against the plain declarations of Scripture, or against the facts of experience. In either case, it is for us sufficiently answered. It is vain to argue that a holy and benevolent God cannot permit sin and misery, if sin and misery actually exist. It is vain to say that his impartiality forbids that there should be any diversity in the en- dowments, advantages, or happiness of his rational creatures. It is vain to insist that a holy God cajinot permit children to suffer for the sins of their parents, when we constantly see that they do thus suffer. So it is utterly irrational to contend that God cannot foreordain sin, if He foreordained (as no Christian doubts) the crucifixion of Christ. The occurrence of sin in the plan adopted by_Godj_js a palpable fact ; the consistency, therefore, of fore- ordination with the holiness of God cannot rationally be denied. The second method of dealing with such objections is to show that the principle on which they are founded is unsound. The princi- ple on which the objection under consideration rests, is that an agent is responsible for all the necessary or certain consequences of his acts. The objection is, that a holy God cannot decree the occurrence of sin, because his decree renders that occurrence cer- tain. That is, an agent is responsible for whatever his act renders certain. That principle, however, is utterly untenable. A right- eous judge, in pronouncing sentence on a criminal, may be sure that he will cause wicked and bitter feelings in the criminal's mind, or in the hearts of his friends, and yet the judge be guiltless. A father, in excluding a reprobate son from his family, may see that the inevitable consequence of such exclusion will be his greater wick- edness, and yet the father may do right. It is the certain conse- quence of God's leaving the fallen angels and the finally impeni- tent to themselves, that they will continue in sin, and yet the holi- ness of God remain untarnished. The Bible clearly teaches that God judicially abandons men to their sins, giving them up to a rep- robati mind, and He therein is most just and holy. It is not true, therefore, that an agent is responsible for all the certain conse- quences of his acts. It may be, and doubtless is, infinitely wise and just in God to permit the occurrence of sin, and to adopt a plan of which sin is a certain consequence or element ; yet as he neither causes sin, nor tempts men to its commission. He is neither its author nor approver. He sees and knows that higher ends will be accomplished by its admission than by its exclusion, that a per- fect exhibition of his infinite perfections will be thereby effected, and therefore for the highest reason decrees that it shall occur through the fre-s choice of responsible agents. Our great ground
648 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. IX. — The Decrees.
of confidence, however, is the assurance that the judge of all the earth must do right. Sin is, and God is ; therefore the occurrence of sin must be consistent with his nature ; and as its occurrence cannot have been unforeseen or undesigned, God's purpose or de- cree that it should occur must be consistent with his holiness.
C. The Doctrine <ff Decrees destroys all 31otive to Exertion.
A third objection is, that the doctrine of foreordination, which supposes the certainty of all events, tends to the neglect of all use of means. If everything will happen just as God has predeter- mined, we need give ourselves no concern, and need make no effort. (1.) This objection supposes tliat God has determined the end without reference to the means. The reverse, however, is true. The event is determined in connection with the means. If the latter fail, so will the former. God has decreed that men shall live by food. If any man refuses to eat, he will die. He has ordained that men shall be saved through faith. If a man refuses to believe, iie will perish. If God has purposed that a man shall live, He has also purposed to preserve him from the suicidal folly of refusing to eat. (2.) There is another fallacy included in this objection. It supposes that the certainty that an event will happen, acts as a mo- tive to neglect the means of its attainment. This is not according to reason or experience. The stronger the hope of success, the greater the motive to exertion. If sure of success in the use of the appropriate means, the incentive to effort becomes as strong as it can be. On the other hand, the less hope, the less disposition there is to exert ourselves ; and where there is no hope, there will be no exertion. The rational and Scriptural foundation for the use of means, and the proper motives to avail ourselves of them, are, (1.) The command of God. (2.) Their adaptation to produce the effect. (3.) The divine ordination which makes the means neces- sary to the attainment of the end. And (4.) The promise of God to give his blessing to those who obediently avail themselves of the means of his appointment.
D. It is Fatalism. It is objected, in the fourth place, that the doctrine of decrees amounts to the heathen doctrine of fate. There is only one point of agreement between these doctrines. They both assume abso- lute certainty in the sequence of all events. They difler, how- ever, not only as to the ground of that certainty, the nature of the influence by which it is secured, and the ends therein contem-