like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." (Is. xlvi. 9, 10.) Those passages of Scripture in which God is said to repent, are to be in- terpreted on the same principle as those in which He is said to ride upon the wings of the wind, or to walk through the earth. These create no difficulty.
Philosophical Statement.
Theologians, in their attempts to state, in philosophical language, the doctrine of the Bible on the unchangeableness of God, are apt to confound immutabihty with immobility. In denying that God can change, they seem to deny that He can act. Augustine says, on this subject: " Non invenies in Deo aliquid mutabihtatis ; non aliquid, quod aliter nunc sit, aliter paulo ante fuerit. Nam ubi invenis aliter et aliter, facta est ibi quaedam mors : mors enim est, non esse quod fuit." ^ Quenstedt uses language still more open to objection, when he says that the immutability of God is " Perpetua essentias divinas et omnium ejus perfectionum identitas, negans omnem omnino motum cum physicum, tum ethicum." ^ Turrettin is more cautious, and yet perhaps goes too far. He says : " Po- testas variandi actus sues, non est principium mutabihtatis in se, sed tantum in objectis suis ; nisi intelligatur de variatione interno- rum suorum actuum, quos voluntas perfecta non variat, sed imper- fecta tantum." ^ The clause italicized in the above quotation assumes a knowledge of the nature of God to which man has no legitimate claim. It is in vain for us to presume to understand the Almighty to perfection. We know that God is immutable in his being, his perfections, and his purposes ; and we know that He is perpetually active. And, therefore, activity and immutability must be compatible ; and no explanation of the latter inconsistent with the former ought to be admitted.
The Absolute Attributes of Grod not inconsistent with Personality. These attributes of infinity, eternity, and immutability, are freely admitted by tlie modern philosophy to belong to the absolute Being. But it is maintained that such a Being cannot be a person. Personality implies self-consciousness. Self-consciousness necessa- rily implies limitation, a distinction between the self and the not- self Ohne Du kein Ich, — unless there be something objective
1 In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus, xxiii. 9, edit. Benedictines, vol. iii. p. 1952, b, c.
s Theologia, i. viii. § i. xx. p. 414.
« Locus HI. xi. 9, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. i. p. 186.
392 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Cn. V. —Divine Attributes.
and independent to which we stand opposed, as subject and object, there can be no consciousness of self. But nothing can be thus objective and independent in relation to the Absolute ; and, there- fore, the Absolute cannot have any consciousness of self, and con- sequently cannot be a personal Being. We have already seen (chap, iv.) that this objection is founded on an arbitrary definition of the Infinite and Absolute. It assumes that the Infinite must be all, and that the Absolute must be alone, without relation to any- thing out of itself. It is here only necessary to remark, in refer- ence to the objection, (1.) That it may be admitted as a fact that the slumbering consciousness of self in the human soul is awakened and developed by contact with Avhat is not only external to itself I)ut also independent of it. But God is not subject to that law. He is eternally perfect and immutable ; having in Himself the plenitude of life. There is, therefore, no analogy between jthe cases, and no ground for inferring in this case that what is true in us, who begin life as an undeveloped germ, must be true in relation to God. (2.) In the second place, we have no right to assume that even with regard to a finite intelligence created in the perfec- tion of its being, self-consciousness is dependent on what is inde- pendent of itself. Such a being would of necessity be conscious of its own thoughts and feelings ; for thought is a state of conscious- ness in an intelligent being. If God, therefore, can make an intelligent being in the perfection of its limited natui'e, it -would be self-conscious even were it left alone in the universe. (3.) Admit- ting it to be true that " without a Thou there can be no I," we know that, according to the Scriptures and the faith of the Church universal, there are in the unity of the Godhead three distinct persons, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; so that from eternity the Father can say I, and the Son Thou.
We must abide by the teachings of Scripture, and refuse to subordinate their authority and the intuitive convictions of our moral and religious nature to thei arbitrary definitions of any philo- sophical system. The Bible everywhere teaches that God is an absolute Being, in the sense of being self-existent, necessary, inde- pendent, immutable, eternal, and without limitation or necessary relation to anything out of Himself. It teaches moreover that He is infinite ; not in the sense of including all being, all power, all knowledge in Himself, to the exclusion of all other intelligent ao-ents ; but in the sense that no limit can be assigned to hib being or perfections, other^than that which arises out of his own perfec- tion itself. He would cease to be infinite could He be unwise or