OF god's prescience or foreknowledge. 137
(4.) The fourth proposition, That God by the free actions of men (some whereof he foretelleth) doth fulfil his own counsel as to judg- ments and mercies, rewards and punishments, needs no farther proof or confirmation but what will arise from a mere review of the thino-s before mentioned, by God so foretold, as was to be proved. They were things of the greatest import in the world, as to the good or evil of the inhabitants thereof, and in whose accomplishment as much of the wisdom, power, righteousness, and mercy of God was manifest, as in any of the works of his providence whatever. Those things which he hath [so] disposed of as to be subservient to so great ends, certainly he knew that they would be. The selling of Joseph, the crucifying of his Son, the destruction of antichrist, are things of greater concernment than that God should only conjecture at their event. And, indeed, the taking away of God's foreknowledge of things contingent renders his providence useless as to the govern- ment of the world. To what end should any rely upon him, seek unto him, commit themselves to his care through the course of their lives, when he knows not what will or may befall them the next day? How shall he judge or rule the world who every moment is surprised with new emergencies which he foresaw not, which must necessitate him to new counsels and determinations? On the con- sideration of this argument doth Episcopius conclude for the pre- science of God, Ep. ii., " ad Beverovicium de termino vitse,"^ which he had allowed to be questioned in his private Theological Dispu- tations,'^ though in his public afterward he pleads for it. The sum of the argument insisted on amounts to this : —
Those things which God foretells that they shall certainly and in- fallibly come to pass before they so do, those he certainly and infal- libly knoweth whilst they are future, and that they will come to pass; but God foretells, and hath foretold, all manner of future contin- gencies and free actions of men, good and evil, duties and sins: there- fore he certainly and infallibly knows them whilst they are yet future.
The proposition stands or falls unto the honour of God's truth, veracity, and power.
The assumption is proved by the former and sundry other instances that may be given.
He foretold that the Egyptians should afflict his people four hun-
' " Speciera et pondus videtur habere lisec objectio; nee pauci sunt, qui ejus vi adeo moventur, ut divinam futurorum contingentium prteicientiam negare, et quce pro ea facere videntur loca, atque argumenta, magno couatu torquere nialint, et flcctere in sensus, non minus periculosos quam difficiles. Ad me quod attinet, ego hactenus sive religioue quadam animi, sive divincc majestatis reverontia, non potui prorsus in animum meum inducere, rationem istam allegatam tanti esse, ut propter earn Deo futurorum contingentium prsscientia detrahenda sit; maxime cum vix videam, quomodo alioquin divinarum prsedictionum Veritas salvari possit, sine aliqua aut incertitudinis macula, aut falsi possibilis suspicione." — Sim. Episcop. Respons. ad 2 Ep. Johau. Beverovio.
' Episcop. Instit. Thcol lib. iv. cap. xvii. xviii. ; Episcop. Disput. de Deo, tlies. 10.
188 VINDICI^ EVANGELIC^.
dred years, that in so doing they would sin, and that for it he would punish them, Gen. xv, 13, 14; and surely the Egyptians' sinning therein was their own free action. The incredulity of the Jews, treachery of Judas, calling of the Gentiles, all that happened to Christ in the days of his flesh, the coming of antichrist, the rise of false teachers, were all foretold, and did all of them purely depend on the free actions of men ; which was to be demonstrated.
3. To omit many other arguments, and to close this discourse: all perfections are to be ascribed to God; they are all in him. To know is an excellency; he that knows any thing is therein better than he that knows it not. The more any one knows, the more ex- cellent is he. To know all things is an absolute perfection in the good of knowledge ; to know them in and by himself who so knows them, and not from any discourses made to him from without, is an absolute perfection in itself, and is required where there is infinite wis- dom and understanding. This we ascribe to God, as worthy of him, and as by himself ascribed to himself To affirm, on the other side, — (1.) That God hath his knowledge from things without him, and so is taught wisdom and understanding, as we are, from the event of things, for the more any one knows the wiser he is; (2.) That he hath, as we have, a successive knowledge of things, knowing that one day which he knew not another, and that thereupon there is, — (3.) A daily and hourly change and alteration in liim, as, from the increasing of his knowledge there must actually and formally be; and, (4.) That he sits conjecturing at events; — to assert, I say, these and the like monstrous figments concerning God and his knowledge, is, as much as in them lieth who so assert them, to shut his provi- dence out of the world, and to divest him of all his blessedness, self- sufficiency, and infinite perfections. And, indeed, if Mr B. believe his own principles, and would speak out, he must assert these things, how desperate soever; for having granted the premises, it is stupidity to stick at the conclusion. And therefore some of those whom Mr B. is pleased to follow in these wild vagaries speak out, and say (though with as much blasphemy as confidence) that God doth only conjecture and guess at future contingents; for when this argument is brought. Gen. xviii, 19, " ' I know,' saith God, 'Abraham, that he will command his children and his household after him,' etc., there- fore future contingents may be certainly known of him," they deny the consequence ; or, granting that he may be said to know them, yet say it is only by guess and conjecture, as we do.^ And for the present vindication of the attributes of God this may suffice.