But forasmuch as Socinians^ argue from the divine dispensation with regard to the punishment of sins to the free pardon of them without any satisfaction, we must say a few things in reply to this argument of our learned antagonist, as it seems pretty near akin to them, and as they are so Very eager in wresting every thing to favour their own side of the question.
The divine dispensation, then, with the punishment of sins, re- spects either temporary or eternal punishment; but a temporary punishment may be considered either in respect of monitory threats or of a peremptory decree, and both in respect of the time of the in- fliction and of the degrees in the punishment to be inflicted. But God, as the avenger of sin, is considered in Scripture in a two- fold point of view: — 1. As the Legislator" and supreme Lord of the Jews and their commonwealth ; whose state, from that circumstance, Josephus calls a "theocracy:" or, 2. As the supreme Lord and just Judge of the universe. If these considerations be propeily attended to, the subtleties of Crellius are easily dissolved: for God, as the Legislator and supreme Ruler of the Jewish republic, ofttimes dis- pensed with temporary punishments, as denounced in his threaten- ings, both as to the place, degree, and time of their execution; but God, as the supreme Lord and just Judge of the universe, doth not dispense with the eternal punishment of sin, to be inflicted at the proper and appointed time. The learned Twisse's fourth argument remains only to be considered.
" God is able," says he, " to inflict any torture, however great, even an infernal one, upon any person, without the consideration of
1 That is, their relation to their objects, or their qualities considered in this point of view, is different. Divine justice necessarily operates towards its object to punish the sinner, otherwise it would not be justice; but as no creature can merit any thing of Cod, it depends on God's good pleasure whether he bestow rewards or not. — Tk.
3 Crellius, " Of the True Religion," p. 308.
VOL. X. 38
594 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART II.
any demerit; therefore, he is also able, notwithstanding the greatest demerit, to suspend the greatest punishment whatever. The ante- cedent hath been proved ; the consequence from it is notorious, as God is more willing to do good than to punish."
Ans. 1. We have before observed that this mode of reasoninor does not always hold good in theology ; neither, however, in the second place, are these opposites, namely, to inflict torture and to suspend punishment, for torture and punishment are dift'erent. But to inflict an infernal punishment upon any innocent person is a thing impossible; for punishment supposes a transgression: and, therefore, not to inflict punishment upon a guilty person is also im- possible ; for transgression, from the very nature of the thing, requires punishment. But it is astonishing that this learned writer should insist on the proof of the sequel, namely, " That God is more will- ing to do good than to punish," as he hath many times, by very strong arguments, disallowed the natural inclination of the Deity towards the good of the creature ; nor will he ever be able to prove that God is inclined to bestow such kind of benefits on a sinful creature as are opposite to the punishment due to sin, without re- gard to Christ and his satisfaction. But that difference respects a will commanding and exhorting according to morality, not decreeing or acting naturally.
And these are what this learned writer calls his " principal argu- ments;" in which he contends that God can let sin pass unpunished without any satisfaction. I hope that impartial judges, however great respect they may have for the name of Twisse, will not be offended that I have made these short answers to his arguments; as certainly they have been conducted without violence or sarcasm, and by no means from any weak desire of attacking so very illustrious a man, for whose many and great qualities none can have a greater re- spect. But I have engaged in this task from an earnest desire of preserving undiminished the glory of divine justice, and of estab- lishing the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ, lest the Socinians should wrest to their purpose the argimients of this learned man, on the principal of which they place a principal dependence, and by which they acknowledge that they have been induced to adopt heretical opinions.
Our very learned antagonist adds other arginnents to these ; some of which have been satisfactorily answered by Maccovius; others be- long not, according to our view of it, to the present controversy ; and others will come to be considered in our vindication of the arguments of Piscator and Lubbertus, impugned by this celebrated writer, of which we shall take a short review, and, therefore, shall not now enter into any particular consideration of them.
LUBBERTUS DEFENDED. 595
CHAPTER XV.
The defence of Sibrandus Lubbertus against Twisse — The agreement of these very learned men in a point of the utmost importance — A vindication of his argu- ment from God's hatred against sin — Liberality and justice different — The opinion of Lubbertus undeservedly charged with atheism — What kind of necessity of operation we suppose in God ; this pointed out — The sophistical reasoning of this learned writer — How God is bound to manifest any pro- perty of his nature — The reasons of Lubbertus, and Twisse's objections to the same considered — That passage of the apostle, Rom. i. 32, considered and vindicated — His' mode of disputing rejected — The force of the argument from Rom. i. 32 — The " righteous judgment of God," what — Our federal re- presentative, and those represented by him, are one mystical body — An answer to Twisse's arguments, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7 — The learned writer's answer respecting that passage — A defence of the passage — Punitory justice a name of God — Whether those for whom Christ hath made satisfaction ought to be called guilty — Ps. v. 4-6, the sense of that passage considered — From these three passages the argument is one and the same — Lubbertus' argument from the definition of justice weighed — How vindicatory justice is distin- guished from universal — The nature of Hberality and justice evidently differ- ent— Punishment belongs to God — In inflicting punishment, God vindicates h's right — Will and necessity, whether they be opposite — The end of the de- fence of Liibbertus.