destruction of the Huguenots in France, the persecution of the Pu- ritans in England, laid the foundation for the planting of North America with a race of godly and energetic men, who were to make this land the land of refuge for the nations, the home of lib- erty, civil and religious. It would destroy the confidence of God's people could they be persuaded that God does not foreordain what-' soever comes to pass. It is because the Lord reigns, and doeth his pleasure in heaven and on earth, that they repose in perfect secu- rity under his guidance and protection.
§ 2. Objections to the Doctrine of Divine Decrees.
A. Foreordination inconsistent with Free Agency. It is urged that the foreordination of all events is inconsistent with the free agency of man. The force of this objection depends on what is meant by a free act. To decide whether two tilings are inconsistent, the nature of each must be determined. By the decrees of God are to be understood the purpose of God render- ing certain the occurrence of future events. By a free act is meant an act of rational self-determination by an intelligent person. If such an act is from its very nature contingent, or uncertain, then it is clear that foreordination is inconsistent with free agency. This theory of liberty has been adopted by a large body of philoso- phers and theologians, and is for them an insuperable objection to the doctrine of the divine decrees. In answer to the objection, it may be remarked, (1.) Tliat it bears vvith ec[ual force against fore- _knowlsdge. What is foreknown must be certain, as much as what is foreordained. If the one, therefore, be inconsistent with liberty, so also is the other. This is sometimes candidly admitted. Soci- nus argues that the knowledge of God embraces all that is know- able. Future free actions being uncertain, are not the objects of knowledge, and therefore it is no impeachment of the divine om- uiscience to say that they cannot be known. But then they cannot be predicted. We find, however, that the Scriptures are filled with such predictions. It is, therefore, evident that the sacred writers fully believed that free acts are foreknown by the divine mind, and therefore are certain as to their occurrence. Besides, if God can- not foreknow how free agents will act, He must be ignorant of the future, and be constantly inci-easing in knowledge. This is so incom- patible with all proper ideas of the infinite mind, that it has been almost univei'sally rejected, both by philosophers and by Christian theologians. A still weaker evasion is that proposed by some Ar-