Argument from the Religious Experience of Believers.
2. This sense of justice, which is indestructible in the nature of man, and which, in common with reason and conscience, has sur- vived the Fall, is not only revealed in the ordinary experience of men, but still more distinctly in their religious consciousness. What is commonly called " conviction of sin," is only a modifica- tion, and higher form, of those inward experiences which are com- mon to all men. All men know that they are sinners. They all know that sin, as related to the justice of God, is guilt, that which ought to be punished ; and that, as related to his holiness, it ren- ders us polluted and offensive in his sight. They also know, intu- itively, that God is just as well as holy; and, therefore, that his moral perfection calls for the punishment of sin, by the same neces- sity by which He disapproves of and hates it. Under the pressure of these convictions, and the consciousness of their utter inability either to satisfy divine justice, or to free themselves from the defile- ment and power of sin, men either tremble in the constant looking for of judgment, or they look out of themselves for help. When, under either the common or saving operations of the Spirit of God, these sentiments are deepened, then their nature is more cleai^ly revealed. A man, when thus convinced of sin, sees that not only would it be right that he should be punished, but that the justice,
_or moral excellence of God, demands his punishment. It is not that he ougtif tcT^ffer'Toi' Hie good of others, or to sustain the moral government of God, but that he, as a sinner and for his sins, ought to suffer. Were he the only creature in the universe, this convic- tion would be the same, both in nature and degree. Such is the experience of men under the conviction of sin, as recorded in the Scriptures and in the history of the Church. In many cases crim- inals under the pressure of these feelings have delivered themselves to the officers of justice to be punished. More frequently they resort to self-inflicted tortures to satisfy tlie clamors of conscience. We have, therefore, an inward revelation, w^hich can neither be suppressed nor perverted, that justice is not benevolence.
The Sense of Justice not due to Christian Culture.
3. That this sense of justice is not due to Christian culture, or to the influence of peculiar forms of doctrine, but belongs to the common consciousness of men, is plain, (a.) Because it is im- pressed upon ail human languages as far as known or cultivated. All languages have different words for justice and benevolence.
422 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. — "Divine Attkibutes.
There could not be this difference in the words, if the sentiments themselves were not different. Every one knows that when we say a man is just, we mean one thing ; and when we say he is Lenevolent, we mean another thing. (6.) All history as it records the workings of human nature, reveals this innate sense of justice. We everywhere hear men calling for the punishment of offenders, or denouncing those who allow them to escape with impunity. No mass of men ever witness a flagrant act of cruelty or wrong with- out an irrepressible manifestation of indignation. The voice of nature, which in such cases is the voice of God, demands the punishment of the wrong-doer, (c.) In all religions which reveal the inward convictions of men, thei^e are expiatory rites. Every sacrifice for sin, the smoke from every altar, which has been going up through all ages and from every part of the world, are so many attestations to the truth of reason and of Scripture, that there is such an attribute as justice in God, distinct from his benevolence.
Argmnent from the Holiness of Crod.
4. The truth of this doctrine may also be inferred from the holi- ness of God. If He is infinitely pure, his nature must be opposed to all sin ; and as his acts are determined by his nature, his disappro- bation of sin must manifest itself in his acts. But the disfavour of God, the manifestation of his disapprobation, is death, as his favour is life. It cannot be that this essential opposition between holiness and sin should be dependent for its manifestation on the mere ah extra consideration that evil would result from sin being allowed to go unpunished. It might as well be said that we should feel no aversion to pain, unless aware that it weakened our constitution. We do not approve of holiness simply because it tends to produce happiness ; neither do we disapprove of sin simply because it tends to produce misery. It is inevitable, therefore, that the perfection of the infinitely holy God should manifest its opposition to sin, without waiting to judge of the consequences of the expression of this divine repugnance.
5. The doctrine that the pi-evention of crime is the only legiti- mate end of punishment, or that there is no such attribute in God as justice, as distinguished from benevolence, rests on the assump- tion, before remarked upon, that all virtue consists in benevolence ; which again rests on the assumption that happiness is the highest good ; which makes expediency the ground of moral obligation, and the rule of moral conduct. It is indeed a solecism to use the word moral in such connections, for, on this theory, the word has no