ence, and to tlie earthly house in which it now dwells. It luis uriiinal appetites and necessities. It can hunger and thirst. It needs sleep and rest. But the same soul has higlier powers. The earthly body is suited to its earthly state ; the heavenly body to its heavenly state. There are not two substances ^v^r) and Tri/eO^o, fhere is but one and the same substance with different susceptibili- ties and powers. In this same connection Paul says, Flesh and i)lood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven. Yet our bodies are to inherit that kingdom, and our bodies are flesh and blood. Tlie same material substance now constituted as flesh and blood is to be so changed as to be like Christ's glorious body. As this representa- tion does not prove a substantial difference between the body which now is and that which is to be hereafter, so neither does what the Apostle says of the crio/jia ij/v)(ik6v and the o-wyaa Tri/evfjiarLKov prove that the i/'^X'/ '^'1*^1 7Tvev/j.a are distinct substances.
This doctrine of a threefold constitution of man being adopted by Plato, was introduced partially into the early Church, but soon came to be regarded as dangerous, if not heretical. Its being held by tlie Gnostics that the -jruevixa in man was a part of the divine essence, and incapable of sin ; and by the Apollinarians that Christ had only a human o-(2y.a and ^v^^, but not a human irvev^a, the Church rejected the doctrine that the ^vxq and TricS/^a were distinct substances, since upon it those heresies were founded. In later times the Semi-Pelagians taught that the soul and body, but not the spirit in man were the subjects of original sin. All Prot- estants, Lutheran and Reformed, were, therefore, the more zealous in maintaining that tlie soul and spirit, ^v^r) and irvevixa, are one and the same substance and essence. And tiiis, as before remarked, has been the common doctrine of the Church.^
§ 3. Realism. Its Greneral Character. There is still another view of the nature of man which, from its extensive and long-continued influence, demands consideration. According to this view, man is defined to be. The manifestation of the general principle of humanity in union with a given corporeal organization. This view has been held in various forms which cannot here be severally discussed. It is only the tlieory in its more general features, or in the form in which it has been commonly presented, tliat our limits permit us to examine. It necessarily
1 See G. L. Hahn, Tkeologie des N. T. Olshausen, De Trichotomia Natui-m ffnmanai. 9 Xovi Ttstamenti Scriptoribus recepia. Ackermann, Studien und Kriliktn, 1839, p. 882. J. T. Beck, Uviriss d. biblischen Seelenlehre, 1843.
52 PART n. Ch. II. — nature of man.
assumes that humanity, human nature as a general principle or a form of life, exists antecedently (either chronologically or logically) to individual men. " In the order of nature," says Dr, Shedd, " mankind exists before the generations of mankind ; the nature is prior to the individuals produced out of it."^ It exists, also, inde- pendently and outside of them. As magnetism is a force in nature existing antecedently, independently, and outside of any and all individual magnets ; and as electricity exists independently of the Leyden jars in which it may be collected or through which it is manifested at present; as galvanism exists independently of any and all galvanic batteries ; so humanity exists antecedently to indi- vidual men and independently of them. As an individual magnet is a given piece of soft iron in which the magnetic force is present and activ^e, and as a Leyden jar is simply a coated jar in which electricity is present, so an individual man is a given corporeal organization in which humanity as a general life or force is present. To the question what is human nature, or humanity generically considered, there are different answers given. It is said to be a reSy an essence, a substance, a real objective existence. It is some- thing which exists in time and space. This is the common mode of statement. The controversy between realists and nominalists, in its original and genuine form, turned upon this point. The question wliich for ages occupied to so great an extent the attention of all philosophers, was, What are universals? What are genera and species ? What are general terms ? Are they mere words ? Are they thoughts or conceptions existing ni tne mind ? Are the things expressed by general terms real objective existences ? Do individuals only exist; so that species and genus are only classes of individuals of the same kind ; or are individuals only the I'evelatlon;' or individualizations of a general substance which is the species or genus ? According to the early and genuine realists, and accord- ing to the modern speculative philosophers, the species or genus is first, independent of and external to the individual. The individual is only "a subsequent modus existendi ; the first and antecedent mode [in the case of man] being the generic humanity of which this subsequent serial mode is only another aspect or manifestation." ^ Precisely, as just stated, as magnetism is antecedent to the mag- net. The magnet is only an individual piece of iron in and through which generic magnetism is manifested. Thus the realist says, '■Etsi rationalitas non esset in aliquo, tamen in natura remaneret."^
1 nistnnj of Chrisdnn Doctrine, vol. ii. p. 77.
2 Sliedd's Essays Boston, 1807, p. 259, note, and his History of Christian Doctrine, vol ii. p. 117.
* Cousin, Fragments Philosophiques, Paris, 1840, p. 167.