The intimate conviction tliat men can be responsible for nothing which is not in their power, led, in the first place, to the Pelagian doctrine of the freedom of the will. It was not enough to consti- tute free agency that the agent should be self-determined, or that all his volitions should be determined by his own inward states. It was required that he should have power over those states. Lib- erty of the will, according to the Pelagians, is plenary power, at all times and at every moment, of choosing between good and evil, and of being either holy or unholy. Whatever does not thus fall within the imperative power of the will can have no moral character. " Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis : capaces enim utri- usque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur : atque ante actionem proprige voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit."^ Again, " Volens namque Deus rationabilem creaturam voluntarii boni munere et liberi arbitrii potestate donare, utriusque partis possibilitatem homini inserendo propi'ium ejus fecit, esse quod velit ; ut bom ac mali capax, natural- iter utrumque posset, et ad alterumque voluntatem deflecteret."
2. Sin, therefore, consists only in the deliberate choice of evil. It presujjposes knowledge of what is evil, as well as the full power of choosing or rejecting it. Of course it follows, —
3. That there can be no such thing as orio-inal sin, or inherent hereditary corruption. Men are born, as stated in the foregoing quotation, ut sine virtute, ita sine vitio. In other words men are born into the world since the fall in the same state in which Adam was created. Julian says:^ "Nihil est peccati in homine, si nihil est proprise voluntatis, vel assensionis. Tu autem concedis nihil fuisse in parvulis proprias voluntatis : non ego, sed ratio concludit ; nihil igitur in eis esse peccati." This was the point on which the Pela- gians principally insisted, that it was contrary to the nature of sin that it should be transmitted or mherited. If nature was sinful, then God as the author of nature must be the author of sin. Ju- lian ^ therefore says : " Nemo naturaliter malus est ; sed quicunque reus est, moribus, non exordiis accusatur."
4. Consequently Adam's sin injured only himself. This was one of the formal charges presented against the Pelagians in the Synod of DiospoHs. Pelagius endeavored to answer it, by saying that the sin of Adam exerted the influence of a bad example, and in that
1 V^X&gms, Apud Augustinum de Ptccato Originali, 14; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. x. p. 573, a, b.
2 Apud Augustinum Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum, i. 60; Wcyrls, vol. x. p. 1511, d 8 Ibid,
154 PART n. Ch. vm. — sm.
sense, and to that degree, injured his posterity. But he denied that there is any causal relation between the sin of Adam and the sinfulness of his race, or that death is a penal evil. Adam would have died from the constitution of his nature, wdiether he had sinned or not ; and his posterity, whether infant or adult, die from like necessity of nature. As Adam was in no sense the repre- sentative of his race, as they did not stand their probation in him, each man stands a probation for himself; and is justified or con- demned solely on the ground of his own individual personal acts.
5. As men come into the world without the contamination of original sin, and as they have plenary power to do all that God requires, they may, and in many cases do, live without sin ; or if at any time they transgress, they may turn unto God and perfectly obey all his commandments. Hence Pelagius taught that some men had no need for themselves to repeat the petition in the Lord's prayer, " Forgive us our trespasses." Before the Synod of Car- thage one of the grounds on which he was charged with heresy was, that he taught, " et ante adventum Domini fuerunt homines impeccabiles, id est, sine peccato."
6. Another consequence of his principles Avhich Pelagius una- voidably drew was that men could be saved without the gospel. As free will in the sense of plenary ability, belongs essentially to man as much as reason, men whether Heathen, Jews, or Christians^ may fully obey the law of God and attain eternal life. The only difference is that under the light of the Gospel, this perfect obe- dience is rendered more easy. One of his doctrines, therefore, was that " lex sic mittit ad regnum ccelorum, quomodo et evange- lium."
7. The Pelagian system denies the necessity of grace in the sense of the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit. As the Scriptures, however, speak so fully and constantly of the grace of God as manifested and exercised in the salvation of men, Pelagius could not avoid acknowledging that fact. By grace, however, he understood everything which we derive from the goodness of God. Our natural faculties of reason and free will, the revelation of the truth .whether in his works or his word, all the providential bless- ings and advantages which men enjoy, fall under the Pelagian idea of grace. Augustine says, Pelagius represented grace to be the natural endowments of men, which inasmuch as they are the jrift of God are grace. " Ille (Pelagius) Dei gratiam non appellat nisi naturam, qua libero arbitrio conditi sumus." ^ And Julian, he
1 Epistola clxx'x. 3; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. ii. pp. 9-il, a, 942, a.