122 NECESSITY OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST [EXERC. XXIX.
plies a contradiction to say that it doth so, and yet that it depends merely on the will of God. And in that book De Deo he hath other conceptions to this purpose: Cap. xxiii. p. 180, “ Est ratio ali- qua honestatis, circa quam Deus juste dispensare non potest;” and p. 186, “Deo indignum est contumacium scelera impunita demit- tere;” and cap. xxviii, “ Nec sanctitas nec majestas Dei usquequaque fert ut impune mandata ejus violentur.” If it be thus with respect unto some sins, it must not be because of sin, but only of some de- grees of sin, if it be not so with all sin whatever. And who can believe that the nature of sin is not contrary unto the holiness and majesty of God, but that some certain degrees only of it are so? and who shall give in that degree of sin when it becomes so inconsistent with God’s holiness and majesty? It is said that this is stubborn- ness and impenitency. But whoever sins once against God will be impenitent therein, unless relieved by the grace of Jesus Christ, which supposeth his satisfaction. And this is evident in the in- stance of the angels that sinned.
23. The defence which he makes of his former assertion, contain- ing the substance of what remains of their plea against the neces- sity of the satisfaction of Christ, I shall particularly examine, and put an end unto this Exercitation. He therefore pleads, “ Nemini sive puniat sive non puniat facit injuriam; siquidem de jure ipsius tantum agitur; neque enim nocenti debetur poena, sed is eam debet ; et debet quidem illi, cui injuria omnis ultimo redundat, qui in nostro negotio Deus est; jus autem suum si rem spectes ut persequi cuique licet, ita et non persequi, ac de eo quantumlibet remittere: hac enim juris proprii, ac dominici natura est.”
Ans. “Jus Dei,” dixasnua rot Oecd, “the right of God,” im this matter, is neither “jus proprium,” which answers the right of every private person, nor “jus dominicum,” or the right of absolute domi- nion, but the right of a ruler or supreme judge, whereunto the things here ascribed unto the right of God in this matter do not belong, as we shall see. For whereas he saith, first, “ That whether he punish or do not punish, he doth wrong to none,” it is granted that no wrong is done to men; for, by reason of his sovereignty, he can do them none. But where punishment is due unto any sin, it cannot be absolutely spared, without the wrong or impeachment of that justice in whose nature it is to require its punishment. It is not, then, pro- perly said that if God should not punish sin he should wrong any, for that he cannot do, do he what he will; but not to punish sin is contrary to his own holiness and righteousness. And for what he adds, secondly, “ That punishment is not due to the offender, but that he owes his punishment unto him against whom the injury is done, who in this case is God ;” I say, certainly no man ever imagined that
SECT. 23.] ON THE SUPPOSITION OF SIN AND GRACE. 123
punishment is so due to the offender, or is so far his right, as that he should be injured if he were not punished, or that he might claim it as his right. Few offenders will pursue such a right. And whereas it is said that the injury in sin is done to God, it must be rightly understood; for the injury that is done unto him hath no analogy with that which is done by one private man unto another. Neither doth our goodness add any thing to him, nor our sin take any thing from him: Job xxxv. 6-8, “If thou sinnest, what doest thou against him? or if thy transgressions be multiplied, what doest thou unto him? If thou be righteous, what givest thou him? or what receiveth he of thine hand? Thy wickedness may hurt a man as thou art; and thy righteousness may profit the son of man.” But that which is here called “injury,” is the transgression of the law of the righteous Judge of all the world; and shall he not do right? shall he not recompense unto men according to their ways? And therefore that falls to the ground which he adds as the proof of the whole: “ For as it is lawful for every one to prosecute his own right, so every one may forego it, remit of it, or not prosecute it, at his pleasure.” And this is that which is principally insisted on by them in this cause, namely, that the right of punishing being in God only, he may forego it if he please, seeing every one may recede from or not pursue his own right at his pleasure. But a person may have a double right. First, that which ariseth from a debt, or a personal injury. This every man may pursue, so as that hereby he wrongs not any unconcerned therein, nor transgresses any rule of duty pre- scribed unto himself; and every one may at his pleasure remit, so as no prejudice redound thereby unto others. But our sins in re- spect of God have neither the nature of debts properly, nor of per- sonal injuries, though they are metaphorically so called. And there is a right of rule or government, which is either positive or natural. Of the first sort is that which magistrates have over their subjects. Hereunto belongs the right of exacting punishment according to the law. Now, this is such a right as hath duty inseparably annexed unto it. This, therefore, a righteous magistrate cannot forego with- out destroying the end of magistracy in the public good. For a magistrate to say, ‘I have, indeed, a right to punish offenders in the commonwealth, but I will forego it, seeing all its exercise depends upon my will, is a rejection of his duty, and an abrenunciation of his authority. But, lastly, the right of God to rule over all is natu- ral and necessary unto him: so therefore is our obligation unto obedience, or obnoxiousness unto punishment. To say that God may forego this right, or remit of it, is to say that he may at his pleasure cease to be our Lord and God; for the same nature of God _ which necessarily requireth our obedience doth indispensably require