It is true that the strict definition of a miracle does not include events of the kind just mentioned. Such events, therefore, are called by Trench "providential," as distinguished from "absolute miracles." This want of comprehensiveness, however, does not seem to be a sufficient reason for rejecting the common definition of a miracle. Because there certainly is a class of events to which that definition strictly applies ; and it is important that those events on which such stress is laid in Scripture, should have a designation peculiar to themselves, and which expresses their true nature. The importance of what are called providential miracles, is not lessened by their being thrown into a class by themselves. They continue to be clear evidence of divine intervention. As Mr. Mozley says, it is not exclusively on the nature of the event that its value as evidence depends, but on the attending circumstances. The flocks of locusts, or of the quails, would not, of themselves, have been proof of any special divine intervention ; but taken in connection with Moses' threat in the one case, and promise in the other, those events proved as conclusively as the most absolute miracle could have done, that he was the messenger of Him who could' control the laws of nature and constrain them to execute his will. »
§ 2. The Possihility of Miracles. This is of coiirse denied by ftll those who do not make any dis- tinction between God and nature. This is done by Spinoza and all his modern disciples. " Existimant," says Spinoza, " Deum tamdiu nihil agere, quamdiu natura solito ordine agit ; et contra, potentiam naturae et causas naturales tamdiu esse otiosas, quam diu Deus agit ; duas itaque potentias numero ab invicem distinctas im- aginantur, scilicet, potentiam Dei et potentiam rerum naturalium, a