Objections to the Popular Distinction between Natural and Moral
Ability.
In tliis country much stress lias been laid upon the distinction between moral and natural ability. It has been regarded as one of the threat American improvements in theology, and as marking an important advance in the science. It is asserted that man since the fiill has natural ability to do all that is required of him, and on this ground his responsibility is made to rest ; but it is admitted that he is morally unable to turn unto God, or perfectly keep his commandments. By this distinction, it is thought, we may save the great principle that ability limits obligation, that a man cannot be bound to do what he cannot do, and at the same time hold fast the Scriptural doctrine which teaches that the sinner cannot of himself repent or change his own heart. With regard to this dis- tinction as it is commonly and popularly presented, it may be remarked : —
1. That the terms natural and moral are not antithetical. A thing may be at once natural and moral. The inability of the sin- ner, as above remarked, although moral, is in a most important sense natural. And, therefore, it is erroneous to say, that it is sim])ly moral and not natural.
2. The terms are objectionable not only because they lack pre- cision, but also because they are ambiguous. One man means by natural ability nothing more than the possession of the attributes of reason, will, and conscience. Another means plenary power, all that is requisite to produce a given effect. And this is the proper meaning of the words. Ability is the power to do. If a man has the natural ability to love God, he has full power to love Him. And if He has the power to love Him, he has all that is reqviisite to call that love into exercise. As this is the proper meaning of the terms, it is the meaning commonly attached to them. Those who insist on thenatural ability of the sinner, gen- erally assert that he has full power, without divine assistance, to do all that is I'equired of him : to love God with all his soul and mind and strength, and his neighbour as himself. All that stands in the n'ay of his thus doing is not an inability, but simply disinclination, or the want of will. An ability which is not adequate to the end contemplated, is no ability. It is therefore a serious objection to the use of this distinction, as commonly made, that it involves a great error. It asserts that the sinner is able to do what in fact he cannot do.
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3. It is a further objection to tl)is mode of stating the Joctnne that it tends to embarrass or to deceive. It must embarrass tlie people to be told that they can and cannot repent and believe. One or the other of the tw^o propositions, in the ordinary and proper sense of the terms, must be false. And any esoteric or metaphysical sense in which the theologian may attempt to recon- cile them, the people will neither appreciate nor respect. It is a much more serious objection that it tends to deceive men to tell them that they can change their own hearts, can repent, and can believe. • This is mot true, and every man's consciousness tells him that it is untrue. It is of no avail for the preacher to sav that all he means by ability is that men have all the faculties of rational beings, and that those are the only faculties to be exercised in turn- ing to God or in doing his will. We might as reasonably tell an uneducated man that he can understand and appreciate the Iliad, becanse he has all the faculties which the scholar possesses. Still less does it avail to say tliat the only difficulty is in the will. And therefore when we say that men can love God, we mean that they can love Him if they will. If the word will, be here taken in its ordinary sense for the power of self-determination, the proposition that a man can love God if he will, is not true ; for it is notorious that the affections are not under the power of the will. If the word be taken in a wide sense as including the affections, the prop- osition is a truism. It amounts to saying, that we can ^.ove God if we do love Him.
4. The distinction between natural and moral ability, as com monly made, is unscriptural. It has already been admitted that there is an obvious and very important distinction between an ina- bility arising out of the limitations of our being as creatures, and an inability arising out of the apostate state of our nature since the fall of Adam. But this is not what is commonly meant by those who assert the natural ability of men to do all that God requires of them. They mean and expressly assert that man, as his nature now is, is perfectly able to change his own heart, to repent and lead a holy life ; that the only difficulty in the way of his so doing is the want of inclination, controllable by his own power. It is ihis representation which is unscriptural. The Scriptures never thus address fallen men and assure them of their ability to deliver themselves from the power of sin.
5. The whole tendency and effect of this mode of statement are injurious and dangerous. If a sinner must be convinced of his guilt before he can trust in the righteousness of Christ for his jus-
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tifn-ation, he must be convinced of his helplessness before he can look to God fur deliverance. Those who are made to beheve that tliev can save themselves, are, in the divine administration, com- UKinly left to their own resources.
In opposition therefore, to the Pelagian doctrine of the sinner's plenary ability, to the Semi-Pelagian or Arminian doctrine of what is called " a gracious abihty," tliat is, an ability granted to all who hear the gospel by the common and sufficient grace of the Holy Spirit, and to the doctrine that the only inability of the sinner is his disincHnation to good, Augustinians have ever taught that this inability is absolute and entire. It is natural as well as moral. It is as complete, although different in kind, as the inability of the blind to see, of the deaf to hear, or of the dead to restore them- selves to life.
Proof of the Doctrine.
1. The first and most obvious argument in support of the Au- gustinian or Orthodox argument on this subject is the negative one. That is, the fact that the Scriptures nowhere attribute to fallen men ability to change their own hearts or to turn themselves unto God. As their salvation depends on their regeneration, if tliat work was within the compass of their own powers, it is incred- ible that the Bible should never rest the obligation of effecting it upon the sinner's ability. If he had the power to regenerate him- self, we should expect to find the Scriptures affirming his possession of this ability, and calling upon him to exercise it. It may indeed be said that the very command to repent and believe implies the possession of everything that is requisite to obedience to the com- mand. It does imply that those to whom it is addressed are ra- tional creatures, capable of moral obligation, and that they are free moral agents. It implies nothing more. The command is nothing more than the authoritative declaration of what is obligatory upon those to whom it is addressed. We ai*e required to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect. The obligation is imperative and constant. Yet no sane man can assert his own ability to make him- self thus perfect. Notwithstanding therefore the repeated commands given in the Bible to sinners to love God with all the heart, to repent and believe the gospel, and live without sin, it remains true that the Scriptures nowhere assert or recognize the ability of fallen man to fulfil these requisitions of duty.
268 PART II. Ch. VIU. - SIN. ;
Express Declarations of the Scriptures. 2. Besides this negative testimony of the Scriptures, we have the repeated and exphcit declarations of the Word of God on this subject. Our Lord compares the relation between himself and his people to that which exists between tlie vine and its branches. The point of analogy is the absolute dependence common to both relations. " As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it
abide in the vine ; no more can ye, except ye abide in me