peiutence and unbelief. This Paul says even of the light of nature. The lieathen are without excuse for their idolatry, because the eternal power and Godhead of the divine Being are revealed to them in his works. Knowing God, they glorified Him not as God. (Rom. i. 20, 21.) So common grace is sufficient to convince men, (1.) Of sin and of their need of redemption. (2.) Of the truth of the gospel. (3.) Of their duty to accept its offers and to live in obedience to its commands ; and (4.) That tiieir impenitence and unbelief are due to themselves, to their own evil hearts ; that they voluntarily prefer the world to the service of Christ. These effects the grace common to all who hear the gospel tends to pro- duce. These effects it does in fact produce in a multitude of cases, and would produce in all were it not resisted and quenched. But it is not sufficient to raise the spiritually dead; to change the heart, and to produce regeneration ; and it is not made to produce these effects by the cooperation of the human will. This is a point which need not be discussed separately. The Remonstrant and Romish doctrine is true, if the other parts of their doctrinal system are true ; and it is false if that system be erroneous. If the Au- gustinian doctrine concerning the natural state of man since the fall, and the sovereignty of God in election, be Scriptural, then it is certain that sufficient grace does not become efficacious from the cooperation of the human will. Those who hold the last men- tioned doctrine reject both the others ; and those who hold the two former of necessity reject the last. It is not, however, only in virtue of its logical relation to other established doctrines that the doctrine of sufficient grace is rejected. It may be proved to be contrai'y to what the Scriptures teach on regeneration and the mode in which it is effected. These arguments, however, may be more properly presented when we come to the answer to the. ques- tion. Why the grace of God is efficacious in the work of conver- sion?
Congruity.
Another erroneous view on this subject is that the influence of the Spirit in conversion owes its efficacy to its congruity. By this is sometimes meant its adaptation to the state of mind of him who is its subject. When a man is in one state, the same influence, both as to kind and degree, may f>vil to produce any serious impres- sion ; when in a different and more favourable frame of mind, it may issue in his true conversion. In this view the doctrine of congruity does not differ from the view already considered. It supposes that the subject of the Spirit's influence, in one state of
678 PART ni. Cu. XIV. — VOCATION.
mind resists, and in another, submits to, and cooperates with it , and that its efficacy is in the end due to this cooperation.
Sometimes, however, more is meant than that tlie grace is con- gruous to the state of mind of its subject. Cardinal Bellarmin objects to the view above stated that it assumes that the reason why one man believes and another disbelieves, is to be found in the free will of the subject. This, he says, is directly contrary to what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians iv. 7, " Who maketh thee to differ ? And what hast thou that thou didst not receive ? " " Nam," he adds, " si duo sint, qui eandem concionatorem audiant, et eandem interius inspirationem habeant, et unus credat, alter non credat, nonne dicere i)oterit is qui crediderit, se discern! ab infideli, per liberum arbitrium quia ipse inspirationem acceperit, quam alter rejecit? nonne gloriari poterit contra infidelem, quod ipse Dei gra- tiaB cooperatus sit, quam ille contempsit ? et tamen Apostolus hoc omnino prohibet." ^ Here the main principle which distinguishes Augnstinianism from all other schemes of doctrine is conceded. Why does one man repent and believe the Gospel, while another remains impenitent ? The Augustinian says it is because God makes them to differ. He gives to one what He does not give to another. All Anti-Augustinians say that the reason is, that the one cooperates with the grace of God, and the other does not ; or, the one yields, and the other does not ; or, that the one resists, and the other does not. Bellarmin here sides with Augustine and Paul. His own theory, however, is a virtual retraction of the above men- tioned concession. He says that the different results in the cases supposed, are to be referred to the congruity between the influence exerted and the state of mind of the person on whom that influence is exerted. But this congruity is foreseen and designed. God knows just what kind and degree of influence Avill be effectual in determining the will of a given person, under given circumstances, and in a given state of mind. And this influence he determines to exert with the purpose of securing tiie sinner's conversion, and with the certain foreknowledge of success. Bellarmin ^ says, " Ut efficacia proveniat non tarn ex vehementia persuasionis, quam ex dispositione voluntatis, quam Deus praevidet. Nimirum cum Deus ita proponit aliquid interna persuasione, ut videt voluntatem aptam esse ad consentiendum." And again, " Infallibilitas [rei] non oriatur ex vehementia motionis divina?, sed ex pra3visione aptitudi- nis ipsius voluntatis."* In one view this seems to refer the cause
1 De Gratia et Libera Arbilrio, I. xii.; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 420, d. ' Ilfid. IV. ix. ; Disputationes, vol. iv. pp.543 e, 544 a. s See Turrettin, Imtitutio Theologim, locus xv. ques. iv.