20. In the first chapter of his third book he again attempts an opposition unto this righteousness of God. “Justitia ista,” saith he, “cui vos satisfaciendum esse omnino contenditis, in Deo non residet, sed effectus est voluntatis ipsius. Cum enim Deus pecca- tores punit, ut digno aliquo nomine hoc opus ejus appellemus, jus- titia tunc eum uti dicimus.” Therefore it seems do we deal benignly with God; and what he doth only in anger and fury we give ita worthy name, and say he doth it in righteousness! But what shall we say when God himself ascribeth his punishing of sin to his jus- tice and judgment in governing the world? This he doth plainly Ps. ix. 7, 8, 1. 6, xcviii. 9; Rom. i. 32, ii. 5. Shall he also be said to find out a worthy name for what he doth, though he do it on such accounts as wherein the thing signified by that name is not concerned? It is a hard task, doubtless, to prove that God doth not “judge the world in righteousness.” But he hath reason, as he supposeth, for his assertion; for he adds, “ Quod autem justitia ista in Deo non resideat ex eo maxime apparere potest, quod si ea in Deo resideret nunquam is ne minimum quidem delictum cuiquam
118 NECESSITY OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST [ EXERC. XXIX.
condonaret; nihil enim unquam facit aut facere potest Deus quod qualitatibus que in ipso resident adversatur. Exempli causa, cum in Deo sapientia et sequitas resideat, nihil unquam insipienter, nibil inique facit aut facere potest;’—‘ That there is no such justice in God appears from hence, that if there were, he could never forgive the least sin unto any; for God doth nothing, nor can do any thing, that is. contrary to the qualities which reside in him. For instance, whereas there is wisdom and equity in God, he can do nothing un- wisely, nothing unjustly.” So he. But he seems not to observe that herein he pleads our cause more forcibly than his own:/ for we say, that because this justice is a natural property of God, he can > do nothing against it, and so cannot forgive any sin absolutely with- out respect unto satisfaction made unto that righteousness; and when this is done, to pardon and forgive sin is no way adverse or contrary unto it. This whole difficulty is reconciled in the cross of Christ, and can be so no otherwise; for God set him forth to be a propitiation, eig tvdesEw HS dixasoobvyc, Rom. iil. 25; which when it is done, as pardon is a fruit or effect of mercy, so it is consistent with the severity of justice. See 2 Cor. v. 21; Rom. viii. 3; Gal. iii. 13, 14; Heb. ix. 13-15. And the whole ensuing discourse of Socinus in that chapter may be reduced unto these two heads:—First, A supposition that Christ did not nor could undergo the punishment due to our sins; which is to beg the matter in question, contrary to Scripture testimonies innumerable, many whereof I have elsewhere vindicated from the exceptions of himself and his followers. For let this be granted, and all his discourse about the impossibility of pardoning any sin, upon the supposition of such a righteousness in God, falls to the ground. And if he will not grant it, yet may he not be allowed to make a supposition on the contrary to be the ground of his argument whereby he endeavours to overthrow it. Secondly, He confounds the habits of justice and mercy with the acts of them. Hence would he prove an inequality betwixt justice and mercy, because there is so between punishing and pardoning. And so also God declares that he delights in mercy, but is slow to anger. But actually to pardon is no way opposite to justice, where satisfaction is made; nor to punish [opposite] unto mercy, where the law of obtaining an interest in that satisfaction is not observed. And all that God declares in the Scripture concerning his justice and mercy, with the exercise of them towards sinners, is grounded on the supposition of the interposition and satisfaction of Christ. Where that is not, as in the case of the angels which sinned, no mention is made of mercy, more or less, but only of judgment ac-_ cording to their desert.
21. The author of the Racovian Catechism manageth the same
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SECT. 21.] ON THE SUPPOSITION OF SIN AND GRACE. 119
plea against the vindictive justice of God, and gathers the objections unto a head, which Socinus more largely debated on, cap. viii. De Morte Christi. And although little be added therein unto what I have already cited, yet it containing the substance of what they are able to plead in this cause, I shall take a view of it in the words of these catechists: “Ham misericordiam et justitiam qualem hic adyersarii inseri volunt, negamus Deo inesse naturaliter. Nam, quod attinet ad misericordiam, eam Deo non ita natura inesse ut isti sentiunt hine patet; quod si natura Deo inesset non potest Deus ullum peccatum prorsus punire; atque vicissim si ea justitia natura Deo inesset ut illi opinantur, nullum peccatum Deus remitteret. Adversus enim ea, que Deo insunt natura, nunquam potest quid- quam facere Deus. Exempli causa, cum Sapientia Deo insit natura nunquam contra eam quidquam Deus facit, verum queecunque facit, omnia facit sapienter. Verum cum Deum constet remittere peccata et punire, quando velit, apparet Deo ejusmodi misericordiam et justitiam, qualem illi opinantur, non inesse natura, sed esse effec- tus ipsius voluntatis. Preeterea eam justitiam quam adversarii mi- sericordize opponunt; qua Deus peccata punit, nusquam litere sacree hoc nomine justitiz insigniunt, verum iram et furorem Dei appel- lant; imo justitiee Dei in scripturis hoc attribuitur cum Deus peccata condonat, 1 Joh. i. 9; Rom. iii. 25, 26.” And hereon they conclude that there was no need, nor can there be any use, of the satisfaction of Christ. Ans. First, The design of this discourse is to prove that justice and mercy are not properties of the divine nature; for if they be, it cannot be denied but that the sufferings of Christ were ne- cessary that sin might be pardoned. Now, herein we have against our adversaries the light of nature, and that not only as teaching us, by the conduct of right reason, that there is a singular perfection in these things, which must therefore be found in Him who is so the author of all goodness and limited perfections unto others as to contain essentially and eminently all goodness and perfection in himself, but also it is not difficult to evince the actual consent of all mankind who acknowledge a Deity unto this principle, that God is just and merciful, with that justice and mercy which have respect unto the sins and offences of men. There is, indeed, this difference betwixt them, that justice is ascribed unto God properly, as a habit or a habitual perfection; mercy analogically and reductively, as an affection. And therefore mercy in God is not accompanied with that sympathy and condolency which are mixed with it in our human nature. But that natural goodness and benignity whence God is ready to relieve, whereof his sparing and pardoning are proper effects, are that mercy of God which he represents unto us under the highest expressions of tenderness and compassion. See Ps. ciii.