they were performed, or of the evidence by which they are sup- ported. Not one in a thousand of them could stand the test of such an examination ; most of tliem, indeed, are barefaced impos- tures openly justified by the authorities on the ground of pious frauds. It is a sufficient reason for repudiating, prior to any examination, all such pretended miracles, that they are wrought in support of an antichristian system, that they are part of a com- plicated mass of deceit and evil.
Insufficiency of Human Testimony. There is still another ground on which the possibility of a mira- cle's being known or proved has been denied. It is said that no evidence is adequate to establish the occurrence of a miraculous event. Our faith in miracles must rest on historical testimony. Historical testimony is only the testimony of men liable to be de- ceived. All confidence in such testimony is founded on experi- ence. Expei'ience, however, teaches that human testimony is not always reliable; whereas our experience, that the course of nature is uniform, is without exception. It will, therefore, always be more probable that the witnesses were mistaken than that the course of nature has been violated. This is Hume's famous argu- ment, of which Babbage says that it, " divested of its less impor- tant adjuncts, never has and never will be refuted." ^ He evi- dently means that it cannot be refuted except mathematically, through the doctrine of probabilities. For he says on a subsequent page, that those who support the prejudice against mathematical pursuits, " must now be compelled to admit that they have en- deavoured to discredit a science which alone can furnish an exact refutation of one of the most celebrated arguments against revela- tion." 2 He endeavours to prove the reverse of Hume's proposi- tion ; that is, that on the doctrine of probabilities, it is unspeakably more probable that there should be a violation of the laws of na- ture (e. g., that a dead man should come to life) than that six independent witnesses should concur in testifying to the same falsehood. The argument may be valid in the view of mathema- ticians ; but to ordinary men it seems to be a wrong application of the principles of that venerable science. As we cannot determine by the law of probabilities a question in aesthetics or morals, neither can God's relation to the world, and the use of his power, as in- volved in the doctrine of miracles, be thus determined. It does not depend on the validity of human testimony. However uncer- 1 Ninth Bridgewatei' Treatise, p. 121. 3 Jifij, 132.
634 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. Xn.— Miracles.
tain or unreliable such testimony may be, such events as miracles may happen, if consistent with the nature of God, and may be rationally believed. There may be proofs of their reality which no man can disregard. It is, however, as just remarked, a false assumption that human testimony is inadequate to produce absolute certainty. Men do not hesitate on the testimony of even two men to consign a fellow-man to death. In order that human testimony should command assent it must, (1.) Be given in proof of a pos- sible event. The impossible cannot be proved by any kind of evidence. Professor Powell asks, How much testimony would be required to pi'ove that two and two had, on a given occasion, made five ? As no amount of testimony could prove such an im- possibility, the argument is that no amount of evidence can prove a miracle. If miracles be impossible, that is an end of the matter. No man is so foolish as to pretend that the impossible can be proved. (2.) The second condition of the credibility of testimony is that the event admit of easy verification. If a man testify that he saw a ghost, it may be true that he saw something which he took to be a ghost ; but the fact cannot be verified. The resur- rection of Christ, for example, the miracle on the truth of which our salvation depends, was an event which could be authenticated. The identity between the dead and living Jesus could be estab- lished beyond the possibility of any reasonable doubt. (3.) The witnesses must have satisfactory knowledge or evidence of the truth of the facts to which they testify. Had the Apostles seen Christ after his resurrection only on one occasion, at a great dis- tance, in an obscure light, and only for a fleeting moment, the value of their testimony Avould be greatly impaired. But as they saw Him repeatedly during forty days, conversed with Him, ate with Him, and handled Him, it is out of the question that they should have been mistaken. (4.) The witnesses themselves should be sober-minded, intelligent men. (5.) They should be good men. The testimony of other men, under these conditions, may be as coercive as that of our own senses. And it may be so confirmed by collateral evidence, natural and supernatural, by the nature of eflects produced, and by signs and wonders and gifts of the Holy Ghost, as to render unbelief a miracle of folly and wickedness.
The fallacy of Hume's argument has often been pointed out. In the first place, it rests on the false assumption that confidence in human testimony is founded on experience, whereas it is founded on a law of our nature. "We cannot help confiding in good men. We know that deceit is inconsistent with goodness ; and therefore