THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
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Two other forms of determinism have received wide attention, the first of which has been associated with T. H. Green: one is free in his choices so far as his action is determined by nothing but himself. The man himself and his circumstances being what they are at a stated juncture, the determination of the will is already given—a different determination would require a different man. Choice expresses one’s character, interest, attention, motive; action has its roots in character (Works, ii. 318 sqq., London, 1893; cf. J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, p. 94, New York, 1901). The second of these views, in the interest of monistic personal idealism, maintains that every individual will is free so far as its life is unique, in some respect underivable from all other wills, or so far as it is a self and not mere temporal phenomenon and different from the Absolute. It is conceived as an act of attention, occurring only at the moment, never before, never afterward, individual, yet incapable of complete causal explanation (J. Royce, The World and the Individual, ii. 337 sqq., New York, 1901; M. W. Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, ib. 1911). C. A. BEcKWITH.
BrstiograpHy: Among the works on the history of the doctrine may be named: F. Keller, Spinoza und Leibniz tiber Willensfreiheit, Erlangen, 1847; C. E. Luthardt, Die Lehre vom freien Willen . . . in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung, Leipsic, 1863; O. Liebmann, Ueber den individuellen Beweis fiir die Freiheit des Willens, Stuttgart, 1866; H. T. Buckle, Hist. of Civilization, new ed., 3 vols., London, 1869; T. Wildauer, Die Psychologie des Willens bei Sokrates, Platon und Aristoteles, 2 parts, Innsbruck, 1877-79; W. Gass, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, 3 vols., Berlin, 1881-87; L. Braiutigam, Leibniz und Herbart, tiber Willensfreiheit, Heidelberg, 1882; H. Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, London, 1886, 2d ed., 1888; J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, pt. 2, bk. I., ch. i., §§ 1, 5, 3d ed., Oxford, 1891; idem, Study of Religion, bk. III., ch. ii., 2 vols., ib., 1888; H. Alexander, Theories of Will in the History of Philosophy, New York, 1898; M. Krieg, Der Wille und die Freiheit in der neuern Philosophie, Freiburg, 1898; K. Dunkmann, Das Problem der Fretheit in der gegenwirtigen Philosophie, Halle, 1899; J. A. Froehlich, Fretheit und Notwendigkett als Element einer etnheitlichen Weltanschauung, Leipsic, 1908; J. Verweyen, Das Problem der Willensfretheit in der Scholastik, Heidelberg, 1909; K. Zickendraht, Der Streit zwischen Erasmus und Luther tiber die Willensfreiheit, Leipsic, 1909.
Works ef epochal importance are: The Ethica of Aristotle (see the article for editions and translations); Augustine’s De gratia et libero arbitrio, Eng. transl. in NPNF, 1 ser., v. 443 sqq.; Isaac of Antioch, Predestinatus; B. Spinoza, Die Ethica, e.g., Leipsic, 1875; D. Hume, T'reatise on Human Nature, 3 vols., London, 1739-40, ed. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888; J. Edwards, A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of the Freedom of the Will, Boston, 1754, new ed., London, 1856 (discussed by J. Dana, An Examination of Pres. Edwards’ Inquiry on Freedom of the Will, New Haven, 1773; J. Day, An Examination of Pres. Edwards’ Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, New Haven, 1821; T. T. Crybace, An Essay on Moral Freedom, etc., Edinburgh, 1829; H. P. Tappan, A Treatise on the Will containing a Review of Edward's ‘‘ Inquiry, &c.,’’ New York, 1839, Glasgow, 1857, A. T. Bledsoe, An Examination of President Edwards’ Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, Philadelphia, 1845; W. B. Greene, Remarks in Refutation of the Treatise of J. Edwards on the Freedom of the Will, West Brookfield, Mass., 1848; J. G. Stewart, Freedom of the Will Vindicated; or, Pres. Edwards’ Necessarian Theory Refuted, Glasgow, 1876); G. W. Leibnitz, Nouveaux essais, book II., ch. xxi., in @uvres philosophiques, Amsterdam, 1765; J. Priestley, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, London, 1777; I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunfi, Riga, 1781; J. F. Herbart, Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, Gottingen 1836; A. Schopenhauer Dve beiden Grund-