include the other elements of a falsehood ; but every lie is a viola- tion of a promise. It arises out of the very nature of human society, and from the relation in which men of necessity stand to each other, that every man is expected to speak the truth, and is under a tacit but binding promise not to deceive his neighbours by word or act. If in any case he is guilty of intentional decep- tion, he must be able to show that in that particular case the obligation does not exist ; that is, that the party deceived has no right to expect the truth, and that no virtual promise is violated in deceiving him. This is certainly the fact in military ma- noeuvres, and in some other cases of rare occurrence.
This, however, is not always admitted. Augustine, for exam- ple, makes every intentional deception, no matter what the ob- ject or what the circumstances, to be sinful. " Ille mentitur," he says, " qui aliud habet in animo, et aliud verbis vel quibusli- bet significationibus enuntiat." * Again he says,2 " Nemo autem dubitat mentiri eum qui volens falsum enuntiat causa fallendi : quapropter enuntiationem falsam cum voluntate ad fallendum prolatam, manifestum est esse mendacium.', He reviews the cases recorded in the Bible which seem to teach the opposite doc- trine. This would be the simplest ground for the moralist to take. But, as shown above, and as generally admitted, there are cases of intentional deception which are not criminal.
Kinds of Falsehood.
Augustine divides falsehood into no less than eight classes. But these differ for the most part simply as to their subject mat- ter, or their effects. The division as given by Thomas Aquinas and very generally adopted since,3 is into three classes ; the per- nicious, the benevolent, and the jocose. Under the first head come all falsehoods which are instigated by any evil motive and are designed to promote some evil end. It includes not only the direct enunciation of what is false, but also all quibbling or pre- varication.
1 De Mendacio, 3 ; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. vi. p. 712, a.
2 Ibid. 5, (iv.), p. 715, a.
8 Aquinas, Summa, n. ii. 110, 2; edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 203, a, of third set. "Potest dividi mendacium, in quantum habet rationem culpse, secundum ea quae aggravant, vel diminuunt culpam mendacii ex parte finis intenti. Aggravat autem culpam mendacii, si aliquis per mendacium intendat alterius nocumentum : quod vocatur mendacium pernicio- sum. Diminuitur autem culpa mendacii, si ordinetur ad aliquod bonum, vel delectabile, et sic est mendacium jocosum : vel utile, et sic est mendacium officiosum, quo intenditur juvamentum alterius, vel remotio nocumenti. Et secundum hoc dividitur mendacium in tria praedicta." The first, according to Romanists, is a mortal sin, the two latter are regarded as venial.