had failed to escape from Elba, the state of Europe would have been very different from what it is at present. God, it is assumed, knows what would have been the sequence of events on any or every possible hypothesis. It is therefore said that there must be in God, besides the knowledge of simple intelligence by which Tie knows the possible, and the knowledge of vision by which He knows the actual, a scientia media, by which He knows the con- ditionally future. Illustrations of this form of knowledge, it is thought, are found in Scripture. In 1 Samuel xxiii. 11, it is said that David inquired of the Lord whether the men of Keilah would deliver him, should he remain among them, into the hands of Saul ; and was answered that they would. Here, it is argued, the event was not merely possible, but conditionally certain. If David remained in Keilah, he certainly would have been delivered up. Thus our Lord said, that if his mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon, the people of those cities would have repented. Here again is declared what would have happened, if something else had happened.
The Origin of this Distinction. This distinction was introduced into theology by the Jesuit the- ologians Fonseca and Molina ; by the latter in his work " De Con- cordia Providentise et Gratise Divinae cum Libero Arbitrio Hom- inis." Their object was to reconcile the foreordination of God with the freedom of man, and to explain the reason why some, and not others, were elected to eternal life. God foresaw who would repent and believe, if they received the knowledge of the Gospel and the gift of the Spirit, and these He elected to salvation. This theory of a scientia media was, for a like purpose, adopted by the Lutheran and Remonstrant theologians, but was strenuously op- posed by the Reformed or Augustinians. (1.) Because all events are included under the categories of the actual and possible ; and, therefore, there is no room for such a class as events conditionally future. It is only possible, and not certain, how men would act under certain conditions, if their conduct be not predetenninnd, either by the purpose of God, or by their own decision alre£.dy formed. Besides, it is the fundamental principle of the theolo- gians who adopt this theory, or at least of many of them, that a free act must from its nature be uncertain as to its occurrence. A free agent, it is said, can always act contrary to any amount of in- fluence brought to bear upon him, consistent with his free agency. But if free acts must beuncertain, they (Minnot be foreseen as cer-
400 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. — Divine Attributes.
tain under any conditions. (2.) The futurition of events, accord- ing to the Scriptures, depends on the foreordination of God, who foreordains whatever comes to pass. There is no certainty, there- fore, which does not depend on the divine purpose. (3.) The kind of knowledge which this theory supposes cannot belong to God, because it is inferential. It is deduced from a consideration of second causes and their influence, and therefore is inconsistent with the perfection of God, whose knowledge is not discursive, but independent and intuitive. (4.) This theory is inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine of God's pi'ovidential government, as it as- sumes that the free acts of men are not under his control. (5.) It is contrary to the Scriptural doctrine, inasmuch as it supposes that election to salvation depends on the foresight of faith and repentance, whereas it depends on the good pleasure of God. (6.) The examples quoted from the Bible do not prove that there is a scientia media in God. The answer of God to David, about the men of Keilah, was simply a revelation of the purpose which they had already formed. Our Lord's declaration concerning Tyre and Sidon was only a figurative mode of stating the fact that the men of his generation were more hardened than the inhabitants of those ancient cities. It is not denied that God knows all events in all possible combinations and connections, but as nothing is certain but what- He ordains to eflPect or permit, there can be no class of events conditionally future, and therefore there can be no scientia media. By conditionally future is meant what is suspended on a condition undetermined by God.
D. Forehnoioledge.
Among the objects of the divine knowledge are the free acts of men. The Scriptures abundantly teach that such acts are fore- known. Such knowledge is involved in the prediction of events which either concern the fi*ee acts of men, or are dependent on them. If God be ignorant of how free agents will act, his knowl- edge must be limited, and it must be constantly increasing, which is altogether inconsistent with the true idea of his nature. His government of the world also, in that case, must be precarious, dependent, as it would then be on the unforeseen conduct of men. The Church, therefore, in obedience to the Scriptures, has, almost with one voice, professed^ith_in God's foreknowledge of the free acts of his creatures.
The Socinians, however, and some of the Remonstrants, unable to reconcile this foreknowledge with human Hberty, deny that free