RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPEDIA
Confirmation Conflict of Duties
be done if they should clash with each other. Since Cicero gave the word ofjicium the signification of a universal ethical conception, there originated in actual practise the possibility of a collision between the universal idea of moral obligation and the individual concrete action. This difficulty finds its illustration in the ethics of Kant and Schleiermacher. With Kant, the conception of duty loses its concrete content by changing itself into the law of free will, obedience to the consciousness of duty which is not bound by any moral law. It is evident that no conflict of duties can here be spoken of, " since duty and obligation are conceptions which express the objective practical necessity of a certain action, and two rules that oppose each other can not present themselves at the same time." According to Schleiermacher, " man's highest good is the totality of all actions in conformity with duty. If these were in conflict, some parts of the highest good of man would be in conflict, which is impossible. Thus there can be no conflict between duties." Kant and Schleiermacher were followed by ethical teachers who did not share their presuppositions— Reinhard, Baumgarten-Crusius, Daub, Marheineke, Rothe, Schwarz, Heppe, Luthardt, and others.
Conflicts of duties may be arranged under three heads. There may be (1) a conflict between duty and personal inclination. In this case, strictly speaking, there is no conflict of duties; Three but still there are cases in which sinful Kinds of habits take on the form of an objective Conflict, claim of duty, as in the conception of honor prevalent among Germans and other peoples. A Christian officer of the army may wish to discard dueling in conformity with the law and his own conviction; but when he has to choose between participation in a duel and relinquishment of liis calling, there originates a real conflict of duties. Moreover, inclination and duty are often hard to distinguish; since the choice of a calling should correspond closely to one's gifts, there may originate a conflict between the inclination to such choice and the duty toward the family. Also many matrimonial unions create not only conflicts, but real colHsions. Or, (2) concrete duty may conflict with the general moral obligation. An officer of the State, in executing his official duty, may be compelled to commit actions the injustice of which he recognizes, and to omit others which according to his moral conviction are just. A judge may be compelled by the laws in force to acquit in cases where clear insight and moral consciousness condemn, and to condemn where reason and morality acquit. There are also cases in which the concrete duties of one's official calHng or to his family claim his whole attention and activity in such a way that faith in the practise of love toward one's neighbor is considerably impaired. Again (3) a conflict of duties exists when concrete duty is opposed to concrete duty. Thus duty toward the State and duty toward the family may conflict; also duty toward the Church and duty toward the State; duty toward the Church and duty toward t he family Even specific duties of one sphere may conflict with each other; duty toward children and III.-15
duty toward wife or husband, duty toward one's caUing and duty of obedience to the authorities. Only one whose vision has been obscured by abstract theories can think that such conflicts are only apparent and imaginary, or due to defective moral development. On the contrary, moral character intensifies them.
The cases of Abraham (Gen. xxii.), Jephthah (Judg. xi. 34-40), David (II Sam. xxiv. 12-14), and others present conflicts of duties in the Old Testament; in the New Testament there are conflicts in Matt. viii. 22, xvii. 24 sqq. In conflict between faithfulness to confession and obedience to the secular authori- Biblical ties (Matt. x. 17 sqq.; John xvi. 2) Illustra- the Lord exhorted to a strength which, tions. even in martyrdom, would maintain the freedom of religion (Acts iv. 19, v. 29); but he foresaw that not all would find this strength (cf. Luke xiv. 18 sqq.). Paul also felt the conflict between his duty to attack Judaism and the love for his people (Rom. ix. 1 sqq.).
According to the old casuistry, there ought to be a solution of every conflict. The most important and correct rule that has been Solution, laid down is that the duty of right precedes the duty of love. Apart from such rules, the solution is often expected from the perfect development of Christian character. This view might be correct if conflicts originated inwardly; but their peculiarity consists in the pressure of external demands upon the moral consciousness, and thus they may be rather intensified by the development of Christian character (Matt. X. 34). There is, however, a deep-rooted conviction in the consciousness of redemption possessed by God's children that such conflicts can not disturb the peace and joy of the state of grace (John xiv. 27, XV. 11, xvii. 13) since the attainment of the highest good is independent of our actions. When a Christian father of a family, for instance, finds himself forced to neglect the duty of educating his children, on account of his duty to support his family, there is after all no solution of the conflict in the inevitable choice of the latter duty before the former; the conflict rather becomes continuous. In many cases self-renunciation must take the place of an actual solution. Conflicts of duty may be looked upon not only from the personal, but also from the social point of view. Public reforms and progress often make their way through conflicts of duty. Where consciences sleep there are no conflicts; but where men with living conscience take hold of duties and earnestly desire their fulfilment there will grow from the conflicts of duties energetic efforts for their redress. In all conflicts the believing Christian ought to remember not only the words of Luke xvii. 10, but also of I John iii. 19-21. See Casuistry; Conscience; Duty: and Ethics.
(L. Lbmme.)
Bibliography: J. E. Erdmann, Veber Kollision der Pflichten, Berlin, 1853; G. Schulze, Ueher den Widerstreit der Pflichien, Halle, 1878; H. L. Martensen, Christian Ethics, § 139, 5 vols., Edinburgh, 1865-82; F. H. R. Frank, System der christlichen Sittlichkeit, i., § 22, pp. 7 sqq., Erlangen, 1884; and in general treatises on ethics and casuistry.
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