120 NECESSITY OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST [EXERO. XXIX.
8-14, And in such declarations of himself he instructs us in what apprehensions we ought to have of his nature; which if it be not gracious and merciful, we are taught by him to err and mistake. So when God showed unto Moses his glory, and made a declaration of himself by his name, he did it not by calling over the free acts of his will, or showing what he would or could do, if so be he pleased, but he described his nature unto him by the essential properties of it, that the people might know who ‘and what he was with whom they had to do, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7. And yet among them is that mercy reckoned which is exerted in the pardoning of iniquity, transgres- sion, and sin. The same is to be said concerning the justice of God; for this vindictive justice is nothing but the absolute rectitude of the nature of God with respect unto some outward objects, namely, sin and sinners. Had there, indeed, never been any sin or sinners, God could not in any outward acts have exercised either vindictive justice or sparing mercy; but yet he had been notwithstanding eter- nally just and merciful.
And there is this difference between the justice and mercy of God on the one hand, and his power and wisdom on the other, that these latter, being absolute properties of the divine nature, without re- spect unto any other thing, do constitute their own objects; so that in all the works of God he doth not only not act against them, but he cannot act without them, for all that he doth must necessarily be done with infinite power and wisdom. But for the other, they can- not outwardly exert or act themselves but towards objects ante- cedently qualified; whence it is enough that God neither doth nor can do any thing against them. And this he cannot do; for, secondly, it is weakly pleaded that if God be merciful, he cannot punish any sin. For to punish sin absolutely is no way contrary to mercy. If it were, then every one who correcteth or punisheth any for sin must needs be unmerciful. Nor is it contrary unto justice to pardon sin when satisfaction is made for it; without which God neither doth nor can pardon any sin, and that for this reason, namely, that it is contrary to his justice so to do. Thirdly, Whence God is said to pardon sin in his righteousness, or because he is right- eous, hath been declared before. His faithfulness in his promises with respect unto the mediation of Jesus Christ is so called, which our adversaries cannot deny.
22. Crellius in almost all his writings opposeth this justice of God, ofttimes repeating the same things; which it were tedious to pursue,—besides, I have long since answered all his principal argu- ments and objections, in my Diatriba de Justitia Divina. I shall therefore here only call one of his reasons unto an account, whereby he would prove that there was no necessity for making any satisfac-
SECT. 22.] ON THE SUPPOSITION OF SIN AND GRACE. 121
tion unto God for sin, because I find it to prevail among many who are less skilled in disputations of this nature. And this is that which he insists on, Lib. de Deo, cap. iii. de Potestate Deii He lays down this as a principle: “ Deus potestatem habet infligendi poenam, et non infligendi; justitize autem divine nequaquam repugnat pecca- tori, quem punire jure possit, ignoscere.” He is treating in that place about the supreme dominion and free power of God. And hereunto he saith it belongeth to inflict punishment, or to spare and pardon. But he is herein evidently mistaken: for although he who is absolutely supreme over all may punish and spare, yet it belongs not to him as such so to do: for punishing and sparing are the acts of a governor or judge as such; and unto God as such are they constantly ascribed in the Scripture, James iv. 12; Ps. ix. 8, 9; Gen. xviii. 25; Ps. 1. 6, xeiv. 2; Heb. xi 23. Now, it is one thing what may be done by virtue of absolute sovereignty and dominion, setting aside the consideration of rule and government, and another what ought to be done by a righteous ruler or judge. And whereas he says it is not contrary to justice to spare one who might de jure be punished, if he means by “a ruler may punish him by right,’ no more but that he may do so and do him no wrong, were there no more in the ease it might be true. But it is not thus at any time with sinners; for not only may God punish them and do them no wrong, but his own holiness and righteousness requires that they should be punished. And therefore the assertion, if accommodated to the cause in hand, must be this, “ It is no wrong to justice to spare them who ought to be punished ;” which is manifestly false. And Crellius himself grants that there are sins and sinners which not only God may punish de jure, but that he ought so to do, and that it would be contrary to his justice not to punish them: Adv. Grot. ad cap. i. p. 98, “ Deinde nec illud negamus rectitudinem ac justitiam Dei nonnunquam eum ad peccata punienda movere; eorum nempe quibus veniam non concedere, non modo zequitati per se est admodum consentaneum, verum etiam divinis decretis ut ita loquar debitum, quales sunt homines non resipiscentes, atque in peccatis contumaciter perseve- rantes; maxime si illud peccati genus in quo persistunt, insignem animi malitiam, aut apertum divine majestatis contemptum spiret, si enim hujusmodi hominibus venia concederetur, facile supremi rectoris majestas, et legum ab ipso latarum evilesceret, et gloria ipsius, quze pregcipuus operum ejus omnium finis est, minueretur.” What here he grants concerning some sins, we contend to be true concerning all. Neither do that justice, equity, and rule which require these sins of contumacy and impenitency to be punished, depend on a free decree or act of the will of God only, for then no. sin of itself or in its own nature deserves punishment. And it im-