178 PART II. Ch. ^aiL — sin.
habet vationem peccati." ^ To this the Romanists oppose from Andradius tlie definition : " Quod nihil liabeat rationem peccati nisi f;at a volente et sciente." If this be so, then it is impossil)Ie that there should be any inherent or innate sin. As infants are not " knowing and willing," in the sense of moral agents, tliey can- not have sin. Bellannidi - says: " Non satis "est ad culpam, ut aliquid sit voluntarinm habituali voluntate, sed requiritur, ut ))ro- cesserit ab actu etiam voluntario : Alioqui voluntarinm illud, hab- ituale voluntate, naturale esset, et raisericordia non reprehensione (lignum." He says, that if a man were created in puris natural- ibus, without grace, and with this opposition of the flesli to the rt^a- son, he would not be a sinner. With the loss of original rio;hteous- ness there is unavoidably connected this rebellion of the lower against the higher nature of man. With the loss of tlie bias of the will toward God, is of necessity connected aversion to God. This obliquity of the will which attends original sin, is not sin in itself, yet it is sin in us. For Bellarmin says, there is a " perversio vol- miratis et obliquitas unicuique inhgerens, per quani peccatores pro- prie et formaliter dicimur, cum primum homines esse inci[)iraus,'' This certainly appears contradictory. The perversion of the will, or concupiscence, consequent on the loss of original righteousness, is not itself sinful. Nevertheless, it constitutes us properly and formally sinners, as soon as we begin to exist. Nothing is of the nature of sin but voluntary action, or what proceeds from it, and yet infants are sinners from their birth. He attempts to reconcile these contradictions by saying : " Peccatum in Adamo actuale et personale in nobis originaliter dicitur. Solus enim ipse actuali voluntate illud commisit, nobis vero communicatur per genera- tionem eo modo, quo communicari potest id, quod transiit, nimirum per imputationem. Omnibus enim imputatur, qui ex Adamo nas- cuntur, quoniam omnes in lumbis Adami existentes in eo et per eum peccaviraus, cum ipse peccavit." That is, the voluntary act of Adam was at the same time the act of the will of all his de- scendants. Thus original sin is sin in us, although nothing is sin in any creature wdiich does not consist in an act of his own will, or which does not flow from such act. To this, however, Baur prop- erly remarks : " What is an act of a non-existing will, an act to which the nature of sin is attributed, although it lies entirely out- side of the individual consciousness? Can any meaning be attached to such a representation ? Does it not destroy the idea of guilt and
1 Chemnitz, Examen Concilii Tridentini, I. iv. edit. Frankfort, 1674, p. 116.
2 Dc Amissione Gratia et Statu Peccati, V. xviii., Disputatitmes, vol. iv. p. 333, d.