A fine show of reasoning ; but there is no real solid truth in it, for all is false.
In what sense sin deserves punishment from the necessity of the divine nature, we have already shown at large. Neither, however, do we think ourselves bound to teach that God could not forbid sin but under the penalty of eternal death ; for we hold that not one or another kind of punishment is necessary, but that punishment itself is necessary, and the punishment, according to the rule of God's wisdom and justice, is death. Moreover, a rational creature, con- scious of its proper subjection and obediential dependence, being created and existing, God did not account it at all necessary to forbid it to sin by a free act of his will, under one penalty or another; for both these follow from the very situation of the creature, and the order of dependence, — namely, that it should not transgress by withdrawing itself from the right and dominion of the Creator, and if it should transgress, that it should be obnoxious and exposed to coercion and punishment. But it being supposed that God should forbid sin by an external legislation, the appointment of punishment, even though there should be no mention made of it, must be coequal with the prohibition.
" But God," says he, " in his human court forbids sin by a modi- fication of the punishinent annexed ; as, for instance, theft, under the penalty of a quadruple restitution : why may he not do likewise in his own internal court, and consequently suspend all punishment?"
There is no need of much disputation to prove that there is nothing sound or substantial in these arguments. The modification of punish- ment respects either its appointment or infliction. Punishment it- self is considered either in respect of its general end, which is the punishment of transgression, and has a regard to the condition of the creatures with respect to God ; or in respect of some special end, and has a respect to the condition of the creatures among themselves. But whatever modification punishment may undergo, provided it attain its proper end, by acconjplishing the object in view, the nature of punish- ment is preserved no less than if numberless degrees were added to it. As to the establishment of punishment, then, in a human court, as it has not primarily and properly a respect to the punishment of trans- gression, nor a regard to the condition of the creatures with respect to God, but with respect to one another, that degree of punishment is just which is fit and proper for accomplishing the proposed end.
The punishment, then, of theft by a quadruple restitution had in its api^ointment no such modification conjoined with it as could render it
1 " Et moderari et suspendere," — " In his ovrn inteiual court loth mitigate aud sus- pend," etc. — Ed.
614 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PAllT II.
unfit and improper in respect of the end proposed, among that people to Avhom that law concerning retributions was given ; but as the inflic- tion of punishment, according to the sentence of the law, depended on the supreme Ruler of that people, it belonged to him to provide that no temporal dispensation with punishment exercised by him, in right of his dominion, should turn out to the injury of the commonwealth.
But hence this learned writer concludes, " That in his own in- ternal court God may modify and susj)end punishment."
We can only conjecture what he means by the "internal court'" of God. From the justice of God the appointment of punishment is derived ; but that is improperly called a court. How far God is at liberty, by this justice, to exercise his power in pardoning sins the Scriptures show. The just right of God is, " that they who commit sin are worthy of death." " But he may modify the punishment," says our author. But not even in a human court can any such modi- fication be admitted as would render the punishment useless in re- spect of its end ; nor, in respect of God, do we think any degree or mode of punishment necessary, but such as may answer the end of the punishment, so far as respects the state of the creatures with re- spect to God. Nor is any argument from a human court applied to the divine justice, nor from the modification to the suspension for a limited time, nor from a suspension to the total punishment, all which this learned author supposes, of any force.
The sum of the whole is this, as we have laid it down, — That God must necessarily, from his right and justice, inflict punishment on sin, so far as this punishment tends to preserve the state of the crea- ture's dependence on its Creator and proper and natural Lord; so, whatever constitutions or inflictions of punishment, with any particu- lar modification or dispensation, we have admitted, these do not, as the supreme judgment of all is reserved to the destined time, at all operate against our opinion.
The other reasons advanced by this learned author in support of this argument are not of sufficient weight to merit attention. It hath been clearly proved already that the supposition of the pardon of sin, without an intervening satisfaction, implies a contradiction, though not in the terms, in the very thing itself. Nor does it follow that God can Avithout any punishment forgive sin, — to avoid which all rational creatures are indispensably bound from his natural right over them, — because any distinguished action among mankind, to the performance of which they are bound by no law, may be rewarded, there being no threatening of punishments for the neglect of it an- nexed, that has a respect to a privilege not due.^ By such conse- quences, drawn from such arguments, tlie learned gentleman will neither e.stablish his own opinion nor prejudice ours. ' See Suarcz de Len-ib. Priv.