THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
ticularism, a system of morals binding on everyone. The thought was plausible by reason of the fact that among the peoples of the earth a far-reaching unanimity in moral judgment actually prevailed. This agreement seemed merely to have been brought to light by social intercourse, though in reality it had been, for the most part, created by such intercourse. The vehicle for the development of the thought was metaphysics and the psychology of the idealistic philosophy. By converting Plato's archetypal " ideas " into immanent, active " logoi " and combining these into a single " logos," which they identified with the Godhead, the Stoics reached the conception of a divine world-reason, of which the reason of the individual is a part. It manifests itself in the dictates of finite reason as the imperative law of the Godhead. Knowledge of this natural moral law is instinctive and a priori, it being perceived by means of intuitively evident " common notions" (Gk. koinai ennoiai). Although these ideas were designated as " innate " (emphytoi) before Cicero's time, he was really the first so to regard this original outfit of the practical reason, and, too, not only in embryo but also in general outline, inasmuch as the germs of moral laws are found in the animal impulses to procreation and care for the young, and since the four cardinal virtues are already pre-formed in the sense of perception for truth, social order, size and independence, and fitness and harmony. Under the emperors this thought was taken up in Roman jurisprudence, when Roman society had exchanged its national for a cosmopolitan character. To the arbitrary laws of man, changing with time and place, conditioned by practical considerations, and not always perfect, it opposes the natural law, sanctioned by God, universally valid and unchangeable— the perfect law, and the standard for all statute-law.
This Stoic conception was brought into Christian theology by the apologists to establish the truth of revelation and fix a boundary between In Christianity and Judaism. Their argu-
Christian ment was, that the eternal, universal, Theology, natural law, because it had been obscured by sin, was publicly promulgated by Moses and afterward confirmed by Christ, with the repeal of the ceremonial and political adjuncts. At first the natural moral law, this fundamental postulate of Christianity, which was intended to explain, establish, and put into effect the ethical knowledge already at hand, was conceived as an original endowment of the reason. Then the natural moral law, together with the conception of natural right, became in the church system the foundation of the new law revealed in Christ, which takes into account the supernatural purpose of man. This new law transcends both the natural and the Mosaic law, in that it applies to intention as well as to overt act, demands spiritual acts that cultivate grace, and finally gives the Evangelical Counsels (see Consilia Evangelica). The fact that the natural law was regarded as obscured gave to the Church, as the custodian of revealed law, the control and administration of the laws of the land.
In contrast to the Roman Catholic conception of Christianity as nova lex, the Reformation recognizes Jesus as Redeemer only, and not as In the law-giver. It sees in the natural law Refor- the recognition of man's supernatural mation. destiny, which is imparted to him with the creation of the reasoning faculty; and, consequently, it includes in natural law, and the Mosaic law confirming the same, the highest demands of Christianity; viz., humility, dependence, humble trust in God, etc. Since, however, as regards its content, the natural law is obscured and requires the grace of God to make it appear in all its splendor, the assertion that it is innate is nothing but an expression of the feeling of obligation to meet the Christian demand. If this is to move conscience, then the soul must be formed in accordance with it. Further, the conception of natural law served in the conflict with the visionaries to separate the parts of the Mosaic law that were universally binding from those that were binding on the Jews alone. Finally, it established the independence of the temporal authorities as opposed to the Church, since the external acts it regulates are discovered by the reason. With Melanchthon comes the title under which this humane basis of Greco-Roman ethics was used to teach the Gospel and prove its truth. In the sequel natural right and natural moral law became the means of emancipation from the continued activity of Roman Catholic motives in Protestantism.
The theocratic conception of the State as the
guardian of both tables made the State responsible
for the true worship of God and the
Further salvation of its subjects. Now, through
Develop- the further development of the idea of ment. natural law, a new conception gains the ascendency, which regards the State as a human institution having as its object temporal peace. Revelation had always shown itself as a source of freedom of personality, and, at the same time, as the tyrannizing domination of a foreign will. As a means of emancipation from this supernatural authority of revelation representatives of Deism and the Enlightenment (qq.v.) made use of the traditional innate moral law. In philosophical ethics rationalism and empiricism are here opposed to each other. According to the rationalistic view, either the truth of absolute ethical imperatives, like that of mathematical and logical axioms, brings its evidence to conscience intuitively, or else, as Kant maintains, the moral law followed from the formal power of the reason to apprehend the unconditioned or posit unity. On the other hand, the empiricists hold that the moral law is only the sum total of those rules of life, learned by experience, which, if followed, will bring the greatest possible amount of satisfaction to a pre-moral instinct, either the egoistic, the altruistic, or both. The fact that among different peoples, and in different ages, the moral law has not always had the same content, has made it evident that the moral consciousness has had a history, that it is the result of a gradual development. With this new viewpoint the old antagonism between rationalism and empiricism becomes absorbed in that between ideal-