Chapter I.--On the Freedom of the Will, [2383] With an Explanation and Interpretation of Those Statements of Scripture Which Appear to Nullify It.
1. Since in the preaching of the Church there is included the doctrine respecting a just judgment of God, which, when believed to be true, incites those who hear it to live virtuously, and to shun sin by all means, inasmuch as they manifestly acknowledge that things worthy of praise and blame are within our own power, come and let us discuss by themselves a few points regarding the freedom of the will--a question of all others most necessary. And that we may understand what the freedom of the will is, it is necessary to unfold the conception of it, [2384] that this being declared with precision, the subject may be placed before us.
2. Of things that move, some have the cause of their motion within themselves; others, again, are moved only from without. Now only portable things are moved from without, such as pieces of wood, and stones, and all matter that is held together by their constitution alone. [2385] And let that view be removed from consideration which calls the flux of bodies motion, since it is not needed for our present purpose. But animals and plants have the cause of their motion within themselves, and in general whatever is held together by nature and a soul, to which class of things they say that metals also belong. And besides these, fire too is self-moved, and perhaps also fountains of water. Now, of those things which have the cause of their movement within themselves, some, they say, are moved out of themselves, others from themselves: things without life, out of themselves; animate things, from themselves. For animate things are moved from themselves, a phantasy [2386] springing up in them which incites to effort. And again, in certain animals phantasies are formed which call forth an effort, the nature of the phantasy [2387] stirring up the effort in an orderly manner, as in the spider is formed the phantasy of weaving; and the attempt to weave follows, the nature of its phantasy inciting the insect in an orderly manner to this alone. And besides its phantasial nature, nothing else is believed to belong to the insect. [2388] And in the bee there is formed the phantasy to produce wax.
3. The rational animal, however, has, in addition to its phantasial nature, also reason, which judges the phantasies, and disapproves of some and accepts others, in order that the animal may be led according to them. Therefore, since there are in the nature of reason aids towards the contemplation of virtue and vice, by following which, after beholding good and evil, we select the one and avoid the other, we are deserving of praise when we give ourselves to the practice of virtue, and censurable when we do the reverse. We must not, however, be ignorant that the greater part of the nature assigned to all things is a varying quantity [2389] among animals, both in a greater and a less degree; so that the instinct in hunting-dogs and in war-horses approaches somehow, so to speak, to the faculty of reason. Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir up within us this phantasy or that, is confessedly not one of those things that are dependent upon ourselves; but to determine that we shall use the occurrence in this way or differently, is the prerogative of nothing else than of the reason within us, which, as occasion offers, [2390] arouses us towards efforts inciting to what is virtuous and becoming, or turns us aside to what is the reverse.
4. But if any one maintain that this very external cause is of such a nature that it is impossible to resist it when it comes in such a way, let him turn his attention to his own feelings and movements, (and see) whether there is not an approval, and assent, and inclination of the controlling principle towards some object on account of some specious arguments. [2391] For, to take an instance, a woman who has appeared before a man that has determined to be chaste, and to refrain from carnal intercourse, and who has incited him to act contrary to his purpose, is not a perfect [2392] cause of annulling his determination. For, being altogether pleased with the luxury and allurement of the pleasure, and not wishing to resist it, or to keep his purpose, he commits an act of licentiousness. Another man, again (when the same things have happened to him who has received more instruction, and has disciplined himself [2393] ), encounters, indeed, allurements and enticements; but his reason, as being strengthened to a higher point, and carefully trained, and confirmed in its views towards a virtuous course, or being near to confirmation, [2394] repels the incitement, and extinguishes the desire.
5. Such being the case, to say that we are moved from without, and to put away the blame from ourselves, by declaring that we are like to pieces of wood and stones, which are dragged about by those causes that act upon them from without, is neither true nor in conformity with reason, but is the statement of him who wishes to destroy [2395] the conception of free-will. For if we were to ask such an one what was free-will, he would say that it consisted in this, that when purposing to do some thing, no external cause came inciting to the reverse. But to blame, on the other hand, the mere constitution of the body, [2396] is absurd; for the disciplinary reason, [2397] taking hold of those who are most intemperate and savage (if they will follow her exhortation), effects a transformation, so that the alteration and change for the better is most extensive,--the most licentious men frequently becoming better than those who formerly did not seem to be such by nature; and the most savage men passing into such a state of mildness, [2398] that those persons who never at any time were so savage as they were, appear savage in comparison, so great a degree of gentleness having been produced within them. And we see other men, most steady and respectable, driven from their state of respectability and steadiness by intercourse with evil customs, so as to fall into habits of licentiousness, often beginning their wickedness in middle age, and plunging into disorder after the period of youth has passed, which, so far as its nature is concerned, is unstable. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that external events do not depend on us, but that it is our own business to use them in this way or the opposite, having received reason as a judge and an investigator [2399] of the manner in which we ought to meet those events that come from without.
6. Now, that it is our business to live virtuously, and that God asks this of us, as not being dependent on Him nor on any other, nor, as some think, upon fate, but as being our own doing, the prophet Micah will prove when he says: "If it has been announced to thee, O man, what is good, or what does the Lord require of thee, except to do justice and to love mercy?" [2400] Moses also: "I have placed before thy face the way of life, and the way of death: choose what is good, and walk in it." [2401] Isaiah too: "If you are willing, and hear me, ye shall eat the good of the land; but if ye be unwilling, and will not hear me, the sword will consume you: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." [2402] And in the Psalms: "If My people had heard Me, and Israel had walked in My ways, I would have humbled their enemies to nothing, and laid My hand upon those that afflicted them;" [2403] showing that it was in the power of His people to hear and to walk in the ways of God. And the Saviour also, when He commands, "But I say unto you, Resist not evil;" [2404] and, "Whosoever shall be angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment;" [2405] and, "Whosoever shall look upon a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart;" [2406] and by any other commandment which He gives, declares that it lies with ourselves to keep what is enjoined, and that we shall reasonably [2407] be liable to condemnation if we transgress. And therefore He says in addition: "He that heareth My words, and doeth them, shall be likened to a prudent man, who built his house upon a rock," etc., etc.; "while he that heareth them, but doeth them not, is like a foolish man, who built his house upon the sand," etc. [2408] And when He says to those on His right hand, "Come, ye blessed of My Father," etc.; "for I was an hungered, and ye gave Me to eat; I was athirst, and ye gave Me to drink," [2409] it is exceedingly manifest that He gives the promises to these as being deserving of praise. But, on the contrary, to the others, as being censurable in comparison with them, He says, "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire!" [2410] And let us observe how Paul also converses [2411] with us as having freedom of will, and as being ourselves the cause of ruin or salvation, when he says, "Dost thou despise the riches of His goodness, and of His patience, and of His long-suffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? But, according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou art treasuring up for thyself wrath on the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who will render to every one according to his works: to those who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory and immortality, eternal life; while to those who are contentious, and believe not the truth, but who believe iniquity, anger, wrath, tribulation, and distress, on every soul of man that worketh evil; on the Jew first, and on the Greek: but glory, and honour, and peace to every one that worketh good; to the Jew first, and to the Greek." [2412] There are, indeed, innumerable passages in the Scriptures which establish with exceeding clearness the existence of freedom of will.
7. But, since certain declarations of the Old Testament and of the New lead to the opposite conclusion--namely, that it does not depend on ourselves to keep the commandments and to be saved, or to transgress them and to be lost--let us adduce them one by one, and see the explanations of them, in order that from those which we adduce, any one selecting in a similar way all the passages that seem to nullify free-will, may consider what is said about them by way of explanation. And now, the statements regarding Pharaoh have troubled many, respecting whom God declared several times, "I will harden Pharaoh's heart." [2413] For if he is hardened by God, and commits sin in consequence of being hardened, he is not the cause of sin to himself; and if so, then neither does Pharaoh possess free-will. And some one will say that, in a similar way, they who perish have not free-will, and will not perish of themselves. The declaration also in Ezekiel, "I will take away their stony hearts, and will put in them hearts of flesh, that they may walk in My precepts, and keep My commandments," [2414] might lead one to think that it was God who gave the power to walk in His commandments, and to keep His precepts, by His withdrawing the hindrance--the stony heart, and implanting a better--a heart of flesh. And let us look also at the passage in the Gospel--the answer which the Saviour returns to those who inquired why He spake to the multitude in parables. His words are: "That seeing they might not see; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest they should be converted, and their sins be forgiven them." [2415] The passage also in Paul: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." [2416] The declarations, too, in other places, that "both to will and to do are of God;" [2417] "that God hath mercy upon whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will?" "The persuasion is of Him that calleth, and not of us." [2418] "Nay, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that hath formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?" [2419] Now these passages are sufficient of themselves to trouble the multitude, as if man were not possessed of free-will, but as if it were God who saves and destroys whom He will.