RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPEDIA
Voss Vows
tioning’ by silence, by the father or husband of daughter’s vow or wife’s.
The making of a vow is regarded in religious law as not an absolute religious duty (cf. Deut. xxiii. 22 sqq.). But the caution is often repeated that once made it must be kept. For the making of vows that can not be performed a penalty is provided in Lev. v. 4 sqq., but ef. Eccles. v. 4 sqq. The New Testament did not reach a high ethical standard in the matter (but cf. Matt. xv. 5), since it did not consider the cases in which the paying of a vow conflicted with higher duties. Yet the case of Jephthah might have induced such consideration.
(F. Buut.)
II. In the Church: Connected with the idea of a personal God with whom his creatures have personal relations is the conception of services and gifts which they may offer to him, and thus also of religious acts by which they pledge certain services expressly to him. This is the most general notion of a religious vow (cf. the short definition of Thomas Aquinas, ‘‘ A promise made to,God’’). Ina narrower sense, the word conveys the idea of the promise of something which the promiser does not strictly owe to God, or which he is not already bound to give or perform. The impulse to make such a promise may come from the desire to show gratitude and devotion to God by offering him something of special value; or it may be thought of as a means of advancing in communion with God and in the achievement of perfection; or without such definitely religious motives, it may be offered as giving some sort of a right to receive a desired favor in exchange.
While the Old Testament (see I, above) presents vows as, under certain conditions, a natural part of a religious life, it tells nothing that is necessarily decisive for Christian ethics; nor does the New Testament contain any positive teaching on the
subject. From the mouth of Christ
2. New- there is only a sharp word for those
Testament who vow to the temple service that Indications. with which they should have supported their parents (Matt. xv. 4; Mark vii. 10). The epistles are silent as to vows. In Acts (xxi. 23-26) it is stated that Paul on one occasion took part in the fulfilment of a vow made by certain brethren of Hebrew birth; but the circumstances do not make it a commendation of vows as such to other Christians, since what Paul did came from loving care for the brethren, not out of any conviction of the intrinsic value of a vow. The reference to a vow in Acts xviii. 18 is obscure. In any case it was not a real Naziritic vow such as the old covenant provided for (see NAZIRITES), since this could be performed only at Jerusalem, but merely a private vow. It is possible, if the person in question was Paul and not, as the order of the words would suggest, Aquila, that he felt the need, amid the severe conflicts which beset him in Corinth, of devoting himself the more to God by an outward expression analogous to that of the Nazirites; but no more than this purely symbolic meaning can be deduced from it. Acts v. 1-4 can not be cited in this connection, as nothing is said of Ananias having made his offering in the form of a vow.
1. Basal Ideas.
Views on the subject in general must therefore be formed from the universal principles of Christian ethics as contained in the New Testament and attested by the Christian conscience. The idea of a gift which the pious soul feels compelled to consecrate to God is of the very essence of Christianity. But this gift is nothing less than that of the whole person, will, and life (cf., e.g., Rom. vi. 11, 13, vii. 4; Gal. ii. 20; II Cor. v. 16). This self-dedication to God takes place at baptism, together with the reception of divine grace and the entry upon a new life. The promise made then (and at confirmation) may fairly be called a vow in the usual meaning of the word; but nothing is promised which is not already obligatory. It is justified as the formal expression of the internal impulse called forth by the appeal of redemption (I John iv. 19; Rom. viii. 14 sqq.).
The concrete individual development of the moral life leads to the conception of various special objects of solemn promise, and to that of special vows.
Two kinds of duties and promises may
3. Ethics of be distinguished: (1) the general eththe Vow. ical duties imposed by the community and accepted by the individual, and
(2) special acts or manners of ethical conduct which the individual takes upon himself, either to make progress in the spiritual life or to express a particular sense of obligation toward God. The first class of duties are imposed both by Church and State, as well as by voluntary associations, and solemn promises are required from their members. But these (e.g., the marriage vow) hardly come within the definition, being made rather to the community than to God (see OaTH). As to the second class, an examination on approved ethical principles will show that a Christian may, of his own free impulse, undertake to promise to God certain special acts or manners of life which are not of universal obligation, either divine or human. In such a course the logical limits of freedom and obligation must be preserved in their due proportion; and it is true of such promises that they are implicitly involved in the general or baptismal vow to love and serve God with all one’s heart. It must be remembered also that all action is conditioned by a variety of subjective and objective circumstances which may alter from time to time. What seems now a positive duty may some day be superseded by a more pressing one, and man must then be free to follow the higher call. There may be cases in which a vow to remain unmarried should be taken by an Evangelical Christian; but if he is to make it unconditionally, he must be absolutely sure that he will never be placed in a position in which it would be better for him to be married. An unconditional vow of the sort may amount to tempting God, with no promise of a blessing in return; and the same may be said of the pledge required by total-abstinence societies. If the formal expression of the resolve becomes a burden on the conscience, it exposes the soul to an additional danger; in that case such special and formal vows will be required only seldom and under extraordinary circumstances in the life of Evangelical Christians. In most cases their place will better be taken by an earnest laying before God of the impulses of devotion, with a prayer
Vows Wackernagel
to be kept firm in purpose. Any civil compulsion to the observance of vows should of course be excluded; in cases where one’s relation to an association or to another person is confirmed in the form of a vow addressed to God, the principles which govern all contracts will naturally be enforced, while the obligation as taken in the sight of God will be left to the conscience of the individual.
The view of Roman Catholics on this whole matter is entirely different. They distinguish from the duties to which. the ordinary Christian is bound an-
other and higher class of duties, im- 4. Roman posed not by divine command but by Catholic an ‘‘ Evangelical counsel ’’ whose non- Doctrine. observance is in itself no sin, but the following of which brings a special reward and greater perfection. These counsels cover especially voluntary poverty, obedience, and celibacy, and are connected with the doctrine of works of Supererogation (q.v.). Roman Catholic theologians divide vows into personal and real, the latter concerning property, and they give to the former the higher place. Again, a vow may be for life or for a definite time. It may be solemn (publicly pronounced before the church and accepted by it, as in the case of monastic vows and of the tacit vow of celibacy made at ordination to the sub-diaconate), or simple. Older Roman Catholic theologians used to attempt to demonstrate the existence of a precedent for vows in the practise of the apostles and of the mother church at Jerusalem, especially in its community of goods. It is possible to trace back Christian vows in the sense of voluntary promises as far as the doctrine of works of supererogation can be traced; and this can not be ignored in the ‘‘ Shepherd ”’ of Hermas. The resolve, amounting to a vow, of life-long celibacy occurs first among women (as early as the Apostolic Constitutions, iii. 2 and iv.; Ignatius, Ad Polycarpwm, v.). The history of further development is that of monasticism in general. To the doctrine of works of supererogation, on which this system of vows rests, organized Christianity adhered, and so undertook to regulate and enforce the making and observance of vows, finally drawing even simple or private vows within its jurisdiction. By present Roman Catholic practise dispensations from vows can be granted by the pope alone in five cases, in others:by the bishop. The Church will not permit vows which prejudice the rights of a third person, or those made by minors without the consent of their parents. It attempts to compel observance of vows by force, especially in the case of the monastic vow, and employs the aid of the secular power when possible.
The medieval view of vows, represented most thoroughly by Thomas Aquinas, was combated even before the Reformation by Johann Pupper von Goch (q.v.) in De libertate Christiana (probably
1473) and Dialogus, maintaining that
5. Evangel- God has given but one law and proical Views. posed but one sort of perfection to all
Christians. Luther took his stand on
the all-embracing character of the baptismal vow, to which other vows were derogatory. Carlstadt was the first to advocate the release of monks from their vows; but Luther ended by going to the root