detectiyes for the discovery of crimes; or those which are de- signed to prevent evil or secure good for ourselves or others. All such falsehoods are pronounced by Romanists to be venial sins, mere peccadilloes.1 The example given by Dens, in the place referred to, of this class of sins, is the case of a man having money, denying that he has it to avoid being robbed. This is very different from the doctrine of Augustine, who teaches that it is unlawful to lie to save life, or even to save a soul.2 Augus- tine's position is consistent with what was said above, that there are occasions on which a higher obligation absolves from a lower, as our Lord himself teaches. But that principle applies to the case of falsehood only when the enunciation of what is untrue ceases to be falsehood in the criminal sense of the word. It has been seen that three elements enter into the nature of false- hood properly so called, (1.) The enunciation of what is false. (2.) The intention to deceive. (3.) The violation of a promise ; that is, the violation of the obligation to speak the truth, the obligation which rests upon every man to keep faith with his neighbour. In military manoeuvres, as above remarked, there is no expectation, and no right for expectation, that a general will reveal his true intentions to his adversary, and therefore in that case deception is not falsehood, because there is no violation of an obligation. But when a confessor was called upon by a heathen magistrate to say whether he was a Christian, he was expected, and bound to speak the truth, although he knew the consequence would be a cruel death. So when a man is asked if he has money about him, he is expected to speak the truth, and has no right to lie any more than a Christian had a right to lie to save his life. The doctrine that " mendacia officiosa " are only venial sins, rests on the principle that the intention determines the character of the act. The simple Scriptural rule is, that he who does " evil that good may come," his " damnation is just/'
It is a fact of experience, that, so far as our inner life at least is concerned, exorbitant attention to how to do a thing destroys the ability to do it. An adept in logic may be a very poor rea- soner ; and a man who spends his life in studying the rules of elocution may be a very indifferent orator. So a man versed in
1 Dens, ut supra, vol. iv. N. 242, p. 307. " Mendacium officiosum dicitur, quod com- mittitur solum causa utilitatis propria? vel alienae : v. g. quis dicit, se non habere pecunias, ne iis spolietur a militibus." And on the same page he says, " Officiosum autem et joco- sum sunt ex genere suo peccatum veniale." So also Gury, vol. i. p. 199. "Mendacium officiosum peccatum venale est, per se, quia in eo gravis deordinatio non apprehenditur."
2 De Mendacio, 9, (vi.); Works, ut supra, vol. vi. p. 719 ff.
448 PART ni. Ch. XIX. — THE LAW.
all the subtleties of casuistry is apt to lose the clear and simple apprehension of right and wrong. Professor Gury has for the motto of his book on moral theology, the words of St. Gregory : " Ars artium regimen animarum." Very true, but it is a bad way to lead a man to a given point to put him into a labyrinth. These books of casuistry only serve to mystify the plainest sub- jects. Indulging in such subtleties can hardly fail to lead to the adoption of false principles. It is very plain that the man who was at once a prince and a bishop, could not well be drunk as prince and sober as bishop ; yet, as we have seen, these books teach that a priest may lie as a man, and yet speak truth as a vicar of God. The plain directions of the Word of God and a conscience enlightened by his Spirit, are safer guides in matters of duty than all the books on moral theology the Jesuits ever wrote. This is not saying that morals are not a proper subject of study, or that there is not a call in that field for the exercise of discrimination and distinction. The objection is not to the study of morals, but to inordinate devotion to that department, and to the perplexing and perverting subtleties of casuistry.
Pious Frauds.
Pious fraud was reduced by Romanists to a science and an art. It was called economics, from oiWo/ua, " dispensatio rei familiaris,', the discretionary use of things in a family according to circumstances. The theory is founded on the principle that if the intention be lawful, the act is lawful. Any act, therefore, designed to promote any "pious" end is justifiable "in foro conscientiae." This principle was introduced at an early period into the Christian Church. Mosheim attributes to it a heathen origin.1 He says that the Platonists and Pythagoreans taught that it was commendable to lie to promote a good end. The evil, however, had probably an independent origin wherever it appeared. It is plausible enough to rise spontaneously in any mind not under the control of the Word and Spirit of God.
Augustine had to contend against this error in his day. There were certain orthodox Christians who thought it right falsely to assert that they were Priscillianists in order to gain their confi- dence and thus be able to convict them of heresy. This brought up the question whether it was allowable to commit a fraud for a good end ; in other words, whether the intention determined the character of the act. Augustine took the negative of the ques-
1 Ecclesiastical History, i. ii. 2. 3. § 15; edit. New York, 1859, vol. i. p. 130.