cause,' he adds, " would deviate still more widely from its nature, inas- much as the notion of a cause involves not only the notion of a determination to activity, but of a determination to a particular, nay a dependent, kind of activity." ^ " The three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not," asks Mr. Mansel,* " imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being ? A cause cannot, as such, be absolute : the Absolute can- not, as such, be cause."
6. According to the laws of our reason and consciousness, there can be no duration without succession, but succession as implying change cannot be predicated of the Absolute and Infinite, and yet without succession there can be no thought or consciousness ; and,
* Mansel, pp. 78, 79. 2 Bruno, p. 171. ^ Discussions, p. 40. * Mansel, p. 77.