Chapter XXXVII.--Ironical Dilemmas Respecting Matter, and Sundry Moral Qualities Fancifully Attributed to It.
I see now that you are coming back again to that reason, which has been in the habit of declaring to you nothing in the way of certainty. For just as you introduce to our notice Matter as being neither corporeal nor incorporeal, so you allege of it that it is neither good nor evil; and you say, whilst arguing further on it in the same strain: "If it were good, seeing that it had ever been so, it would not require the arrangement of itself by God; [6528] if it were naturally evil, it would not have admitted of a change [6529] for the better, nor would God have ever applied to such a nature any attempt at arrangement of it, for His labour would have been in vain." Such are your words, which it would have been well if you had remembered in other passages also, so as to have avoided any contradiction of them. As, however, we have already treated to some extent of this ambiguity of good and evil touching Matter, I will now reply to the only proposition and argument of yours which we have before us. I shall not stop to repeat my opinion, that it was your bounden duty to have said for certain that Matter was either good or bad, or in some third condition; but (I must observe) that you have not here even kept to the statement which you chose to make before. Indeed, you retract what you declared--that Matter is neither good nor evil; because you imply that it is evil when you say, "If it were good, it would not require to be set in order by God;" so again, when you add, "If it were naturally evil, it would not admit of any change for the better," you seem to intimate [6530] that it is good. And so you attribute to it a close relation [6531] to good and evil, although you declared it neither good nor evil. With a view, however, to refute the argument whereby you thought you were going to clinch your proposition, I here contend: If Matter had always been good, why should it not have still wanted a change for the better? Does that which is good never desire, never wish, never feel able to advance, so as to change its good for a better? And in like manner, if Matter had been by nature evil, why might it not have been changed by God as the more powerful Being, as able to convert the nature of stones into children of Abraham? [6532] Surely by such means you not only compare the Lord with Matter, but you even put Him below [6533] it, since you affirm that [6534] the nature of Matter could not possibly be brought under control by Him, and trained to something better. But although you are here disinclined to allow that Matter is by nature evil, yet in another passage you will deny having made such an admission. [6535]
[6528] Compositionem Dei.
[6529] Non accepisset translationem.
[6530] Subostendis.
[6531] Affinem.
[6532] Matt. iii. 9.
[6533] Subicis.
[6534] This is the force of the subjunctive verb.
[6535] Te confessum.
Chapter XXXIII.--Other Speculations of Hermogenes, About Matter and Some of Its Adjuncts, Shown to Be Absurd. For Instance, Its Alleged Infinity.
My observations touching the site [6536] of Matter, as also concerning its mode [6537] have one and the same object in view--to meet and refute your perverse positions. You put Matter below God, and thus, of course, you assign a place to it below God. Therefore Matter is local. [6538] Now, if it is local, it is within locality; if within locality, it is bounded [6539] by the place within which it is; if it is bounded, it has an outline, [6540] which (painter as you are in your special vocation) you know is the boundary to every object susceptible of outline. Matter, therefore, cannot be infinite, which, since it is in space, is bounded by space; and being thus determinable by space, it is susceptible of an outline. You, however, make it infinite, when you say: "It is on this account infinite, because it is always existent." And if any of your disciples should choose to meet us by declaring your meaning to be that Matter is infinite in time, not in its corporeal mass, [6541] still what follows will show that (you mean) corporeal infinity to be an attribute of Matter, that it is in respect of bulk immense and uncircumscribed. "Wherefore," say you, "it is not fabricated as a whole, but in its parts." [6542] In bulk, therefore, is it infinite, not in time. And you contradict yourself [6543] when you make Matter infinite in bulk, and at the same time ascribe place to it, including it within space and local outline. But yet at the same time I cannot tell why God should not have entirely formed it, [6544] unless it be because He was either impotent or envious. I want therefore to know the moiety of that which was not wholly formed (by God), in order that I may understand what kind of thing the entirety was. It was only right that God should have made it known as a model of antiquity, [6545] to set off the glory of His work.
[6536] De situ.
[6537] Oehler here restores the reading "quod et de modo," instead of "de motu," for which Pamelius contends. Oehler has the mss. on his side, and Fr. Junius, who interprets "modo" here to mean "mass or quantity." Pamelius wishes to suit the passage to the preceding context (see ch. xxxvi.); Junius thinks it is meant rather to refer to what follows, by which it is confirmed.
[6538] In loco.
[6539] Determinatur.
[6540] Lineam extremam.
[6541] Modo corporis: or "bulk."
[6542] Nec tota fabricatur, sed partes ejus. This perhaps means: "It is not its entirety, but its parts, which are used in creation."
[6543] Obduceris: here a verb of the middle voice.
[6544] In reference to the opinion above mentioned, "Matter is not fabricated as whole, but in parts."
[6545] Ut exemplarium antiquitatis.