Chapter XXXV.--Contradictory Propositions Advanced by Hermogenes Respecting Matter and Its Qualities.
As regards all other points touching Matter, although there is no necessity why we should treat of them (for our first point was the manifest proof of its existence), we must for all that pursue our discussion just as if it did exist, in order that its non-existence may be the more apparent, when these other points concerning it prove inconsistent with each other, and in order at the same time that Hermogenes may acknowledge his own contradictory positions. Matter, says he, at first sight seems to us to be incorporeal; but when examined by the light of right reason, it is found to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal. What is this right reason of yours, [6506] which declares nothing right, that is, nothing certain? For, if I mistake not, everything must of necessity be either corporeal or incorporeal (although I may for the moment [6507] allow that there is a certain incorporeality in even substantial things, [6508] although their very substance is the body of particular things); at all events, after the corporeal and the incorporeal there is no third state. But if it be contended [6509] that there is a third state discovered by this right reason of Hermogenes, which makes Matter neither corporeal nor incorporeal, (I ask,) Where is it? what sort of thing is it? what is it called? what is its description? what is it understood to be? This only has his reason declared, that Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal.
[6506] Ista.
[6507] Interim.
[6508] De substantiis duntaxat.
[6509] Age nunc sit: "But grant that there is this third state."
Chapter XXXVI.--Other Absurd Theories Respecting Matter and Its Incidents Exposed in an Ironical Strain. Motion in Matter. Hermogenes' Conceits Respecting It.
But see what a contradiction he next advances [6510] (or perhaps some other reason [6511] occurs to him), when he declares that Matter partly corporeal and partly incorporeal. Then must Matter be considered (to embrace) both conditions, in order that it may not have either? For it will be corporeal, and incorporeal in spite of [6512] the declaration of that antithesis, [6513] which is plainly above giving any reason for its opinion, just as that "other reason" also was. Now, by the corporeal part of Matter, he means that of which bodies are created; but by the incorporeal part of Matter, he means its uncreated [6514] motion. If, says he, Matter were simply a body, there would appear to be in it nothing incorporeal, that is, (no) motion; if, on the other hand, it had been wholly incorporeal no body could be formed out of it. What a peculiarly right [6515] reason have we here! Only if you make your sketches as right as you make your reason, Hermogenes, no painter would be more stupid [6516] than yourself. For who is going to allow you to reckon motion as a moiety of Matter, seeing that it is not a substantial thing, because it is not corporeal, but an accident (if indeed it be even that) of a substance and a body? Just as action [6517] is, and impulsion, just as a slip is, or a fall, so is motion. When anything moves even of itself, its motion is the result of impulse; [6518] but certainly it is no part of its substance in your sense, [6519] when you make motion the incorporeal part of matter. All things, indeed, [6520] have motion--either of themselves as animals, or of others as inanimate things; but yet we should not say that either a man or a stone was both corporeal and incorporeal because they had both a body and motion: we should say rather that all things have one form of simple [6521] corporeality, which is the essential quality [6522] of substance. If any incorporeal incidents accrue to them, as actions, or passions, or functions, [6523] or desires, we do not reckon these parts as of the things. How then does he contrive to assign an integral portion of Matter to motion, which does not pertain to substance, but to a certain condition [6524] of substance? Is not this incontrovertible? [6525] Suppose you had taken it into your head [6526] to represent matter as immoveable, would then the immobility seem to you to be a moiety of its form? Certainly not. Neither, in like manner, could motion. But I shall be at liberty to speak of motion elsewhere.
[6510] Subicit.
[6511] Other than "the right reason" above named.
[6512] Adversus.
[6513] The original, "Adversus renuntiationem reciprocationis illius," is an obscure expression. Oehler, who gives this reading in his edition, after the editio princeps, renders the term "reciprocationis" by the phrase "negative conversion" of the proposition that Matter is corporeal and incorporeal (q.d. "Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal"). Instead, however, of the reading "reciprocationis," Oehler would gladly read "rectæ rationis," after most of the editions. He thinks that this allusion to "the right reason," of which Hermogenes boasted, and of which the absurd conclusion is exposed in the context, very well suits the sarcastic style of Tertullian. If this, the general reading, be adopted, we must render the whole clause this: "For it will be corporeal and incorporeal, in spite of the declaration of that right reason (of Hermogenes), which is plainly enough above giving any reason," etc. etc.
[6514] Inconditum. See above ch. xviii., in the middle. Notwithstanding the absurdity of Hermogenes idea, it is impossible to translate this word irregular as it has been proposed to do by Genoude.
[6515] Rectior.
[6516] Bardior.
[6517] Actus: being driven.
[6518] Actus ejus est motus.
[6519] Sicut tu.
[6520] Denique.
[6521] Solius.
[6522] Res.
[6523] Officia.
[6524] Habitum.
[6525] Quid enim?
[6526] Si placuisset tibi.
[6527] See below, ch. xli., p. 500.