But he introduces some as making answers to his argument, who affirm "That Christ was not innocent, but a sinner by imputation, and made sin for us; and that it was necessary from the essential justice of God, and his authority, as enjoining that he should make atonement for sin in himself and in his own person."^
I applaud the prudence of this learned man, who, from no kind of necessity, hut freely, frames answers to his own arguments. Here he has exhibited such a one as nobody but himself would have dreamed of ; for although what your crazy disputants, or this learned divine, fighting with himself, say be true, he must, however, be a fool who can believe that it has any relation to the present subject. To those adversaries who urge that "God freely punishes sin because he jDunished his Son who knew no sin," and who contend that " God may equally not punish the guilty as punish the innocent," we answer, that Christ, though intrinsically and j^ersonaUy innocent, yet as he was by substitution, and consequently legally, guilty, is no instance of the punishment of an innocent person; for he was not punished as the most innocent Son of God. Passing over these things, then, — and indeed they are of no import to the present subject, — he endeavours to prove, by several arguments, that God laid our sins upon Christ
1 '• Necessary from the essential justice of God that he should suffer the punishment due to sinners, either in his own proper person, or in that of a surety." — Ed.
VOL. X. 39
610 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [ PART IT.
by constituting him surety, and from no necessity of nature. But even this effort is of no service to his cause, for this we by no means deny ; so that his labour is entirely superfluous. At length, however, in the progress of the dispute, this learned gentleman advances some arguments that seem suitable to his purpose.
"We readily grant," says he, "upon supposition that Christ was made our surety by the decree of God, that he could not be but punished by God, and yet freely, as God created the world of mere free will, though necessarily, in respect of his immutability; for it cannot be that a free action should impose on God a natural or physical necessity of doing any thing."
We have shown before what kind of a necessity we ascribe to God in punishing sins. It is not an inanimate or merely physical.neces- sity, as if God acted from principles of nature, in a manner alto- gether natural, — that is, without any intervening act of understanding or will; for "he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will." But it is such a necessity as leaves to God an entire con- comitant liberty in acting, but which necessarily, by destroying all antecedent indifference, accomplishes its object, — namely, the punish- ment of sin, — the justice, holiness, and purity of God so requiring. But this necessity, though it hindereth not the divine liberty, any more than that which is incumbent on God of doing any thing in consequence of a decree, from the immutability of his nature, yet it arises not from a decree, but from things themselves particularly constituted, and not as the other kind of necessity, from a decree only. And, therefore, in those things which God does necessarily, merely from the supposition of a decree, the decree respects the thing to be done, and affects it antecedently to the consideration of any necessity incumbent on him ; but in those whose necessity arises from the demand of the divine nature, a decree only supposes a certain con- dition of things, which being supposed, immediately, and without any consideration of any respect to a decree, it is necessary that one or another consequence should follow. As, for instance : after God de- creed that he would create the world, it was impossible that he should not create it, because he is immutable, and the decree immediately re- spected that very thing, namely, the creation of it. But the necessity of punishing sin arises from the justice and holiness of God, it being supposed that, in consequence of a decree, a rational creature existed, and was permitted to transgress; but he punishes the transgression which he decreed to permit because he is just, and not only because he decreed to punish it. The necessity, then, of creating the world arises from a decree; the necessity of punishing sin, from justice.
"But it is impossible," says Rutherford, "that a free action can impose a natural or jjhysical necessity of doing any thing upon God."
But by a " free action" it can be proved that certain things may be placed in such a condition that God could not but exercise certain
EUTHERFOED REVIEWED. 611
acts towards them, on account of the strict demand of some attribute of his nature, though not from a pliysical and insensible necessity, which excludes all liberty of action ; for it being supj)osed that in consequence of a free decree God willed to speak with man, it is necessary from the decree that he should speak, but that he should speak truth is necessary from the necessity of his nature. Suppos- ing, then, a free action, in which he hath decreed to speak, a natural necessity of speaking truth is incumbent on God, nor can he do otherwise than speak truth. Supposing sin to exist, and that God willed to do any thing with regard to sin (although perhaps this is not in consequence of a decree), it is necessary, by necessity of nature, that he should do justice, — that is, that he should punish it ; for the righteous judgment of God is, "That they which commit such things," namely, who commit sin, "are worthy of death." There are cer- tain attributes of the Deity which have no egress but towards certain objects particularly modified, for they do not constitute or create objects to themselves, as other divine attributes do ; but these objects being once constituted by a free act of the divine will, they must necessarily, — for such is their nature and manner, — be exercised.