iv. Thr Witness of Conscience.— The work of conscience lies, no doubt, within the moral sphere. But in considering the basis of ethics, we are led to see that moral action implies a reference to an infinite Personality as the ground and origin of man's personal being. Morality presupposes re- ligion as the basis of its possibility, ana prepares for religion through its incompleteness. Con- science, accordingly, as the supreme moral faculty, points beyond the merely moral sphere, and be- comes a witness to the truth of religion. The witness of conscience is not to be regarded as logical demonstration. In point of fact, spiritual realities cannot be reached by logical processes. The only valid argument for religious truth is that which proceeds by consideration of the constitution of man, and discerns in that con.stitution the necessity of the existence of a Divine Being in whose image man has been made. In that argu- ment, the witness of conscience forms an important element. To trace this witness fully belongs to dogmatics. We conclude this article by a bare outline of the direction which this witness takes.
1. God. — Conscience we have seen to he man's consciousness in action of right to be done. This U with eotial truth to be described as the revelntinn
of right within us, or the voice of God speaking in the soul of man. In moral action we are deal- ing with more than tlxe judgments of our fellow- men, with more even than our own judgment upoD ourselves. There is present in the court of con- science an inNasible Assessor, who is, indeed, the ultimate source and standard of right by which the judgment proceeds. Individual experience presents this line of proof with an intensity which 13 best expressed in silence. Biography and his- tory present the demonstration often ■vvith tragic articulateness. In conscience, the consciousness of God cannot be got rid of. It haunts the sinner in his revolt as shadow of doom. It accompanies the seeker in his upward movement with ever- growing confirmation. All other arguments for the being of God find their force increased by being combined with this. If the ontological argument leads us to a reason or universal self- consciousness, through man's relation to which knowledge is possible ; if the argument e con- tingentia Tnunai brings us to an eternal substance in which all things inhere ; if the teleological argu- ment requires a purpose fulfilling itself in creation, — thi moral argumen* enables us to define that reason, substance, purpose, as a Person whose very nature is righteousness. (See suggestive treatment in lUingworth, Personality, Lect. iv.)
2. Christ. — The constitution of man requires as its root a Personal God, to whom conscience in man ascribes moral perfection. But Personality is incon- ceivable apart from Self-revelation and Self-com- munication. An Incarnation of God, therefore, ia profoundly congruous with thedemand for God which arises out of the constitution of man. Jesus Christ is presented to the mind of man as such an Incar- nation. It vnll scarcely be denied that He used language regarding Himself which implies such a claim. It is certain that the Church with growing fulness has made it on His behalf. Conscience makes in in tensest form the demand for a Per- sonal God. It is fair, therefore, to ask if con- science is satisfied with the claim advanced for Christ. Here there is no hesitation in the answer. The conscience of humanity has recognized in Christ, in His teaching and in His life, the final revelation of Good. Christ is the conscience of humanity. The words of J. S. Mill are often and justly adduced as consenting to this dictum. ' Even now it would not be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life.' Here we have a moral argument, not only for Theism, but for Christianity. Conscience, as Domer finely says, becomes our ' iraiSayuiyis ' (Gal 3**), and "leads us through obedience into knowledge (Jn 7"). Faith in Christ, accordingly, is no longer an act unrelated to our moral life, but is itself a moral obligation.
3. Atonement. — Con.science, especially as en- lightened by Christianity, witnesses to infinite perfection. At tlie same time, it pronounces upon all our actions sentence of failure. Between the absolute good and the individual will there is ever a want of complete harmony. Conscience abates none of its condemnation, when action is largely harmon- ized with social institutions or codes of moral law. The more entirely it wins the mastery, the more stern is its refusal to be satisfied. Its demand is for absolute harmony with infinite good. Any breach it treats as infinite ; and lays upon the heart the burden, not of shortcoming merely, hut of guilt. The question of salvation, therefore, ia a moral question, ft is stated in Hebrews in this form. How can the conscience be cleansed from dead works to seree the living God? (He 9") How can the incubus of guilt be removed, so that
COXSCIEXCE
CONSORT
475
the will of man may act in unhindered harmony with the will of Uocl ? Two solutions conscience declines.
First, that of gratuitous forgiveness. God is ponietimes represented as saying, in virtue of His bare almighty will, ' I lorgive.' But mere sovereignty is mere unieason. And if to this be added, 'at the pronijiting of His tender heart,' the reply is still, mere feeling is mere unreason. In either case, the bupreme arbiter of life is repre- .sented as mere caprice ; and in order to save man from consequences of immoral act, we have con- founded the whole moral sphere. To conscience, sin is a moral fact, and not until sin is dealt with can the relations of God and man be adjusted on a permanent, i.e. on a moral, biisis.