Chapter XIII.--God the Maker of the Devil.
And Peter said: "Now indeed our object is to show how and by whom the evil one came into being, since he did come into being; but we shall show if he came into being blamelessly, when we have finished the subject now in hand. Then I shall show how and on account of what he came into being, and I shall fully convince you that his Creator is blameless. [1432] We said, then, that the four substances were produced by God. And thus, through the volition of Him who mingled them, arose, as He wished, the choice of evils. For if it had arisen contrary to His determination, or from some other substance or cause, then God would not have had firmness of will: for perchance, even though He should not wish it, leaders of evil might continually arise, who would war against His wishes. But it is impossible that this should be the case. For no living being, and especially one capable of giving guidance, can arise from accident: for everything that is produced must be produced by some one."
[1432] This passage is evidently corrupt. But it is not easy to amend it.
Chapter XIV.--Is Matter Eternal?
And Simon said: "But what if matter, being coeval with Him, and possessing equal power, produces as His foe leaders who hinder His wishes?" And Peter said: "If matter is eternal, then it is the foe of no one: for that which exists for ever is impassible, and what is impassible is blessed; but what is blessed cannot be receptive of hatred, since, on account of its eternal creation, [1433] it does not fear that it will be deprived of anything. But how does not matter rather love the Creator, when [1434] it evidently sends forth its fruits to nourish all who are made by Him? And how does it not fear Him as superior, as trembling through earthquakes it confesses, and as, though its billows ran high, yet, when the Teacher was sailing on it and commanded a calm, it immediately obeyed and became still? [1435] What! did not the demons go out through fear and respect for Him, and others of them desired to enter into swine; but they first entreated Him before going, plainly because they had no power to enter even into swine without His permission?" [1436]
[1433] Probably "eternity" should be read, instead of "eternal creation."
[1434] At this word thems. of Cotelerius breaks off; and we have the rest only in the Ottobonian ms., first edited by Dressel.
[1435] Matt. xxvii. 51, viii. 24-26.
[1436] Matt. viii. 31.
Chapter XV.--Sin the Cause of Evil.
And Simon said: "But what if, being lifeless, it possesses a nature capable of producing what is evil and what is good?" And Peter said: "According to this statement, it is neither good nor evil, because it does not act by free choice, being lifeless and insensible. Wherefore it is possible to perceive distinctly in this matter, how, being lifeless, it produces as if it were living; [1437] and being insensible, it yet plainly fashions artistic shapes both in animals and plants." And Simon said: "What! if God Himself gave it life, is not He, then, the cause of the evils which it produces?" And Peter said: "If God gave it life according to His own will, then it is His Spirit that produces it, and no longer is it anything hostile to God, or of equal power with Him; or it is impossible that everything made by Him is made according as He wishes. But you will say, He Himself is the cause of evil, since He Himself produces the evils through it. What sort, then, are the evils of which you speak? Poisonous serpents and deadly plants, or demons, or any other of those things that can disturb men?--which things would not have been injurious had not man sinned, for which reason [1438] death came in. For if man were sinless, the poison of serpents would have no effect, nor the activities of injurious plants, nor would there be the disturbances of demons, nor would man naturally have any other suffering; but losing his immortality on account of his sin, he has become, as I said, capable of every suffering. But if you say, Why, then, was the nature of man made at the beginning capable of death? I tell you, because of free-will; for if we were not capable of death, we could not, as being immortal, be punished on account of our voluntary sin. [1439] And thus, on account of our freedom from suffering, righteousness would be still more weakened if we were wicked by choice; for those who should have evil purposes could not be punished, on account of their being incapable of suffering. [1440]
[1437] Possibly the right reading is empsuchous, "it produces living beings."
[1438] Or, "on whose account."
[1439] [Comp. xi. 8; Recognitions, iii. 21, 26, etc.--R.]
[1440] The text is corrupt.