B. OuTLiSE OF Christian Doctrine.
i. The Nature of Conscience. — The locus ctn.txicus here is Ro 2'*- ". The connexion of thought is the responsibility of all men for their actions, their condemnation in sin, their acceptance in righteous- ness. This apjilies to Gentiles as well as Jews. It would not apply had Gentiles no revelation of absolute good made to them, as the Jews had in the Law. Such a revelation, however, the Gentiles have. They (v.") do by nature, i.e. instinctively, the things wliicli are articulately prescribed in the Law, and accordinglj' while they have not the Law as a ^\^^tten code, yet they have it in another sense. In what sense is now explained (v."). The comparison in the apostle's mind is between Jew and Gentile, in respect of the delivery to each of God's Law. To the Jews, this delivery was made at Sinai, and so in speaking of its delivery to the Gentiles he uses Sinaitic imagery. The apostle's description involves three points. (I) The delivery of the Law in the dictates of natural impulse ; ' the work of the law,' i.e. a course of conduct conforming to the will of God, being ' written in their hearts,' as in the case of the Jews it was written on tables of stone. (2) The recognition of the Law in its binding obligations by a moral faculty, just as the Jews heard with bodily ear t!io proclamation of the Ten Command- ments ; ' their conscience bearing witness there- with,' i.e. along with the heart, when it speaks and prompts to duty. (3) .Judgments passed u|>on actions in the light of the witness of conscience, some being favourable, others (as the emphasis implies, the greater number) being unfavourable ; ' their thou<ditsone with another, accusing or else excus- ing them.'
The doctrine of this passage, borne out by other Scripture usage, tlierefore, is : (a) That man has received a revelation of good, sullicient to make biin morally responsible. This reve-
lation conies in dilferent forms to men differently placed in the providential disposition of affairs. Kven those who seem least advantageously situ, ated have the revelation of 'nature.' Man is so made that he finds the satisfaction of his true self in moral good only ; and towards this the forward imi)ulse of his heart goes forth. The race, charged with the special function of guarding and triiusmitting the spiritual heritage of human- ity, has ajipropriately a special revelation of good, explicitly hearing the stamp of superhuman origin. Finally, when 'the fulness of time' in the moral disci]iline of mankind is reached, the good linds complete revelation in a person, the man Christ .lesus. ' Nature,' with its few rudimentary facts of moral life, and ' Law,' with its greater articulate- ness, are summed up in ' Christ,' in whom moral good is perfectly realized. (/3) That man possesses a moral facultj', or is jjossessed by it, that he l^s a conscience, which is indeed his .self-consciousness in respect of moral action, in virtue of which he recognizes, ajjproves, and binds upon himself the Goocl, in whatsoever form it is revealed to him, and by the authority of which he pronounces judgment upon himself. This doctrine obviously rests upon the general scriptural doctrine of man as made in the image of Go<l, of man as spirit even as God is spirit or personality, a conception which we have seen to be the suggestion of philosophy in its criticism of unphilosophical sensationalist psycho- logy. God reveals His will to man, partially in Nature and Law, fully in Christ. Man as a spiritual being is susceptible of this revelation ; his consciousness of it in things moral is conscience.
This view of conscience greatly simplifies it, and reduces it from the position of an inexplicable faculty, fulminating in impotent majesty above the warring impulses of man s nature. It is simply the faculty, if we must u.se the term, through which we apprehend the divine will so that it may govern our lives. It is no more a separate faculty than faith, and deserves no more thap faith the credit of its operations. As faith lays hold of Christ, and thus saves and sanctifies ; sc conscience lays hold of the divine will, and thus legislates and judges. It is not an independent source of law and judgment. It voices the will of God.
It is plain, however, that this view, if in one sense it deprives conscience of the proud position which an intuitionist theory would confer u])()n it, in another confers ujion it unique and awful supremacy. When conscience wakes and speaks, it means that man is in spiritual contact with God, that God is making His will felt in the depths of man's constitution. Thus it is that ' to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it net, to him it is sin ' ; sin, not error or mistake, nor only shortcoming, but tres[iass against the law of God, which is recognized as the law of our own being, in keeping which our welfare lies.
The practical result is that conscience claims, and must receive if we are to be true to our very nature, a position of absolute supremacy. I'Acry action must be brought beneath its sway ; in popular phrase, we must make conscience of all we do. Actions laiil upon us by outward authority, we arc to do, not because the authority is supported by force, but because con.scienco re- cognizes the good of which this authority is an cxjiression ; ami .so we obey ' for conscience' sake ' (Ro l.'l"). Actions which seemingly lie outsi<le the moral judgment, bavin" apparently no relation to moral questions, are toTie brought before con- science and carefully scrutinized, so that even in such matters as what wo are to eat or refrain from eating, we are still to act 'for conscience' sake' (I Co lO^-*). The whole domain of life is to