21. Nay, that very declaration, that from the same lump a vessel is formed both to honour and to dishonour, will not push us hard; for we assert that the nature of all rational souls is the same, as one lump of clay is described as being under the treatment of the potter. Seeing, then, the nature of rational creatures is one, God, according to the previous grounds of merit, [2378] created and formed out of it, as the potter out of the one lump, some persons to honour and others to dishonour. Now, as regards the language of the apostle, which he utters as if in a tone of censure, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" he means, I think, to point out that such a censure does not refer to any believer who lives rightly and justly, and who has confidence in God, i.e., to such an one as Moses was, of whom Scripture says that "Moses spake, and God answered him by a voice;" [2379] and as God answered Moses, so also does every saint answer God. But he who is an unbeliever, and loses confidence in answering before God owing to the unworthiness of his life and conversation, and who, in relation to these matters, does not seek to learn and make progress, but to oppose and resist, and who, to speak more plainly, is such an one as to be able to say those words which the apostle indicates, when he says, "Why, then, does He yet find fault? for who will resist His will?"--to such an one may the censure of the apostle rightly be directed, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" This censure accordingly applies not to believers and saints, but to unbelievers and wicked men.
Now, to those who introduce souls of different natures, [2380] and who turn this declaration of the apostle to the support of their own opinion, we have to reply as follows: If even they are agreed as to what the apostle says, that out of the one lump are formed both those who are made to honour and those who are made to dishonour, whom they term of a nature that is to be saved and destroyed, there will then be no longer souls of different natures, but one nature for all. And if they admit that one and the same potter may undoubtedly denote one Creator, there will not be different creators either of those who are saved, or of those who perish. Now, truly, let them choose whether they will have a good Creator to be intended who creates bad and ruined men, or one who is not good, who creates good men and those who are prepared to honour. For the necessity of returning an answer will extort from them one of these two alternatives. But according to our declaration, whereby we say that it is owing to preceding causes that God makes vessels either to honour or to dishonour, the approval of God's justice is in no respect limited. For it is possible that this vessel, which owing to previous causes was made in this world to honour, may, if it behave negligently, be converted in another world, according to the deserts of its conduct, into a vessel unto dishonour: as again, if any one, owing to preceding causes, was formed by his Creator in this life a vessel unto dishonour, and shall mend his ways and cleanse himself from all filth and vice, he may, in the new world, be made a vessel to honour, sanctified and useful, and prepared unto every good work. Finally, those who were formed by God in this world to be Israelites, and who have lived a life unworthy of the nobility of their race, and have fallen away from the grandeur of their descent, will, in the world to come, in a certain degree [2381] be converted, on account of their unbelief, from vessels of honour into vessels of dishonour; while, on the other hand, many who in this life were reckoned among Egyptian or Idumean vessels, having adopted the faith and practice of Israelites, when they shall have done the works of Israelites, and shall have entered the Church of the Lord, will exist as vessels of honour in the revelation of the sons of God. From which it is more agreeable to the rule of piety to believe that every rational being, according to his purpose and manner of life, is converted, sometimes from bad to good, and falls away sometimes from good to bad: that some abide in good, and others advance to a better condition, and always ascend to higher things, until they reach the highest grade of all; while others, again, remain in evil, or, if the wickedness within them begin to spread itself further, they descend to a worse condition, and sink into the lowest depth of wickedness. Whence also we must suppose that it is possible there may be some who began at first indeed with small offences, but who have poured out wickedness to such a degree, and attained such proficiency in evil, that in the measure of their wickedness they are equal even to the opposing powers: and again, if, by means of many severe administrations of punishment, they are able at some future time to recover their senses, and gradually attempt to find healing for their wounds, they may, on ceasing from their wickedness, be restored to a state of goodness. Whence we are of opinion that, seeing the soul, as we have frequently said, is immortal and eternal, it is possible that, in the many and endless periods of duration in the immeasurable and different worlds, it may descend from the highest good to the lowest evil, or be restored from the lowest evil to the highest good.
22. But since the words of the apostle, in what he says regarding vessels of honour or dishonour, that "if a man therefore purge himself, he will be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the Master's service, and prepared unto every good work," appear to place nothing in the power of God, but all in ourselves; while in those in which he declares that "the potter hath power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel to honour, another to dishonour," he seems to refer the whole to God,--it is not to be understood that those statements are contradictory, but the two meanings are to be reduced to agreement, and one signification must be drawn from both, viz., that we are not to suppose either that those things which are in our own power can be done without the help of God, or that those which are in God's hand can be brought to completion without the intervention of our acts, and desires, and intention; because we have it not in our own power so to will or do anything, as not to know that this very faculty, by which we are able to will or to do, was bestowed on us by God, according to the distinction which we indicated above. Or again, when God forms vessels, some to honour and others to dishonour, we are to suppose that He does not regard either our wills, or our purposes, or our deserts, to be the causes of the honour or dishonour, as if they were a sort of matter from which He may form the vessel of each one of us either to honour or to dishonour; whereas the very movement of the soul itself, or the purpose of the understanding, may of itself suggest to him, who is not unaware of his heart and the thoughts of his mind, whether his vessel ought to be formed to honour or to dishonour. But let these points suffice, which we have discussed as we best could, regarding the questions connected with the freedom of the will. [2382]
[2275] The whole of this chapter has been preserved in the original Greek, which is literally translated in corresponding portions on each page, so that the differences between Origen's own words and amplifications and alterations of the paraphrase of Rufinus may be at once patent to the reader.
[2276] Natura ipsius arbitrii voluntatisque.
[2277] Quæcunque hujusmodi sunt, quæ solo habitu materiæ suæ vel corporum constant.
[2278] Non tamen animantia sunt.
[2279] Phantasia.
[2280] Voluntas vel sensus.
[2281] Mella, ut aiunt, aeria congregandi. Rufinus seems to have read, in the original, aeroplastein instead of keroplastein,--an evidence that he followed in general the worst readings (Redepenning).
[2282] Ordinatior quidem motus.
[2283] Incentivo quodam et naturali motu.
[2284] Ita ut etiam verisimilibus quibusdam causis intra cordis nostri tribunalia velut judici residenti ex utrâque parte adhiberi videatur assertio, ut causis prius expositis gerendi sententia de rationis judicio proferatur.
[2285] Causa ei perfecta et absoluta vel necessitas prævaricandi.
[2286] Naturalem corporis intemperiem; psilen ten kataskeuen.
[2287] Contra rationem totius eruditionis. In the Greek, "contra rationem" is expressed by para to enarges esti: and the words logou paideutikou (rendered by Rufinus "totius eruditionis," and connected with "contra rationem") belong to the following clause.
[2288] Quibus nihil ad turpitudinem deest.
[2289] Mic. vi. 8.
[2290] Deut. xxx. 15.
[2291] Isa. i. 19, 20.
[2292] Ps. lxxxi. 13, 14.
[2293] Matt. v. 39.
[2294] Matt. v. 22.
[2295] Matt. v. 28.
[2296] Matt. vii. 24.
[2297] Matt. vii. 26.
[2298] Matt. xxv. 34 sq.
[2299] The words in the text are: His qui secundum patientiam boni operis, gloria et incorruptio, qui quærunt vitam eternam.
[2300] Rom. ii. 4-10.
[2301] Secundum pietatis regulam.
[2302] Ex. iv. 21, etc.
[2303] Ezek. xi. 19, 20.
[2304] Justificationes.
[2305] The word "now" is added, as the term "flesh" is frequently used in the New Testament in a bad sense (Redepenning).
[2306] Mark iv. 12.
[2307] Rom. ix. 16.
[2308] Phil. ii. 13.
[2309] Rom. ix. 18 sq.
[2310] Rom. ix. 18.
[2311] Obstupefactus.
[2312] Naturaliter.
[2313] Commentitias fabulas introducunt.
[2314] Quid faciente vel quid prospiciente.
[2315] Prospectus et intuitus Dei. Such is the rendering of ennoia by Rufinus.
[2316] Ex. ix. 17, cf. xi. 5 and xii. 12.
[2317] Heb. vi. 7, 8.
[2318] Ex personâ imbrium.
[2319] Dure.
[2320] Bonitas et æquitas imbrium.
[2321] Propositum.
[2322] Limum.
[2323] Cum utique secundum naturam unum sit.
[2324] Malitiæ suæ intentione conceperat.
[2325] Cf. Ex. viii. 27-29.
[2326] Tropum vel figuram sermonis.
[2327] Rom. ii. 4, 5.
[2328] Et apostolicæ similitudinis parum munimenti habere adhus videtur assertio.
[2329] Isa. lxiii. 17, 18. Here the Septuagint differs from the Masoretic text.
[2330] Jer. xx. 7.
[2331] Morali utique tropo accipiendum.
[2332] Ferratum calcem.
[2333] Frenis ferratis.
[2334] Heb. xii. 6.
[2335] Rom. viii. 35.
[2336] Rationabilibus coelestibusque virtutibus.
[2337] Primatus.
[2338] Immaculatus.
[2339] Luke xviii. 14.
[2340] 1 Cor. i. 29.
[2341] Non tamen sine certâ ratione.
[2342] Digeri. The rendering "dispersed" seems to agree best with the meaning intended to be conveyed.
[2343] In the Greek the term is pentekontaetian.
[2344] Cf. Matt. xiii. 5, 6.
[2345] Hæc.
[2346] Persecrutationis improbitas.
[2347] Substantialiter.
[2348] Wisd. vii. 16.
[2349] Capitulum.
[2350] Rom. ix. 18.
[2351] Ezek. xi. 19, 20.
[2352] Mark iv. 12.
[2353] Prospera sanitas.
[2354] Aula.
[2355] Mentes.
[2356] Evidentissimâ assertione pietatis regulam teneamus.
[2357] Dispensatio humana.
[2358] Futuri status causam præstat semper anterior meritorum status.
[2359] Rom. ix. 16.
[2360] Ad finem boni.
[2361] Medium est velle bona.
[2362] Rom. ix. 16.
[2363] Ps. cxxvii. 1.
[2364] Procinctum juvenum.
[2365] Supernæ vocationis.
[2366] Valde consequenter.
[2367] 1 Cor. iii. 6, 7.
[2368] "Nostra perfectio non quidem nobis cessantibus et otiosis efficitur." There is an ellipsis of some such words as, "but by activity on our part."
[2369] Cf. Phil. ii. 13.
[2370] Hoc ipsum, quod homines sumus.
[2371] Sicut dicamus, quod movemur, ex Deo est.
[2372] Hoc ipsum, quod movetur.
[2373] Rom. ix. 18-21.
[2374] 2 Tim. i. 16-18.
[2375] 2 Cor. v. 10.
[2376] Ex ipsâ conditoris creatione.
[2377] 2 Tim. ii. 20, 21.
[2378] Secundum præcedentes meritorum causas.
[2379] Ex. xix. 19.
[2380] Diversas animarum naturas.
[2381] Quodammodo.
[2382] [Elucidation II.]
Translation from the Greek.