A Brighter Day Begins with His Word.

Hodge, Charles, 1797–1878 • SECTION 209

§3, A.] GOD AS AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE. 361

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that word and which produces a certain effect on the eyes of those who see. He may even understand the laws hy which the produc- tion of colour is determined. A blind man has written a treatise on optics. Thirdly, there is the ignorance under which the mind labors when it can prove contradictory propositions concei'ning the same object, as that the same figure is both square and rcmnd. And fourthly, there is the ignorance of imperfect knowledge. Paul speaks of knowing what passes knowledge.

Our ignorance of God, according to Hamilton, is neither the ignorance of the idiot nor of imperfect knowledge, but it is analo- gous to the ignorance of a blind man of colours, and more definitely, the ignorance we labor under with regard to any object of which we can prove contradictions.

Proof that Hamilton Denies that we can Know Grod. That this .view of his doctrine is correct is proved, (1.) Be- cause he asserts in such broad terms that God cannot be known ; that He is not only inconceivable, but incogitable. (2.) Because, he says, that we know that God is not, and cannot be, what we think He is. It is not merely that we cannot determine with certainty that our idea of God is correct, but we know that it is not correct. " To think that God is, as we can think Him to be," he says, " is blasphemy. The last and highest consecration of all true religion, must be an altar, 'Ayvwo-Tw ©ew, ' To the unknown and unknowable God.' " ^ (3.) Because both he and Mansel continually assert that the Infinite cannot be a person ; cannot know ; cannot be cause ; cannot be conscious ; cannot be the subject of any moral attributes. To think of God as infinite, and to think of Him as a person is an impossibility. (4.) The illustrations which these writ- ers employ determine clearly their meaning. Our ignorance of God is compared to our incapacity to conceive of two straight lines inclosing a portion of space ; or to think " a circular parallelogram." It is not merely that we cannot understand such a figure, but we see that, in the nature of things, any such figure is impossible. So we not only cannot understand how God can be absolute and yet a person, but we see that an absolute person is as much a contradic- tion as a square circle. (5.) Accordingly Herbert Spencer and others, in carrying out Hamilton's principles, come to the conclu- sion not only that we cannot know God, but that it is impossible that a pei'sonal God should exist. There can be no such being.

1 Discussions, p. 22.

862 PAKT I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. IV. — Can God be know« ?

Hamilton s Doctrine of Crod as an object of Faith. Hamilton and Mansel, however, are not only Theists, but Chris- tians. They believe in God, and they beheve in the Scriptures as a divine revelation. They endeavor to avoid what seem to be the inevitable consequences of their doctrine, by adopting two princi- ples : first, that the unthinkable is possible, and, therefore, may be believed. By the unthinkable is meant that which the laws of reason force us to regard as self-contradictory. On this subject Mansel says : " It is our duty to think of God as personal, and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other ; as our con- ception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not follow that this contra- diction exists anywhere but in our own minds : it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God. .... It proves that there are limits to man's power of thought ; and it proves no more." ^ The conclusion is, that as whatever is possible is credible, therefore, as it is possible that God though in- finite may be a person, his personality may be rationally believed.

The Unthinkable, or Impossible, cannot be an object of Faith.

On this it may be remarked, —

1. That there is a great difference between the irreconcilable and the self-contradictory. In the one case the difficulty arises, or may arise, out of our ignorance or mental weakness ; in the other, it arises out of the nature of the things themselves. Many things are irreconcilable to a child which are not so to a man. Many things are irreconcilable to one man and not to another ; to men and not to angels. But the self-contradictory is impossible, and is seen to be so by all ordei's of mind. That two and two should make twenty, or that the same figure should be a square and a circle, is just as irreconcilable to an angel as to a child. What is self-contradictory cannot possibly be true. Now, according to Hamilton and Mansel, infinity and personality are not only irrec- oncilable, but contradictory. The one affirms what the other de- nies. According to their doctrine the Infinite cannot be a person, and a person cannot be infinite, any more than the Infinite can be finite, or the finite infinite. The one of necessity excludes the other. If you affirm the one, you deny the other. There is a great difference between not seeing how a thing is, and clearly

1 Limits of Religious Thou ff lit, p. 106.

Public-domain historical edition (1877). Text from OCR of an original Internet Archive scan; OCR may contain recognition errors.

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