RUTHERFORD REVIEWED. 615
He proceeds, in the fourth place: "God," says he, "worketh nothing without himself from a necessity of nature." This objection hath Leen already answered by a distinction of necessity into that which is absolute and that which is conditional, nor shall we now delay the reader by repeating what has been said elsewhere. " But to punish sin," says he, " is not in any respect more agreeable to the divine nature than not to punish it; but this is an act of grace and liljerty, — that is, an act which God freely exerciseth."
But, according to Rutherford, " it is much more disagreeable," to speak in his own words, " to the divine nature to punish sin than not to j)unish it; for not to punish it, or to forgive it, proceeds from that mercy which is essential, but to punish it from that justice which is a free act of the divine will. But such things as are natural and necessary have a previous and weightier influence with God than those which are free and may or may not take place." Our learned author means, that setting aside the considera- tion of his free decree, God is indifferent to inflict punishment or not inflict it. But by what argument will he maintain this absurd position ? Does it follow from this, that God is said in Scripture to restrain his anger, and not to cut off the wicked ? But surely he is not ignorant that such declarations of divine grace have either a respect to Christ, by whom satisfaction for sin was made, or only denote a temporal suspension of punishment, till the day of public and general retribution.
In the fifth place, he maintains " That a natural necessity Avill admit of no dispensation, modification, or delay ; which, however, it is evident that God either uses, or may use, in the punishment of sin."
A ns. With respect to absolute necessity, which excludes all liberty, perhaps this is true ; but with respect to that necessity which we maintain, which admits of a concomitant liberty in acting, it is alto- gether without foundation. Again : a dispensation with or delay of punishment regards either temporary punishment, with which we grant that God may freely dispense, when the immediate end of that punishment hath not a respect to the creatures in that state of subjection which they owe to God; or eternal punishment, and in respect of that, the time of inflicting it, etc., and freely to appoint it, belong entirely to God; — but that he should inflict the punishment itself is just and necessary.
Nor does that instance, brought from the various degrees of punish- ment, at all avail him, — namely, " That if God can add or take away one degree of punishment, then he may two, and so annihilate the whole punishment : " for we are speaking of punishment as it in- cludes in it the nature of punishment, and is ordained to preserve God's right and dominion over his creatures, and to avenge the purity
CI 6 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART II.
and holiness of God ; not of it as, in consequence of the divine wis- dom and justice, being this or that kind of punishment, or consisting of degrees. For thus far extends that liberty which we ascribe to God in the exercise of his justice, that it belongs to him entirely to deter- mine, according to the counsel of his will, with regard to the degrees, mode, and time to be observed in the infliction of punishment ; and no doubt but a proportion of the punishment to the faults is observed, so that by how much one sin exceeds another in quality, by so much one punishment exceeds another punishment in degree; and in the in- fliction of punishment, God has a respect to the comparative demerit of sins among themselves. We acknowledge, indeed, that God acts differently with persons in the same situation, but not without a re- spect to Christ and his satisfaction. The satisfaction of Christ is not, indeed, the procatarctic cause of that decree by which he deter- mined such a dispensation of things; but the mediation of Christ, who was made sin for those to whom their sins are not imputed, is the foundation for the actual administration of the whole of that decree, respecting that part of it which consists in the dispensation of free grace and sparing mercy. What this learned writer adds, namely, " That not to punish is sometimes an act of severe justice, and that therefore God does not punish from a necessity of nature," is grossly sophistical : for not to punish denotes either the total re- moval of punishment altogether, as is the case with the elect, for whom Christ died, which, so far from being an act of severe justice, this learned man will not deny to proceed from the highest grace and mercy; or it denotes only a suspension of some temporal punish- ment, and for a short time, to the end that sinners may fill up the measure of their iniquity. But this is not, properly speaking, not to punish, l)ut to punish in a different manner, and in a manner more severe, than that to which it succeeds.
What observations our learned author adds in the close of his argu- ments are either sophistical or very untheological. He says, namely, " That God, influenced by our prayers, averts even an eternal punish- ment after that we have deserved it." But what ! is it to be imputed to our prayers that God averts from us the wrath to come? What occasion is there, pray, then, for the satisfaction of Christ ? We have hitherto been so dull and stupid as to believe that the turning away from us of punishment, which has a respect to our faith and prayers, consisted in the dispensation of gi'ace, peace, and the remission of the sins for which Christ made satisfaction, and that God averted from us no deserved jwuishment but what was laid upon Christ, " who hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, by being made a curse for us."