that the act of Adam was our act, is, tliat the same numerical luitiu'e or substance, the same reason and will which existed and acted iu Adam, belong to us ; so that we were truly and properly the agents of his act of apostasy.
President Edwards' Theory of Identity.
The assumption which President Edwards undertakes to con- trovert, is, " That Adam and his posterity are not one, but entirely distinct agents." ^ The theory on which he endeavours to prove that Adam and his posterity were one agent, is not exactly the old real- istic theory, it is rather a theory of his own, and depends on his peculiar views of oneness or identity. According to liim, all one- ness depends upon " the arbitrary constitution of God." The only reason why a full grown tree is the same with its first germ ; or that the body of an adult man is the same with his infant frame ; is that God so wills to regard them. No creature is one and the same in the different periods of its existence, because it is numer- ically one and the same substance, or life, or organism ; but simply because God " treats them as one, by communicating to them like properties, relations, and circumstances ; and so leads us to regard and treat thenj as one." ^ " If the existeuce," he says, " of cre- ated substance, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God's immediate power in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as mucri as the first creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect ; and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method. And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the arbitrary constitution of the Creator ; who, by his wise and sovereign establishment so unites successive new effects, that he treats them as one." ^ He uses two illustra- tions which make his meaning perfectly plain. The brightness of the moon seems to us a permanent thing, but is really a new effect produced every moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in every successive point of time, and so becomes altogether a new effect at each instant. It is no more numerically the same thing with that which existed in the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now, is individually the same sound of the wind which blew just before. What is true of the brigiitness of the moon, he says, must be true also of its solidity, and of every-
1 Original Sin, iv. iii. ; Works, edit. N. Y. 1829, vol. ii. p. 546.
a Ibid. p. 556. » Jlnd. pp. 555, 556-
218 PART n. ch. VIII. — sin.
thing else belonging to its substance. Again, images of things placed before a mirror seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing perfect identity. But it is known to be otherwise. These images are constantly renewed by the impression and re- flection of new rays of ligiit. The image which exists this mo- ment is not at all derived from the image which existed the last, preceding moment. It is no more numerically the same, than if painted anew by an artist with colours which vanish as soon a.s they are put on. The obvious fallacy of these ihustrations is, that the cases are apparetitly, but not really alike. The brightness of the moon and the image on a mirror, are not substances having continued existence ; they are mere effects on our visual organs. Whereas the substances which produce those effects are objective existences or entities, and not subjective states of our sensibility. Edwards, however, says that what is true of the images, must be true of the bodies themselves. " They cannot be the same, with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment, if the case be as has been proved, that their present existence is not, strictly speakinji, at all the effect of their past existence ; but is wholly, every instant, the effect of a new agency or exertion of the power- ful cause of their existence."^ As therefore, there is no such thing as numerical identity of substance in created things, and as all one- ness depends on " the arbitrary constitution of God," and things are one only because God so regards and treats them, there is " no solid reason," Edwards contends, why the posterity of Adam should not be " treated as one with him for the derivation .... of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt." ^ According to this doctrine of identity, everything that exists, even the soul of man, is, and remains one, not because of any continuity of life and substance, but as a sei'ies of new effects produced in every successive moment by the renewed efficiency of God. The whole theory resolves itself into the doctrine that preservation is continued creation. The argument of Edwards in proof of that point is, that " the existence of every created substance, is a de- pendent existence, and therefore is an effect and must have some cause ; and the cause must be one of these two ; either the ante- cedent existence of the same substance, or else the power of the Creator." It cannot be the antecedent existence of the same sub- stance, and therefore must l)e the power of God. His conclusion is that God's upholding of created substance " is altogether equiva- ent to an inmiediate production out of nothing, at each moment."^
1 Original Sin, iv. iii. , Woi-ks, vol. ii. p. 555, note.
2 Jbicl. p. 557. 3 Jbid. p. 554.