It was expressed in the schools by saying that Untversalia are ante rem. The other form of the doctrine asserts that the Universalia are in re. That is that the universals exist only in the indisMduals ; and that the individuals alone ai'e real. " L'identite des individus," says Cousin ^ in his exposition of this form of the doctrine, "^ d'un meme genre ne vient pas de leur essence meme, car cette essence est diffi^rente en chacun d'eux, mais de certains ^l^ments qui se retrouvent dans tous ces individus sans aucune difference, mdiffer- enter. Cette nouvelle theorie differe de la premiere en ce que les universaux ne sont plus I'essence de I'^tre, la substance meme des choses ; mals elle s'en rapproche en ce que les universaux existent reellement, et qu'existant dans plusieurs individus sans difference? ils forment leur identite et par la leur genre." Again, '"^ he says, " Le principe de la nouvelle theorie est que I'essence de chaque chose est leur individuality, que les individus seuls existent, etqu'il ii'y a point en dehors des individus d'essence appelees les universaux, les especes et les genres ; mais que I'individu lui-meme contient tout cela, selon les divers points de vue sous lequels on le considere."^ Thus Socrates as an individual man has his own essence, which, M'ith its peculiarities, makes him Socrates. Neglect those peculiar- ities and consider him as rational and mortal, then you have the idea of species ; neglect rationality and mortality, and consider him as an animal, then you have the idea of the genus ; neglect all these forms (" relictis omnibus formis"), and you have only the idea of substance. According to this view " les espdces et les genres, les plus elev^s comnie les plus inf^rieurs, sont les individus eux- memes, considdrds sous divers point de vue." * This, according to the plain sense of the terms, amounts to the common doctrine. In- dividuals alone exist. Certain individuals have some distinguish- ino- properties or attributes in common. They constitute a par- ticular species. These and other individuals of different species have otiier properties common to them all, and they constitute a genus, and so orders, and classes, until we get to the highest cate- gory of being, which includes all. But if all beings are assumed to be one substance, which substance with certain added qualities or accidents constitutes a class, with certain other additions, an order, with still further modifications, a genus, a species, an indi- vidual, then we have the old theory back again, only extended so as to have a pantheistic aspect.
1 Frnf/ments Philosopliiques, p. 162. 2 Jbid, p. 168.
8 See the exposition by Ab^lard himself quoted on page 170 of Cousin. * Cousin, Fragments Philosophiques, p. 183.