The learned Twisse, when about to reply to the arguments of Lub- bertus,^ brings forward two assertions of his, to the first of which he consents, but not to the latter. The first maintains " coiTective justice to be essential to God," which he approves ; and herein Ave congratulate this very learned man that thus far, at least, he assents to the truth, and in so doing hath given cause to the Socinians to grieve. But, that "it is natural to God to hate and punish sin," which is Lubbertus' second assertion, he denies. The nicety of his discrimination here is truly astonishing ; for what is God's hatred against sin but this corrective justice? How, then, is it possible that that justice should be natural to God, and the hatred of sin not so likewise? I very well know that the learned man will not allow that there is any such aftection as hatred in God, properly so called. What is it, then, else than the constant will of punishing sin? but that is the very vindicatory justice of wliich we treat. Besides, if to hate sin be not natural to God, then it is a thing free and indifferent to him ; he may then not hate it ; he may, according to the opinion of Scotus formerly mentioned, as approved by Twisse, will its contrary, — that is, he may love and approve of sin, though " he be of purer eyes than to behold iniquity."" But, with good reason, he farther
' Namely, Twisse's Te.
' A learned protestant divine, who was born in Friesknd, and lived 1556-1625. He wrote several works against IBellarmine, Socinus, Armiuius, etc., but bis best work is said to be " De PapS, Eomana." — Ed.
6.96 A. DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART II.
maintains that "mercy is essential to God, and yet that it is not necessary that he should show mercy to any one ; but of his free good pleasure he showeth mercy to whomsoever he showeth mercy." We have again and again before shown that justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise, are different. God is under no obli- gation to exercise mercy towards any one, but he owes it to him- self to preserve his own natural right and dominion over his rational creatures ; and the learned gentleman cannot show that there is any such obligation, arising from the nature of the thing itself, between remunerating justice and liberality, on which he next insists, and their objects, as there is between corrective justice and its objects.
But he brings a grievous charge, no less than even that of atheism, against this sentiment of Lubbertus, and on a double account: for, first, he says that " hence it follows that God is a necessary and not a free agent;" and he calls that proposition a spreading gan- grene. 1. But theologians agree, and without any risk of atheism, that God is, in respect of his operations within himself, a necessary agent. 2. If it be necessary that God should do any thing upon some condition supposed, is he therefore to be accounted a necessary and not a free agent? Perhaps never any one hath made God more a necessary agent than Twisse himself doth, for he everywhere maintains, that upon the supposition of a decree, it is necessary that God should do all things in conformity to it; which, however, I do by no means mention as finding fault with. Upon the supposition of a decree, for instance, God could not but create the world ; but is he therefore to be called a necessary agent in the creation of the world? By no means. But you will say, " That necessity flows from the free will of God, but that which you dream of arises from the principles of his nature, and therefore how widely difterent!" I willingly grant, indeed, that the decree of creating the world flowed from the free will of God ; but this being supposed, it was necessary to the divine nature, which is immutable, that it should be created. Nor do we ascribe any other kind of natural necessity to God in punishing sins. The decree of creating rational creatures bound to render him obedience, and so far liable to his right and dominion, and that he willed to permit these creatures to transgress the law of their creation, flowed merely from his free will ; but these things being once supposed, it necessarily belongs to the divine nature, as it is just, to punish those who so transgress. But that God exerciseth a con- comitant liberty in punishing them, we have several times allowed, and we have no doubt but, if this be atheism, it is also Christianity.
Secondly, " Is God at all bound," says our very learned antagonist, "or in any manner obhged, to manifest his justice, more than to manifest his mercy, munificence, and liberality? It is evident that God is not bound to exercise any one property whatever more than
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another. Wherefore, either all things must be said to be necessarily perfonned by God, and even that the world was not made of his free will, but from a natural necessity; or that all things have been, and still are, freely done by God.'' But besides that this reasoning is sophistical, it injures not our cause. The whole matter may be clearly explained in one word : God is not absolutely bound to mani- fest any property of his nature, much less one more than another, for this respects the free purpose of God ; but upon a condition sup- posed, God may be more bound to exercise one property than another, for this relates to its exercise. But none of us have said that it is necessary that God should punish sin because he is necessarily bound to demonstrate his justice: in this very thing he demonstrates his jus- tice indeed ;^ but it is necessary that he should punish sin because he is just. The learned writer then confounds the decree of manifesting the glory of the divine properties, to which God is absolutely bound by none of his properties, with the exercise of these properties upon a condition supposed ; which we have endeavoured to prove to be necessary with respect to vindicatory justice.