The definition which makes faith to be the persuasion of the truth of things not seen, is, however, correct, if by " things not seen " are meant things which are neither objects of the senses, nor of intuition, nor of demonstrative proof. But it does not seem to be correct to include among the "things not seen," which are the special objects of faith, things remembered and not now present to mind. This definition of 'faith, while correct in limit- ing it as to its objects to things not seen, in the sense above stated, is nevertheless defective in not assigning the ground of our conviction of their truth. Why do we believe things to be true, which we have never seen and which we cannot prove ? Different answers are given to that question ; and, therefore, the definition which gives no answer to it, must be considered de- fective.
Definitions founded on the Nature of the Evidence on which Faith
rests.
Some of the definitions of faith, as we have seen, are founded on its subjective nature ; others on its objects. Besides these there are others which seek its distinguishing characteristic in the ground on which the conviction which it includes, rests. The first of these is that which makes faith to be a conviction or per- suasion of truth founded on feeling. This is by many regarded as the one most generally received. Hase 1 says, " Every culti- vated language has a word for that form of conviction which, in opposition to the self-evident and demonstrable, rests on moral and emotional grounds." That word in Greek is ituxtk; in Eng- lish "faith." In his "Hutterus Redivivus,"2 he says, "The common idea of faith is : unmittelbar Fiirwahrhalten, ohne Ver- mittelung eines Schlussbeweises, durch Neigung und Bediirfniss," t. e., "A persuasion of the truth, without the intervention of argument, determined by inclination and inward necessity." He quotes the definition of faith by Twesten, as " a persuasion or conviction of truth produced by feeling ; " and that of Nitzsch, given above, "the unity of knowledge and feeling." Strauss8 says, " The way in which a man appropriates the contents of a revelation, the inward assent which he yields to the contents of the Scriptures and the doctrine of the Church, not because of critical or philosophical research, but often in opposition to them,
1 Dogmatik, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1842, p. 307.
* Sixth edit. Leipzig, 1845, p. 4.
* Dogmatik, § 20, edit. Tubingen and Stuttgart, 1840, vol. i. p. 282.
58 PART III. Ch. XVI. -FAITH.
overpowered by a feeling which the Evangelical Church calls the testimony of the Spirit, but which in fact is only the percep- tion of the identity of his own religious life with that portrayed in the Scripture and prevailing in the Church, — this assent deter- mined by feeling — in ecclesiastical language, is called Faith." Again,1 he says, " The pious man receives religious truth because he feels its reality, and because it satisfies his religious wants," and, therefore, he adds, "No religion was ever propagated by means of arguments addressed to the understanding, or of histori- cal or philosophical proofs, and this is undeniably true of Chris- tianity." Every preacher of a new religion assumes in those to whom he presents it, an unsatisfied religious necessity, and all he has to do is to make them feel that such necessity is met by the religion which he proposes. Celsus, he tells us, made it a ground of reproach against the Christians that they believed blindly ; that they could not justify the doctrines which they held at the bar of reason. To this Origen answered, that this was true only of the people ; that with the educated, faith was elevated into knowledge, and Christianity transformed into a philosophy. The Church was divided between believers and knowers. The rela- tion between faith and knowledge, between religion and philoso- phy, has been the subject of controversy from that day to this. Some took the ground of Origen and of the Alexandrian school generally, that it is incumbent on educated Christians to justify their doctrines at the bar of reason, and prove them to be true on philosophical grounds. Others held that the truths of revelation were, at least in many cases, of a kind which did not admit of philosophical demonstration, although they were not on that account to be regarded as contrary to reason, but only as beyond its sphere. Others, again, taught that there is a direct conflict between faith and knowledge ; that what the believing Christian holds to be true, can be shown by the philosopher to be false. This is Strauss's own doctrine, and, therefore, he concludes his long discussion of this point by saying, « The believer should let the knower go his own way in peace, just as the knower does the believer. We leave them their faith, let them leave us our phi- |0S0Pny Tnere nave been enough of false irenical at- tempts. Henceforth only separation of opposing principles can ead to any good."* On the same page he admits the great truth, « That human nature has one excellent characteristic:
any man feels is for him a spiritual necessity, he allows no
to take from him."
Dogmata, edit. Tubingen ar.d Stuttgart, 1840, vol. i. p. 298. a Ibid. p. 356
what man