speculative truth, or some historical event past or future ; or when the evidence or testimony on which faith is founded is ad- dressed only to the understanding and not to the conscience or to our emotional or religious nature, then faith does not involve feeling. We believe the great mass of historical facts to which we assent as true, simply on historical testimony, and without any feeling entering into, or necessarily connected with it. The same is true with regard to a large part of the contents of the Bible. They, to a great extent, are historical, or the predictions of historical events. When we believe what the Scriptures record concerning the creation, the deluge, the calling of Abra- ham, the overthrow of the cities of the plain, the history of Joseph, and the like, our faith does not include feeling. It is not an exercise of the will in either sense of that word. It is simply a rational conviction founded on sufficient evidence. It may be said, as Aquinas does say, that it is love or reverence towards God which inclines the will to believe such facts on the authority of his Word. But wicked men believe them, and can- not help believing them. A man can hardly be found who does not believe that the Israelites dwelt in Egypt, escaped from bondage, and took possession of the land of Canaan.
In the second place, it is true not only that faith is in many cases inseparable from feeling, but also that feeling has much influence in determining our faith. This is especially true when moral and religious truths are the objects of faith. Want of con- geniality with the truth produces insensibility to the evidence by which it is supported. Our Lord said to the Jews, " Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep." (John x. 26.) And in another place, " If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." (vii. 17.) And the Apos- tle says of those that are lost, " The god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." (2 Cor; iv. 4.) The truth was present, attended by appropriate and abundant evidence, but there was no suscep- tibility. The defect was in the organ of vision, not in the want of light. The Scriptures uniformly refer the unbelief of those who reject the gospel to the state of their hearts. There can be no doubt that all the true children of God received Christ as their God and Saviour on the evidence which He gave of his divine character and mission, and that He was rejected only by the unrenewed and the wicked, and because of their wickedness.
52 PART III. Ch. XVI — FAITH.
Hence unbelief is so great a sin. Men are condemned because they believe not on the only begotten Son of God. (John iii. 18.) All this is true. It is true of saving faith. But it is not true oi all kinds of even religious faith ; that is, of faith which has re- ligious truth for its object. And, therefore, it cannot furnish the differentia or criterion to distinguish faith from other forms of assent to truth. There are states of mind not only popularly, but correctly called belief, of which it is not true that love, or congeniality, is an element. There is such a thing as dead faith, or orthodoxy. There is such a thing as speculative faith. Simon Magus believed. Even the devils believe. And if we turn to other than religious truths it is still more apparent that faith is not necessarily a voluntary assent of the mind. A man may hear of something most repugnant to his feelings, as, for example, of the triumph of a rival. He may at first refuse to believe it ; but the testimony may become so strong as to force conviction. This conviction is, by common consent, faith or belief. It is not sight ; it is not intuition ; it is not a deduction ; it is belief ; a conviction founded on testimony. This subject, i. e., the connection between faith and feeling, will come up again in considering other defini- tions.
In the third place, if we take the word voluntary in the sense which implies volition or self-determination, it is still more evi- dent that faith cannot be defined as voluntary assent. It is, indeed, a proverb that a man convinced against his will remains unconvinced. But this is only a popular way of expressing the truth just conceded, namely, that the feelings have, in many cases, great influence in determining our faith. But, as just remarked, a man may be constrained to believe against his will. He may struggle against conviction ; he may determine he will not be- lieve, and yet conviction may be forced upon him. Napoleon, at the battle of Waterloo, hears that Grouchy is approaching. He gladly believes it. Soon the report reaches him that the advan- cing columns are Prussians. This he will not believe. Soon, however, as courier after courier confirms the unwelcome fact, he is forced to believe it. It is not true, therefore, that in faith as laith there is always, as Aquinas says, an election "voluntarie declmans in unam partem magis quam in alteram." There is another frequent experience. We often hear men say they would give the world if they could believe. The dying Grotius said he would give all his learning for the simple faith of his unlettered servant. To tell a man he can believe if he will is to contradict