the world. It is the common doctrine of jurists. It is, of course, to be conceded that the good of society and of the moral govern- ment of God, is one important end of punishment in all govern- ments, human or divine. It is, however, rather an important col- lateral effect of the administration of justice, than its immediate design. The doctrine in question merges justice into benevolence. According to this way of thinking, it is only because God has a view to the happiness of his rational creatures, that He visits sin with punishment. This doctrine was adopted by some of the early; fathers. In answer to the objection that the Bible represented! God as a vindictive being, because it speaks of his anger and of/ his determination to punish, they said that He punished only outj of benevolence. Thus Clemens Alexandrinus ^ says, " Men ask how God can be good and Jcind if He is angry and punishes ? They should remember that punishment is for the good of the offender and for the prevention of evil." And Tertullian ^ says: " Omne hoc justitise opus procuratio bonitatis est." Origen,^ also to the same effect, says : " Ex quibus omnibus constat, unum eun- demque esse justum et bonum legis et evangeliorum Deum, et benefacere cum justitia et cum bonitate punire."
Many later theologians take the same view. Leibnitz defines justice to be benevolence guided by wisdom. Wolf, who modified the whole system of theology in accordance with the philosophy of Leibnitz, adopted the same view. So did Stapfer,* who says : " Quando Deus ejusmodi malum triste ex peccato necessario se quens creaturse accidere sinit, .... dicitur peccatorera punire, et hoc sensu ipsi tribuitur justitia vindicativa. In justitia punitiva bonitas cum sapientia administratur.^ Notio justitise resolvitur in notionem sapientise et bonitatis." Grotius, the jurist, makes this idea of justice the fundamental principle of his great work, " De Satisfactione Christi."
The Optimist Theory. In this country the same view has been extensively adopted, and made, as it must of necessity be, the controlling principle of those systems of theology in which it is incorporated. It is as- sumed that happiness is tlie greatest good ; and hence that the pur-
1 Pccdng gns, I. viii ; edit. Cologne, 1688, p. 114, c. and p. 115.
2 Adversus Marcionem, II. 10; edit. Basel, 1562, p. 179, seu II. 13; edit. Leipzig, 1841, UL p. 90. Bibliolheca, Ger.sdorf, vol. vi.
8 De Piincipiis, 11. v. 3; edit. Paris, 1733, vol. i. p. 88. a. » Institufiones, i. 153 ; edit. Tiguri, 1743, p. 154. « Ibid. i. 154.
420 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. — Divine Attributkb.
pose and desii'e to promote happiness is the sum of all virtue. From this it follows, that this world, the work of a God of infinite be- nevolence, wisdom, and power, must be the best possible world for ■the production of happiness; and, therefore, the permission of sin, and its punishment, must be referred to the benevolence of God. They are the necessary means for securing the greatest amount of happiness. If happiness be not the greatest good ; if holiness be a higher end than happiness ; if expediency be not the ground and measure of moral obligation, it is obvious that this whole structure collapses.
Proof of the Scriptural Doctrine.
It is admitted that happiness is promoted by justice, and therefore that it is contrary to a wise benevolence that men should be allowed to sin with impunity. But justice cannot properly be merged into benevolence. And that the promotion of happiness by the preven- tion of crime is not the primary end of the infliction of punishment, is evident, - —
1. From the testimony of every man's consciousness. Every man knows that benevolence and justice, as revealed in his own consciousness, are different sentiments. The one prompts to the promotion of happiness, the other involves the instinctive judgment, that a criminal ought to suffer for his crime. We do not stop to ask, or to think, what may be the collateral effect on others of the infliction of punishment. Anterior to such reflection, and indepen- dent of it, is the intuitive perception, that sin should be punished, for its own sake, or on account of its inherent ill-desert. These instinctive moral judgments are as clear and as trustworthy revela- tions of the nature of God as can possibly be made. They force conviction in spite of all speculative sophistries. Every man knows the righteous judgment of God, that those who sin are worthy of death. If justice and benevolence ai'e distinct in us, they are dis- tinct in God. If we, in obedience to the nature which He has given us, intuitively perceive or judge that sin ought to be pun- ished for its own sake, and irrespective of the good effect punish- ment may have on others, then such also is the judgment of God. This is the principle which undei'lies and determines all our ideas of the Supreme Being. If moral perfection be not in Him what it is in us, then He is to us an unknown something, and we use words without meaning when we speak of Him as holy, just, and good.