A Brighter Day Begins with His Word.

John Owen • SECTION 87

Section 87

← The Works of John Owen — Volume 12

' Anonymus adv. cap. priora Matth., p. 28. " Ncgo consequent iam : Deus dicere potuit se scire quid facturus erat Abraham, etsi id certo non prasnoverit, sed probabi- liter, Inducitur enim Deus saepius humano more loquens. Solent autem homines afiBrmare se scire ea futura, qiiaj verisimiliter futura sunt," etc.

OF god's prescience or foreknowledge. VS9

Before I close this discourse, it may not be impertinent to divert a little to that which alone seems to be of any difficulty lying in our way in the assertion of this prescience of God, though no occasion of its consideration be administered to us by him with whom we have to do.

" That future contingents have not in themselves a determinate truth, and therefore cannot be determinately known," is the great plea of those who oppose God's certain foreknowledge of them ; "and therefore," say they, "doth the philosopher affirm that propositions concerning them are neither true nor false." ^ But, —

1. That there is, or may be, that there hath been, a certain predic- tion of future contingents hath been demonstrated ; and therefore they must on some account or other (and what that account is hath been declared) have a determinate truth. And I had much rather conclude that there are certain predictions of future contingents in the Scripture, and therefore they have a determinate truth, than, on the contrary, they have no determinate truth, therefore there are no certain predictions of them. " Let God be true, and every man a liar."

2. As to the falsity of that pretended axiom, this proposition, " Such a soldier shall pierce the side of Christ with a spear, or he shall not pierce him," is determinately true and necessary on the one side or the other, the parts of it being contradictory, which cannot lie together. Therefore, if a man before the flood had used this pro- position in the affirmative, it had been certainly and determinately tnie ; for that proposition which was once not true cannot be true afterward upon the same account,

3. If no affirmative proposition about future contingents be de- terminately true, then every such affirmative proposition is determi- nately false ; for from hence, that a thing is or is not, is a proposition determinately true or false.^ And therefore if any one shall say that that is determinately future which is absolutely indifferent, his affirmation is false ; which is contrary to Aristotle, whom in this they rely upon, who affirms that such propositions are neither true nor false. The truth is, of propositions that they are true or false is cer- tain. Truth or falseness are their proper and necessary affections, as even and odd of numbers; nor can any proposition be given where- in there is a contradiction, whereof one part is true and the other false.

4. This proposition, " Petrus orat," is determinately true de prae- senti, when Peter doth actually pray (for " quicquid est, dum est, determinate est") ; therefore this proposition de future, " Petrus orabit," is determinately true. The former is the measure and rule

' Arist. lib. i. de Interp. cap. viii.

' Alphons. do Mendoza. Con. Theol. Scholast. q. 1, p. 534 ; Vasquez. in 1 Tho. disp. 1 6 ; Ruvio in 1, Interpret, cap. vi. q. unica, etc.

140 VINDICI^ EVANGELiaE.

by which we judge of the latter. So that because it is true de presenti, "'Petrus orat;" ergo this, de future, " Petrus orabit," was ab seterno true (ex parte rei). And then (ex parte modi) because this proposition, " Petrus orat," is determinately true de prsesenti ; ergo this, " Petrus orabit," was determinately true from all eternity.^ But enough of this.

Mr B. having made a sad complaiut of the ignorance and darkness that men were bred up in by being led from the Scripture, and im- posing himself upon them for " a guide of the blind, a light of them which are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, and a teacher of babes," doth, in pursuit of his great undertaking, in this chapter instruct them what the Scripture speaks concerning the being, na- ture, and properties of God. Of his goodness, wisdom, power, truth, righteousness, faithfulness, mercy, independency, sovereignty, infinite- ness, men had before been informed by books, tracts, and catechisms, " composed according to the fancies and interests of men, the Scrip- ture being utterly justled out of the wa}'." Alas ! of these things the Scripture speaks not at all ; but the description wherein that abounds of God, and which is necessary that men should know (whatever be- come of those other inconsiderable things wherewith other poor cate- chisms are stuffed), is, that he is finite, limited, and obnoxious to passions, etc. " Thou that abhorrest idols, dost thou commit sacri- lege V

CHAPTER VI.

Of the creation, and condition of man before and after the fall. MR BIDDLE's third CHAPTER.

Ques. Were the heaven and earth from all eternity, or created at a certain time? and by whom?

Ans. Gen. i. 1.

Q. How long was God a making them?

A. Exod. XX. 11.

Q. How did God create man 9

A. Gen. ii. 7.

Q. How did he create woman?

A. Gen. ii. 21,22.

Q. Why was she called woman ?

A. Gen. ii. 23.

Q. What doth Moses infer from her being made a woman, and brought unto the tnan ?

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