j)le thei'efore which necessarily works an entire cliange in the wliole system of Christian doctrine. It is not, however, an ulti- mate principle. It is itself an inference from the primary assump- tion that ability limits obligation ; that a man can be neither praised nor blamed, neither rewarded nor condemned, except for his own acts and self-acquired character, which acts must be within the compass of his ability. What is either concreated or innate, inher- ent or infused, is clearly not within the power of the will, and therefore cannot have any moral character. As this principle is thus far-reaching It ought to be definitively settled.
Consciousness proves that Dispositions as distinguished from Acts may have "Moral Character.
By the mere moral philosopher, and by theologians whose theology is a philosophy, it is assumed as an axiom, or intuitive truth, that a man is responsible only for what he has full power to do or to avoid. Plausible as this principle Is, it is, —
1. Opposed to the testimony of consciousness. It is a fact of con- sciousness that we do attribute moral character to principles which precede all voluntary action and which are entirely independent of the power of the will. And it is a fact capable of the clearest demonstration that such is not only the dictate of our ow" n Individ- ual consciousness, but also the conviction of all men. If we ex- amine our own consciousness as to the judgment which we pass upon ourselves, we shall find that we hold ourselves responsible not only for the deliberate acts of the will, that is, for acts of de- liberate self-determination, which suppose both knowledge and vo- litioti, but also "for emotional, impulsive acts, which precede all deliberation ; and not only for such impulsive acts, but also for the principles, dispositions, or Immanent states of the mind, by which its acts whether Impulsive or deliberate, are determined. When a man is convinced of sin. It is not so much for specific acts of trans- gression that his conscience condemns him, as for the permanent states of his mind ; his selfishness, worldllness, and maliciousness ; his Ingratitude, unbelief, and hardness of heart ; his want of right affec- tions, of love to God, of zeal for the Redeemer, and of benevolence towards men. These are not acts. They are not states of mind under the control of the will ; and yet In the judgment of conscience, which we cannot silence or pervert, they constitute our character and are just ground of condemnation. In like manner whatever of right dispositions or principles we discover within ourselves, whatever there is of love to God, to Christ, or to his people ; what-
108 PART 11. Ch. v. — original STATE OF MAN.
ever of humility, meekness, forbearance, or of any other virtue , the testimony of consciousness is, that these dispositions, which are neiti^.er tiie acts nor products of the will, as far as they exist within us, constitute our character in tlie sight of God and man. Such is not only the testimony of consciousness with regard to our judg- ments of ourselves, but also as to our judgments of other men. When we pronounce a man either good or bad, the judgment is not founded upon his acts, but upon liis character as revealed bv his acts. Tlie terms good and bad, as applied to men, are not used to expi'ess the character of particular actions which they perform, but the character of the abiding principles, dispositions, or states of mind which determine their acts, and give assurance of what they will be in future. We may look on a good man and know that there is something in him whicli constitutes his character, and which renders it certain that he will not blaspheme, lie, or steal ; but, on the contrary, that he will endeavour in all things to serve God and do good to men. In like manner we may contemplate a wicked man in the bosom of his family, when every evil passion is hushed, and when only kindly feelings are in exercise, and yet we know him to be wicked. That is, we not only know that he has perpetrated wicked actions, but that he is inherently wicked ; that there is in him an evil nature, or abiding state of the mind, which constitutes his real character and determines his acts. When we say that a man is a miser, we do not mean simply that he hoards money, or grinds the face of the poor, but we mean that he has a disposition which in time past has led to such acts and which will continue to produce them so long as it rules in his heart. The Pelagian doctrine, therefore, that moral character can be predicated only of voluntary acts, is contrary to the testimony of consciousness.
Argument from the Cfeneral Judgment of Men.
2. It may, however, be said that our consciousness or moral judgments are influenced by our Christian education. It is there- fore important to observe, in the second place, that this judgment of our individual consciousness is confirmed by the universal judg- ment of our fellow-men. This is plain from the fact that in all known languages there are words to distinguish between dispo- sitions, principles, or habits, as permanent states of the mind, and voluntary acts. And these dispositions are universally recognized as being either good or bad. Language is the product of the com- mon consciousness of men. There could not be such terms as benevolence, justice, integrity, and fidelity, expressing principles