Chapter X.--The Absolute God Entirely Incomprehensible by Man.
"For instance, then, what did you say in the beginning? If the wicked one has been begotten of God, being of the same substance as He, then God is wicked. But when I showed you, from the example which you yourself adduced, that wicked beings come from good, and good from wicked, you did not admit the argument, for you said that the example was a human one. Wherefore I now do not admit that the term being begotten' [1426] can be used with reference to God; for it is characteristic of man, and not of God, to beget. Not only so; but God cannot be good or evil, just or unjust. Nor indeed can He have intelligence, or life, or any of the other attributes which can exist in man; for all these are peculiar to man. And if we must not, in our investigations in regard to God, give Him the good attributes which belong to man, it is not possible for us to have any thought or make any statement in regard to God; but all we can do is to investigate One point alone,--namely, what is His will which He has Himself allowed us to apprehend, in order that, being judged, we might be without excuse in regard to those laws which we have not observed, though we knew them."
[1426] The text is corrupt here. Literally it is, "I do not admit that God had been begotten."
Chapter XI.--The Application of the Attributes of Man to God.
And Simon, hearing this, said: "You will not force me through shame to remain silent in regard to His substance, and to inquire into His will alone. For it is possible both to think and to speak of His substance. I mean from the good attributes that belong to man. For instance, life and death are attributes of man; but death is not an attribute of God, but life, and eternal life. Furthermore, men may be both evil and good; but God can be only incomparably good. And, not to prolong the subject too much, the better attributes of man are eternal attributes of God." And Peter said: "Tell me, Simon, is it an attribute of man to beget evil and good, and to do evil and good?" And Simon said: "It is." And Peter said: "Since you made this assertion, we must assign the better attributes of man to God; and so, while men beget evil and good, God can beget good only; and while men do evil and good, God rejoices only in doing good. Thus, with regard to God, we must either not predicate any of the attributes of man and be silent, or it is reasonable that we should assign the best of the good attributes to Him. And thus He alone is the cause of all good things."
Chapter XII.--God Produced the Wicked One, But Not Evil.
And Simon said: "If, then, God is the cause only of what is good, what else can we think than that some other principle begot the evil one; [1427] or is evil unbegotten?" And Peter said: "No other power begot the wicked one, nor is evil unbegotten, as I shall show in the conclusion; for now my object is to prove, as I promised in the commencement, that God is blameless in every [1428] respect. We have granted, then, that God possesses in an incomparable way the better attributes that belong to men. Wherefore also it is possible for Him to have been the producer of the four substances,--heat, I mean, and cold, moist and dry. These, as being at first simple and unmixed, were naturally indifferent in their desire; [1429] but being produced by God, and mixed externally, they would naturally become a living being, possessing the free choice to destroy those who are evil. And thus, since all things have been begotten from Him, the wicked one is from no other source. Nor has he derived his evil from the God who has created all things (with whom it is impossible that evil should exist), because the substances were produced by Him in a state of indifference, and carefully separated from each other; and when they were externally blended through his art, there arose through volition the desire for the destruction of the evil ones. But the good cannot be destroyed by the evil that arose, even though it should wish to do so: for it exercises its power only [1430] against those who sin. Ignorant, then, of the character of each, [1431] he makes his attempt against him, and convicting him, he punishes him." And Simon said: "God being able to mingle the elements, and to make His mixtures so as to produce any dispositions that He may wish, why did He not make the composition of each such as that it would prefer what is good?"
[1427] "Evil" is not in the mss. It is inserted from the next sentence.
[1428] "Every" is inserted by a conjecture of Schwegler's.
[1429] Lit., "naturally had their desire towards neither."
[1430] The mss. have "by law." We have changed nomo into monon.
[1431] The devil is plainly meant by the "he."