Chapter LXXI.
Celsus accordingly, as not understanding the doctrine relating to the Spirit of God ("for the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned" [4651] ), weaves together (such a web) as pleases himself, [4652] imagining that we, in calling God a Spirit, differ in no respect in this particular from the Stoics among the Greeks, who maintain that "God is a Spirit, diffused through all things, and containing all things within Himself." Now the superintendence and providence of God does extend through all things, but not in the way that spirit does, according to the Stoics. Providence indeed contains all things that are its objects, and comprehends them all, but not as a containing body includes its contents, because they also are "body," [4653] but as a divine power does it comprehend what it contains. According to the philosophers of the Porch, indeed, who assert that principles are "corporeal," and who on that account make all things perishable, and who venture even to make the God of all things capable of perishing, the very Word of God, who descends even to the lowest of mankind, would be--did it not appear to them to be too gross an incongruity [4654] --nothing else than a "corporeal" spirit; whereas, in our opinion,--who endeavour to demonstrate that the rational soul is superior to all "corporeal" nature, and that it is an invisible substance, and incorporeal,--God the Word, by whom all things were made, who came, in order that all things might be made by the Word, not to men only, but to what are deemed the very lowest of things, under the dominion of nature alone, would be no body. The Stoics, then, may consign all things to destruction by fire; we, however, know of no incorporeal substance that is destructible by fire, nor (do we believe) that the soul of man, or the substance of "angels," or of "thrones," or dominions," or "principalities," or "powers," can be dissolved by fire.
[4651] Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 14.
[4652] heauto sunaptei.
[4653] ouch hos soma de periechon periechei, hoti kai soma esti to periechomenon.
[4654] panu apemphainon.
Chapter LXXII.
It is therefore in vain that Celsus asserts, as one who knows not the nature of the Spirit of God, that "as the Son of God, who existed in a human body, is a Spirit, this very Son of God would not be immortal." He next becomes confused in his statements, as if there were some of us who did not admit that God is a Spirit, but maintain that only with regard to His Son, and he thinks that he can answer us by saying that there "is no kind of spirit which lasts for ever." This is much the same as if, when we term God a "consuming fire," he were to say that there "is no kind of fire which lasts for ever;" not observing the sense in which we say that our God is a fire, and what the things are which He consumes, viz., sins, and wickedness. For it becomes a God of goodness, after each individual has shown, by his efforts, what kind of combatant he has been, to consume vice by the fire of His chastisements. He proceeds, in the next place, to assume what we do not maintain, that "God must necessarily have given up the ghost;" from which also it follows that Jesus could not have risen again with His body. For God would not have received back the spirit which He had surrendered after it had been stained by contact with the body. It is foolish, however, for us to answer statements as ours which were never made by us.
Chapter LXXIII.
He proceeds to repeat himself, and after saying a great deal which he had said before, and ridiculing the birth of God from a virgin,--to which we have already replied as we best could,--he adds the following: "If God had wished to send down His Spirit from Himself, what need was there to breathe it into the womb of a woman? For as one who knew already how to form men, He could also have fashioned a body for this person, without casting His own Spirit into so much pollution; [4655] and in this way He would not have been received with incredulity, if He had derived His existence immediately from above." He had made these remarks, because he knows not the pure and virgin birth, unaccompanied by any corruption, of that body which was to minister to the salvation of men. For, quoting the sayings of the Stoics, [4656] and affecting not to know the doctrine about "things indifferent," he thinks that the divine nature was cast amid pollution, and was stained either by being in the body of a woman, until a body was formed around it, or by assuming a body. And in this he acts like those who imagine that the sun's rays are polluted by dung and by foul-smelling bodies, and do not remain pure amid such things. If, however, according to the view of Celsus, the body of Jesus had been fashioned without generation, those who beheld the body would at once have believed that it had not been formed by generation; and yet an object, when seen, does not at the same time indicate the nature of that from which it has derived its origin. For example, suppose that there were some honey (placed before one) which had not been manufactured by bees, no one could tell from the taste or sight that it was not their workmanship, because the honey which comes from bees does not make known its origin by the senses, [4657] but experience alone can tell that it does not proceed from them. In the same way, too, experience teaches that wine comes from the vine, for taste does not enable us to distinguish (the wine) which comes from the vine. In the same manner, therefore, the visible [4658] body does not make known the manner of its existence. And you will be induced to accept this view, [4659] by (regarding) the heavenly bodies, whose existence and splendour we perceive as we gaze at them; and yet, I presume, their appearance does not suggest to us whether they are created or uncreated; and accordingly different opinions have existed on these points. And yet those who say that they are created are not agreed as to the manner of their creation, for their appearance does not suggest it, although the force of reason [4660] may have discovered that they are created, and how their creation was effected.
[4655] eis tosouton miasma.
[4656] Cf. book iv. capp. xiv. and lxviii.
[4657] te aisthesei ten archen.
[4658] to aistheton soma.
[4659] prosachthese de to legomeno.
[4660] khan biasamenos ho logos heure.