But Lubbertus likewise reasons by an argument taken from the common definition of justice, to which Twisse also refers. " Vindi- catory justice," says he, " is the eternal will of God to give to every one his own; therefore, it belongs truly or naturally to God." Twisse cites these words from Lubbertus; for his writings against Vossius I have not by me at present. Now, although this justly celebrated man sometimes agrees to this conclusion, yet as he twitches^ the ar- gument various ways, we shall, as briefly as possible, bring it in
' See Eom. i. 32. » See Exod. xxxiv. 7. ^ Ps. v. 4-6.
* Being founded on the words of Scripture. — Tn.
* " Objects to the nrgnment ou various gi'ounds, Tvhich we shall, as briefly ns pos- sible, cousider in succession." — Eu.
LUBBERTUS DEFENDED. 601
regular order to a point. " First of all," says he, " allow me to put you in mind that that definition of justice holds good only with re- gard to justice in general, but not with regard to vindicatory justice in particular; for the whole of justice is employed in giving to every one his own." I have said before that that definition of the civilians was not quite agreeable to me, nor in every respect satisfactory. But the objection of Twisse is of no weight: for vindicatory justice is not distinguished from universal justice, or justice generally so called, as to its habit, but only in respect of its egress to its proper object; and, therefore, nothing ought to be included in the definition which is not found also in the thing itself Although, then, the learned op- ponent throws obstacles in the way, he cannot deny that vindicatory justice is " a will to give to every one his own, or what is due to him."
" But let Lubbertus bethink himself," says Twisse, " whether the divine bounty is not likewise the eternal will of the Deity to give to some beyond what is their own. Would it not, then, justly follow that it is necessary, and even from absolute necessity, that he should exercise his bounty towards some?"
But neither is this comparison between things dissimilar of the smallest advantage to our adversary's cause: for, — 1. The objects themselves about which these attributes are employed are very different ; for who does not see that there cannot be any comparison formed between the giving to every one according to his right, and giving to some beyond their right? That to give to any one beyond his right is a most free act of the will, the thing itself declares; but to give to every one his own, or what is due to him, the very thing itself requires. All acknowledge that it depends on the mere good pleasure of the Deity whether he may will to be bounteous towards any; but who but an impious wretch would be bold enough to dis- pute whether he may will to be just towards any? But besides; supposing a constant will in the Deity of giving to some beyond their right, or of bestowing on them more than they deserve, in what re- spect it Avould not be necessary (the question does not respect abso- lute necessity) to him to exercise that bounty towards these some, I absolutely do not comprehend. But with regard to the divine bounty, and in what sense that is ascribed to God, and what kind of habitude of the divine will it denotes, this is not the place to inquire.
He again says : " If hence it follow that it is necessary that God should give to each his due, it will certainly be necessary that he should give to each of us eternal damnation."
That punishment belongs not to us, but to God himself, the learned gentleman will afterward acknowledge. But God may give to every one his own, or what is due to every one, in the infliction of punishment, although he do not inflict it on the sinners themselves, but on their surety, substituted in their room and stead. Thus he
G02 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART II.
gives glory to his justice, and does no injury to us: for no one can demand it as his right to be punished ; for no one hath a right to require punishment, which is an involuntary evil, but r.ather becomes subject to the right of another.
To these he replies: " If justice be only the will of giving to every one his own, it is not the necessity of giving it."
But here the learned gentleman trifles; for will and necessity are not opposed, as a thing itself may be prior, and the mode or affection of it posterior, to some other things, either in the first or second act.^ Neither hath any one defined the justice of God by necessity, although from his justice it is necessary that he should act justly. Though it be the will of God, namely, " to give every one what is his due," yet it is a constant and immutable will, which, as it differs not in any respect from the divine essence itself, must exist necessarily; and a proper object for its exercise being supposed, it must necessarily operate, though it act freely.
In the last place, then, this celebrated writer denies that "punish- ment can properly be called ours, in such a sense that, from his will of giving to every one his own, it should be necessary that God should inflict it upon us sinners;" but he asserts that " it belongs to God, as ha\dng the full power either of inflicting or relaxing it." That punish- ment is ours, or belongs to us, cannot be said with propriety ; it must be traced to the source whence it hath its rise, — that is, whence it is just that it should be inflicted upon sinners; but this is the just right or righteous judgment of God, Rom. i. 82. Thus far, then, it may be reckoned among the things that belong to God, as it is his justice that requires it should be inflicted. But it does not follow that God has a full power of inflicting it or relaxing it, because in this sense it may be accounted among the things which belong to him. God owes it to himself to have a proper regard to the honour of all his own perfections.