A Brighter Day Begins with His Word.

Hodge, Charles, 1797–1878 • SECTION 94

§ 1.] THE NATURE OF SIN. 131

← Systematic Theology — Volume 2

)U)t sav that such is the nature of h'o;ht tliat it cannot cause tlie plienomena of vision ; or of acids that tliey cannot affect the organs of taste ; or that our sensations are flfce])tive which lead us to refer them to such causes. Nor can we determine pliilosophi- cally the principles of beauty, and decide what men must admire and what they must dislike. All that philosophy can do is take the facts of our aesthetic nature and from them deduce the laws or principles of beauty. In like manner the facts of our moral con- sciousness must be assumed as true and trustworthy. We cainnot argue that such is the constitution of the universe, such the relation of the individual to the whole, that there can be no such thing as sin, nothing for which we should feel remorse or on the ground of which we should apprehend punishment. Nor can we adopt such a theory of moral obligation as forbids our recognizing as sin what the conscience forces us to condemn. Any man who should adopt such a theory of the sublime and beautiful, as would demonstrate that Niagara and the Alps were not sublime objects in nature ; or that the Madonna del Sisti or the Transfigu- ration by Raphael are not beautiful productions of art ; or that the " Iliad " and " Paradise Lost " are not worthy of the admira- tion of ages, would lose his labour. And thus the man who ignores the facts of our moral nature in his theories of the origin and nature of sin, must labour in vain. This, however, is con- stantly done. It will be found that all the anti-theistic and anti- christian views of this subject are purely arbitrary speculations, at war with the simplest and most undeniable facts of conscious- ness.

With regard to the nature of sin, it is to be remarked that there are two aspects in which the subject may be viewed. The first concerns its metaphysical, and the second, its moral nature. What is that which we call sin ? Is it a substance, a principle, or an act? Is it privation, negation, or defect? Is it antagonism be- tween mind and matter, between soul and body ? Is it selfish- ness as a feeling, or as a purpose ? All these are questions which concern the metaphysical nature of sin, what it is as a res in rtatura. Whereas such questions as the following concern rather its moral nature, namely. What gives sin its character as moral evil? How does it stand related to law? What law is it to which sin is related ? What is its relation to the justice of God ? Whit is its relation to his holiness ? What has, or can have the relation of sin to law ; is it acts of deliberation only, or also im- pulsive acts and affections, emotions and principles, or dispositions "^

132 PART II. Cii. Vm. — SIN.

It is obvious that these are moral, ratlier than metaphysical ques- tions. In some of the theories on the nature of sin it is viewed exclusively in one of these aspects ; and in some, exclusively in the other ; and in some both views are combined. It is not pro- posed to attempt to keep these views distinct as both are of neces- sity involved in the theological discussion of the subject.

§ 2. Philosophical Theories of the Nature of Sin.

The first theory in the order of time, apart from the primitive doctrine of the Bible, as to the origin and nature of sin, is the dualistic, or that which assumes the existence of an eternal prin- ciple of evil. This doctx'ine was widely disseminated throughout the East, and in different forms was partially introduced into the Christian church. According to the doctrine of the Parsis this original principle was a personal being ; according to the Gnos- tics, Marcionites, and Manicheans, it was a substance, an eternal vXr] or matter. Augustine says, " Iste [Manes] duo principia inter se diversa atque adversa, eademque aeterna et coaeterna, hoc est semper fuisse, composuit : duasque naturas atque substantias, boni scilicet et mali, sequens alios antiquos haereticos, opinatus est." ^ These two principles are in perpetual conflict. In the actual world they are intermingled. Both enter into the constitution of man. He has a spirit (^Tmvfxa') derived from the kingdom of light ; and a body with its animal life (o-w/xa and ^xv} derived from the kingdom of darkness. Sin is thus a physical evil ; the defilement of the spirit by its union with a material body ; and is to be over- come by physical means, i. e., by means adapted to destroy the influence of the body on the soul. Hence the efficacy of absti- nence and austerities.^

This theory obviously is : (1.) Inconsistent with Theism, in making something out of God eternal and independent of his will. He ceases to be an infinite Being and an absolute sovereign. He is everywhere limited by a coeternal power which He cannot con- trol. (2.) It destroys the nature of sin as a moral evil, in making it a substance, and in representing it as inseparable from the nature of man as a creature composed of matter and spirit. (3.) It de- stroys, of course, human responsibility, not only by making moral evil necessary from the very constitution of man, and by referring its origin to a source, eternal and necessarily operative ; but by

1 Liber de Heeregibus, XLVi. ; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. viii. p. 48, d.

2 Baur's Manichean System. Neander's Church Sistoi-y, edit. Boston, 1849, vol. i. pp. 478-506. Miiller's Lehre von der Sunde, vol. i. pp. 504-518.

Public-domain historical edition (1876). Text from OCR of an original Internet Archive scan; OCR may contain recognition errors.

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